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This dissertation extends John Rawls’s mature theory of justice out to address the
environmental challenges that citizens of liberal democracies now face. Specifically,
using Rawls’s framework of political liberalism, I piece together a theory of procedural
justice to be applied to a particular constitutional democracy. I show how citizens of
pluralistic democracies should apply this theory to environmental matters in a four stage
contracting procedure. I argue that, if implemented, this extension to Rawls’s theory
would secure background environmental justice. I explain why the theory can be viewed
as a partially specified political conception of environmental pragmatism, and how it
relates to public environmental policy and discourse. While the framework is
anthropocentric, it is one that reasonable non-anthropocentrists can endorse.
Using this theory of background environmental justice, I argue that liberal
democracies must take measures to secure basic environmental rights for all presently
existing and future citizens. Measures must also be in place to secure a minimum of
social goods (including environmental goods) that guarantees that all citizens (present
and future) can exercise their basic rights and liberties. Moreover, disparities in

environmental goods should only be tolerated if they arise in accord with Rawls’s
principle of fair equality of opportunity. This will require the saving of natural capital for
future generations. It also requires measures to maintain social structures that will enable
future citizens to compete for all other environmental goods and hardships in accord with
the requirement of fair equality of opportunity. Also, there are conditions under which
regressive ecological tax policies are justified. Moreover, due to Rawls’s constraint of
just savings, irrespective whether global climate change is caused by human activity,
citizens of liberal democracies should significantly reduce their use of petroleum and
coal, and turn to alternative forms of energy. I discuss carbon taxes, as well as carbon
allocation trading schemes. I also argue that free democracies should employ
precautionary reasoning when attempting to meet the demands of background
environmental justice.
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Introduction

There are many environmental matters that constitutional democracies must now deal
with on a routine basis. A short list of such issues include air and water quality,
sustainability, the protection of endangered species, the introduction of genetically
modified crops, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste management, human
population growth, water management, opening protected public areas to oil and gas
development, desertification, environmental justice (e.g., environmental racism, classism
and sexism), and global climate change. Moreover, many of these concerns have become
bona fide political issues that will likely increase in magnitude as time passes. It is not
surprising, then, that as these issues have become more acute in recent years, the
literature relating normative environmental philosophy, green political theory, and so on,
to public environmental policy has exploded, as well. It is unfortunate, then, that
normative environmental philosophers have paid insufficient attention to John Rawls
(1921–2002)—who is one of the most distinguished moral and political philosophers of
our time—especially after his shift from the moral to the political. One aim of this
project, then, is to fill in many gaps connecting Rawlsian political liberalism with
normative environmental philosophy.
Admittedly, Rawls has not been completely overlooked in the environmental
literature. In fact, there was an initial excitement towards the prospect of extending
Rawls’s justice as fairness into the domain of environmental ethics after his seminal
Theory of Justice (TJ). Still, the secondary literature concerning the relevance of Rawls’s
mature theory—his Political Liberalism (PL) and beyond—to practical environmental
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matters is still relatively scant. Moreover, many authors who have attempted to connect
Rawls’s theory to environmental policy have not applied his theory correctly. In what
follows, then, I shall not focus on the numerous criticisms of Rawls’s conception of
justice. Neither will I concentrate on how Rawls argued for his theory. Rather, my aim is
merely to develop a unique extension to Rawls’s mature theory of political liberalism. In
doing so, I wish to show how it can serve as a cogent framework for citizens within a
pluralistic constitutional democracy to utilize when they publicly discuss and adjudicate
such important environmental matters, and how it could ideally be used to secure
background environmental justice. By doing this, I hope to demonstrate the relevance of
this robust contractualist model of political justice to academic philosophers, policy
makers, as well as those working within the domain of contemporary
environmentalism—the ecology movement, the environmental movement, the green
movement, the conservation movement, etc.
In order to do this I will proceed as follows. First, it is necessary to explicate the
basics of Rawls’s own theory of justice before extending it into the domain of normative
environmental philosophy. Accordingly, the first chapter, ―Rawls’s Political Liberalism,‖
is a concise overview of the elements of Rawls’s Political Liberalism that relate to my
overall project. In it, I explain how Rawls argued for his theory, and why it is a form of
constructivism. I introduce the burdens of judgment, and the idea of an overlapping
consensus. I explain why Rawls’s viewed his mature theory as a free-standing conception
of justice, and why my extension is, similarly, not supposed to be committed to any
particular theory of the good. Other authors have argued that Rawls’s model is inadequate
as a normative ground for environmental ethics, and most environmental ethicists have
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given up on Rawls. Thus, I also begin to explain why his mature theory is a political
conception of justice, and not intended to be a comprehensive moral doctrine.
Of course, if Rawls’s finished theory were a comprehensive doctrine, it would be the
type of framework we might use to judge other things besides basic justice—e.g.,
people’s actions or moral character. Thus, as it relates to normative environmental
philosophy, it would be a serious misconstrual of John Rawls’s mature project to think of
it as we might J. Baird Callicott’s land ethic, which we should view as an entire
ecological worldview.1 However, changed from his earlier TJ, Rawls’s mature theory is
now merely a political conception of justice; and, hence, is intended to apply only to the
basic structure (i.e., the main social and political institutions) of a society composed of
citizens who possess conflicting religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.
Accordingly, my extension to Rawls’s theory should be a framework that any reasonable
citizen should—in principle—find agreeable. And this holds no matter whether his or her
comprehensive worldview is best described as ecocentrist, Kantian, feminist, atheist,
Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and so on.
Accordingly, my framework for Rawlsian background environmental justice must be
constructed upon ideas found within the public political culture of pluralistic
constitutional democracies that are capable of being an object of an overlapping
consensus. Thus, in chapter two, ―Examining the Anthropocentric Model,‖ I examine the
following elements of Rawls’s domestic model: (1) society as a fair system of
cooperation; (2) a well-ordered society is characterized as being effectively regulated by
a political conception of justice; (3) the idea of the basic structure of society; (4) Rawls’s

1

See J Baird Callicott , In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1989)
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original position of equality; (5) persons as free and equal; and (6) the idea of public
justification. I inspect these six items because they are the fundamental elements Rawls
used to construct his theory of political liberalism. I show how each of these relate to his
overall theory, as well as their potential bearing on any Rawlsian framework of
environmental justice. I illustrate Rawls’s three levels of justice (i.e., local, domestic, and
global), and emphasize that my extension to Rawls’s theory is merely a framework for
domestic background environmental justice. I explain that my extension of his political
liberalism must remain anthropocentric because a non-anthropocentric axiology could not
be the object of a reasonable overlapping consensus, and that a pluralistic society wellordered by non-anthropocentrism would not be stable for the right reasons. Nevertheless,
although the resulting model is anthropocentric, I argue that it is a political theory that
reasonable non-anthropocentrists should find attractive. Specifically, I argue that the
Rawlsian model of background environmental justice can be embraced by reasonable
non-anthropocentrists who wish to view themselves as free and equal citizens of a
constitutional liberal democracy.
Moreover, what is conspicuously missing in the environmental philosophy literature is
a robust examination of how Rawls’s mature theory is relevant to public environmental
discourse and public environmental policy decisions at the domestic level. This would
include discussion of Rawls’s emphasis on public justification, which includes the idea of
public reason and his liberal principle of legitimacy. Accordingly, within chapter three,
―Anthropocentric Public Reason and Political Legitimacy,‖ I argue that background
environmental justice can only be actualized if the fundamental systems that distribute
environmental goods and hardships favor no comprehensive theory of the good. I discuss
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Rawls’s principles of public reason and political legitimacy in more detail, and explain
their relevance to public environmental policy and discourse—e.g., pubic environmental
policies must be supported by reasons that could be an object of an overlapping
consensus of reasonable worldviews. I suggest that a society well-ordered by the
Rawlsian model would respect a wide variety of comprehensive moral doctrines, along
with a panoply of incompatible environmental values freely held by its citizens.
Following Rawls, I also maintain that political power is legitimate only when it is
exercised by a basic structure of society that all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can
endorse in the light of their common human reason. I consider how this principle is
applicable to a number of environmental issues, policies, and agencies.
Rawls’s theory has not been applied correctly within the literature on environmental
ethics and environmental justice. Rawls thought that his theory of justice should be
applied in a four-stage contracting sequence. The second stage is the constitutional
convention. Accordingly, within chapter four, ―Domestic Environmental Justice—The
Constitution,‖ I explain how Rawls’s first principle of justice—the equal liberty principle
(i.e. every person must have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for
all)—is to be applied to the constitution of a constitutional liberal democracy. I do not
address the criticisms made against Rawls’s priority of liberty by authors such as H.L.A.
Hart, Brian Barry, Henry Shue, and Norman Daniels. 2 Rather, I merely show how the
Rawlsian model of background environmental justice can incorporate constitutionally
protected basic environmental rights. Following, Rawls, I also argue that while the right

2

See Robert Taylor, ―Rawls’s Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction,‖ Philosophy &
Public Affairs 31 (2003): 246–271.
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hold personal property is a basic right that must be constitutionally protected, the right to
own and control a society’s means of producing goods and services is not. This implies
that a society that has attained background environmental justice would not view the right
to own natural resources (rivers, forests, mountains, etc.) as a basic property right. I also
suggest that a number of important environmental goods should be included within
Rawls’s constitutional social minimum.
In chapter five, ―Domestic Environmental Justice—Fair Equality of Opportunity,‖ I
move on to the legislative stage of the contracting process. I argue that at this point in the
Rawlsian heuristic the contracting parties will agree to implement certain federal
environmental laws, agencies, and policies. I contend that if an environmental good is
generally needed for citizens of liberal democracies to exercise their fundamental rights
and liberties, then it should be considered within the domain of the constitutionally
protected social minimum. Thus, at the legislative stage, the parties will agree to a variety
of measures that will assure that no citizen is denied his or her constitutionally guaranteed
amount of environmental goods. Moreover, I argue that the parties will employ
precautionary reasoning when deliberating about such matters. Accordingly, if a policy
might cause citizens to fall below the constitutionally guaranteed social minimum (e.g., it
might cause health problems or death), or if it could cause citizens to lose the
environmental goods they need in order to effectively exercise their basic rights and
liberties (safe levels of air, water, soil, etc.), the parties will not permit it unless the
scientific consensus is that it is safe.
Moreover, at the legislative stage, the contracting parties are employing Rawls’s
principle of fair equality of opportunity. Background environmental justice accordingly
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requires that once safe levels are established, disparities in environmental
goods/hardships only then be tolerated if they arise in accord with the principle of fair
equality of opportunity—i.e., all citizens must have a fair equal opportunity to be made
more or less advantaged by the disparities. This is part of how the present model explains
the wrongness of environmental racism, classism, etc. Securing this sort of fair equality
of opportunity (which is necessary for background environmental justice) will require
measures to avoid excessive concentrations of wealth, progressive taxation, as well as
universal education. I argue that background environmental justice also requires limits on
political lobbying, criminalizing the selling of the public trust, restrictions on corporate
speech, as well as campaign finance reform.
Like Rawls’s own framework of political liberalism (i.e., justice as fairness), my
extension is limited to a particular constitutional democracy. How, then, does background
environmental justice at the domestic level relate to the supranational arena? Within
chapter six, ―Diverging from Rawls’s Framework,‖ I explain Rawls’s own solution—The
Law of Peoples—and how my project differs from it. I do not employ a second
(international) agreement that governs relations between nation-states. While I believe
such a contractualist/contractarian project could be made viable (along the lines of Pogge,
Beitz, Barry, et al.), it is out of the scope of the present project to do so. Rather, I simply
suppose that, during the legislative stage of the domestic model, the contracting parties
are constrained by important supranational structures—such as reasonably just
international laws and treaties. I argue that this divergence from Rawls’s own system is
reasonable and realistic. Supposing legitimate international treaties on the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions can be actualized, I introduce three carbon rationing options a
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liberal democracy might employ in order to meet a particular ―cap‖ level: micromanaged
direct regulation, direct taxation of greenhouse gas emissions, and cap and trade schemes.
I begin to discuss the bearing the present model has on such policies—the concern that
carbon taxes could be regressive, that cap and trade schemes must comply with fair
equality of opportunity, etc.
Any account of Rawlsian environmental justice will be procedural (not allocative).
That is, a distribution of environmental benefits and burdens is just only when it arises
within a system of processes (within a liberal democracy) that is itself fair. I have been
referring to this as ―background environmental justice,‖ and to complete its description
we must consider the last two key elements of Rawls’s special conception of justice: the
principle of just savings, and the difference principle. I do so in chapter seven, ―Just
Savings and the Difference Principle.‖ Rawls thought that the principle of just savings (a
principle that all generations would want preceding generations to have followed) holds
between generations, and that the difference principle holds within generations. I suggest
(following Rawls) that during the legislative stage of the contracting procedure, the
principle of just savings is to constrain the application of the difference principle. Thus, I
argue that the demands of the equal liberty principle and the principle of fair equality of
opportunity must be extended for an indefinite number of future generations.
Thus, independently of the difference principle, background environmental justice
requires liberal democracies to take measures to guarantee basic environmental rights for
future citizens. Rawlsian sustainability implies not only that segments of the natural
environment must be restored and saved for future generations. It implies that human
made institutions (environmental agencies, policies, etc.) must be preserved, as well.
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Moreover, society must conserve enough natural and social capital to secure a social
minimum of environmental goods for future generations. In addition, certain amounts of
natural capital will need to be restored and saved so that future citizens can compete for
environmental goods/hardships in accord with the principle of fair equality of
opportunity.
I also briefly address Parfit-type non-identity environmental concerns—i.e., that future
citizens cannot be wronged by lax environmental standards and the destruction of
presently existing environmental goods. I suggest that the way to skirt the non-identity
problem is to avoid subjunctive comparisons altogether. With the prior principles in
place, I then address the full bearing of Rawls’s difference principle on a number of
issues such as public subsidies for green technology, cap and trade, carbon taxes, etc. I
provide several illustrations of how the model of background environmental justice can
be applied. The first is a critique of ―sky trust‖ proposals for curbing global warming.
The second involves mountaintop removal coal mining. Then, before moving onto the
next chapter, I argue that irrespective of whether global climate change is caused by
human activity, our generation has a duty of justice to significantly reduce our use of
petroleum and coal, and turn to alternative forms of energy.
Recently, under what has become to be known as ―environmental pragmatism,‖ some
have argued that environmental philosophers should give up on controversial axiological
claims, and instead focus on ―what works‖ as pragmatic solutions to our environmental
woes. Thus, in chapter eight, ―Rawlsian Environmental Pragmatism,‖ I argue that
because it is not part of a comprehensive theory of the good (i.e., it is not committed to
any particular moral or religious outlook), the extended form of Rawls’s mature theory I
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have laid out in the dissertation can adequately serve as a partially specified
environmental pragmatism. I admit, however, that my Rawlsian framework will not have
the overall shape that some environmental philosophers have thought an environmental
pragmatism would have. Environmental pragmatists argue that philosophers should stop
trying to use the idea of natural entities possessing intrinsic value as a foundation for a
viable environmental ethic. I argue that this is mistaken. An ecocentric axiology, for
example, seems entirely fitting for an environmental ethic. However, we must make a
fundamental distinction, like Rawls, between moral and political theory. Also, following
Rawls, I contend that while the principles generated by the Rawlsian model are the most
reasonable, we need not view them as being true. Thus, non-anthropocentric
environmental philosophers should continue to embrace non-anthropocentric axiologies
when explicating and defending their comprehensive moral theories. However, nonanthropocentrist thinkers ought to embrace Rawlsian background environmental justice
as a political theory. I maintain that it is merely political philosophers who should
abandon the notion of the intrinsic value of nature.

1
Chapter 1

Rawls’s Political Liberalism
Shortly after the publication of John Rawls‘s Theory of Justice (TJ), some authors
lamented that his unique version of social contract theory was unsuitable as a basis for a
comprehensive environmental ethic.1 Rawls would not balk at such accusations. In his
Political Liberalism (PL), Rawls readily admitted that his earlier theory failed to
adequately distinguish between moral and political philosophy. 2 A mature Rawls thought
that justice as fairness is not the sort of doctrine in moral theory that attempts to account
for all the particular first order moral judgments people make. These, I might add, would
include the various disparate value judgments concerning the natural environment now
made by citizens of pluralistic democracies—Christians, Muslims, atheists, Deep
Ecologists, ecofeminists, etc. If he had developed such a contractualist moral doctrine, it
would be called ―rightness as fairness.‖3 Rather, as a mere political conception of justice,
justice as fairness is now no longer part of a comprehensive doctrine and, accordingly, is
not supposed to do that sort of work.
In its most mature and refined form, we are to understand John Rawls‘s model of
political justice as free-standing. That is to say, the justice as fairness of everything he
published after, and including, PL is intended to operate free of substantial commitments

1

Here I am thinking of (in chronological order): Michael S. Pritchard and Wade L Robison, ―Justice and
the Treatment of Animals: A Critique of Rawls,‖ Environmental Ethics 3 (1981), 55–61; Russ Manning,
―Environmental Ethics and Rawls‘ Theory of Justice,‖ Environmental Ethics 3 (1981), 155–165; Brent A.
Singer, ―An Extension of Rawls‘ Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics,‖ Environmental Ethics 10
(1988), 217–231; Peter S. Wenz, Environmental Justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), ch. 11; Daniel P.
Thero, ―Rawls and Environmental Ethics: A Critical Examination of the Literature,‖ Environmental Ethics
17 (1995), 93–106.
2
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. xvii.
3
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 111.
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to particular comprehensive philosophical, moral, or religious doctrines. What
precipitated Rawls‘s switch to the political? Rawls thought that because of certain
inevasible burdens of judgment (i.e., causes of reasonable disagreement), reasonable
citizens could pass through narrow reflective equilibrium, into a state of wide reflective
equilibrium, and still possess radically different considered judgments about political
values.4 He argued that due to different experiences, conflicting evidence, the complexity
of data, variations in weighing considerations, and the vagueness of the concepts
involved, it is exceedingly improbable that the political judgments held by reasonable
citizens within a free constitutional democracy will ever converge. 5
So, in reaction to the fact that the burdens of judgment inevitably lead to a reasonable
pluralism, Rawls eventually viewed his justice as fairness as merely a mutual political
standpoint to which all the differing and conflicting reasonable worldviews of society
could acquiesce. This was a colossal change. Rawls claimed that—contrasted with his
earlier TJ—justice as fairness now addresses a different question. Namely: ―How is it
possible for those affirming a comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious, and in
particular doctrines based on religious authority, such as the Church or the Bible, also to
hold a reasonable political conception of justice that supports a constitutional democratic
society?‖6 We are now supposed to view his earlier theory as merely one of a number of
reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines to which a moral agent might subscribe, and
we are to think of his mature theory as one that any reasonable citizen of a liberal

4

Rawls earlier called these the ―burdens of reason.‖ See John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman
ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 475–478.
5
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001),
pp. 35–36.
6
John Rawls, ―Idea of Public Reason Revisited,‖ in his Collected Papers, pp. 614–615.
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constitutional democracy should hold—irrespective of her or his particular
comprehensive worldview.
Additionally, in shifting to the political, Rawls drastically changed his conception of
stability. Since his earlier justice as fairness was supposed to be just one of a number of
comprehensive theories reasonable citizens might hold, Rawls recognized that it is only
via the tyrannical use of governmental force that a society could be made stable (i.e.,
become well-ordered) by his earlier model.7 Still, even though reasonable citizens
undoubtedly have divergent worldviews, Rawls thought that they could still agree on a
political conception of justice. If a framework could be built on certain ideas that one
finds within the public political culture of pluralistic democratic societies (I shall discuss
these in detail in chapter two), he thought it would be uncontroversial enough to be the
object of an overlapping consensus.8 Accordingly, since reasonable citizens of a
pluralistic democracy, who possess radically divergent conceptions of the good, would
still reach an agreement on political justice (i.e., Rawls‘s mature framework of political
liberalism), such a consensus would be stable for the right reasons—and ultimately not as
a mere modus vivendi.9 Similarly, I am optimistic that a liberal democracy well ordered
by my extension to Rawls‘s conception of justice will not only have secured background
environmental justice—such a society will also be stable for the right reasons. However,
before discussing Rawls‘s test of stability, I shall briefly consider how Rawls‘s model
(and my extension to it) is best viewed as a form of political constructivism.

7

See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 37.
See Rawls‘s ―The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,‖ in Justice as Fairness, pp. 32–38.
9
See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 192.
8

4
Rawlsian Political Constructivism
Like Onora O‘Neill, Scanlon, Korsgaard, et al., Rawls is a constructivist. More
specifically, in Lecture III of his PL, Rawls adumbrates the ways one should view his
theory as a form of political constructivism. 10 In broad terms, my extension follows his
view in the following respects. Moral autonomy (vs. political autonomy) requires that a
moral agent undertake a deep philosophical process of questioning all her moral values.
Supposing that an agent has attained the age of reason, she must then consider a wide
variety of moral topics. She must investigate what (if anything) she truly believes
regarding such issues, and contemplate the nature of her core moral values. If an agent
fails to do this in a serious manner, she might very well go through life acting in accord
with principles and values that are imposed upon her by external forces—her parents, her
peers, the media, and so forth.
According to moral constructivism of the Kantian sort, an agent‘s practical reason is
the moral power through which morality is grounded. For example, one form of Kantian
moral constructivism maintains that it is through the categorical imperative that an
agent‘s practical reason constructs moral principles that subsequently apply to the agent.
An agent might ask: ―What do I think of stealing?‖ If the maxim of stealing is not one
that she can rationally want all others to adopt, practical reason tells her that she must not
adopt it, as well. The selection of principles for herself (in some such process), and
incorporating them in her wider set of beliefs, will eventually culminate in a state of wide
reflective equilibrium. She has then developed her own distinct moral character, and has
attained some level of moral autonomy.

10

Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 89–129.

5
Rawlsian political constructivism, on the other hand, is not predicated upon a uniquely
Kantian conception of an agent‘s moral autonomy. Being doctrinally autonomous in
terms of morality, Rawlsian political constructivism is not wedded to any particular
normative or metaethical view regarding the status of moral goodness. While moral
autonomy requires a particular agent to examine her own values, political autonomy
requires that free and equal citizens undertake a deep philosophical process of
questioning the central values of their society. A society is not politically autonomous if
it is well ordered by principles imposed by external forces—kings, demagogues, the
media, etc. No doubt, democracies can take various shapes, but Rawls thought political
autonomy requires deliberative democracy. 11According to Rawlsian political
constructivism, within such a society, it is the public reason shared by free and equal
citizens that acts as a vehicle through which the principles of a political (not a moral)
conception of justice are grounded. (I shall return to this point in chapter three,
―Anthropocentric Public Reason and Political Legitimacy.‖) Specifically, with a distinct
similarity to Kantian moral constructivism, Rawlsian political constructivism maintains
that it is through a certain contracting situation and process that the public reason of a
liberal society constructs principles that are to be used to well-order a society of free and
equal citizens (and thus secure background justice).12 Just as Kant thought that the maxim
of a person‘s action is constrained by his categorical imperative procedure, Rawls
thought that the agreement made in the original position (which will be discussed later in
this chapter, as well as the next) is constrained by constructivist procedure—i.e., the

11
12

See Samuel Freeman, Rawls (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 363.
See Freeman, Rawls, pp. 351–357.
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conditions imposed upon the contracting parties. 13 In this sense, the original position
―constructs‖ the fundamental political principles of justice for a liberal democracy. This
then leads us to Rawls‘s argument for the core principles of his theory—principles that I
will use later in my explication of background environmental justice for a liberal
constitutional democracy. As we will see, background environmental justice of the
Rawlsian sort is procedural—it asks us to consider whether a distribution of
environmental goods (and hardships) has come about within a system of social structures
that are fair (i.e., organized by Rawls‘s lexically ordered principles of political justice).
An Overview of Rawls’s Mature Argument
In reaction to utilitarian thinking regarding social and political justice, Rawls put
forward what he thought to be a theory that ―carries to a higher level of abstraction‖ the
modern social contract theory of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. 14 The model we shall
primarily focus on here—justice as fairness—is limited to the nation-state, and is not
intended as a framework for international justice. (How my extension relates to
supranational justice is discussed in chapter six.) I have noted the ways Rawls theory
(along with my extension) should be viewed as a form of political constructivism. But
what is the argument for his unique form of political liberalism? In its mature form, the
argument for his political conception of justice has two parts, and both are grounded in
organizing ideas Rawls finds within in the public political culture of liberal
democracies.15
It is well beyond the scope of this project to explicate all of the details regarding
Rawls‘s argument for his principles of justice; and it is not the aim of the present project
13
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to do so. Much more of his original position argument will be discussed in the next
chapter. I am presently assuming that his definitive argument(s) is contained within Part
III of his Justice as Fairness.16 And I wish now to make the following remarks regarding
his polemic, as they are important to later parts of my project. The first part of his
argument for his (special) conception of justice is theoretical. One is to imagine each
citizen having a representative within Rawls‘s original position of equality. Later, we
shall notice that we are not supposed to imagine these representatives as being fully
autonomous moral agents. Rather, these contracting parties are beings imbued with a
rational autonomy that is aimed only at maximizing the good of the citizen whom they
represent. (I shall discuss how this is done later.) The parties to the hypothetical
agreement are autonomous in terms of being free to make choices. However, because
they are tasked with selecting principles that will be the best means to securing their
citizen‘s final ends, one must view them as being only instrumentally rational. That is,
they lack a moral sensibility beyond thinking in terms of hypothetical imperatives. 17
Thus, in this sense, the contracting representatives found within Rawls‘s original position
are not reasonable.
The contracting representatives, then, must ask themselves which set of principles—if
used to well-order society—would best promote their citizen‘s aims and interests.
However, because of the veil of ignorance, any particular representative‘s basis of
reasoning is quite constricted. Rawls says:
In the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the social
positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they
16
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represent. They also do not know persons‘ race and ethnic group, sex, or
various native endowments such as strength and intelligence, all within
normal range. 18
Of course, one aim of his veil of ignorance is to ensure impartiality in this imagined
selection process. For example, if a representative knew that she was representing a gay
man, she would have to select principles favoring homosexual men. Similarly, if a party
in the original position knew that the citizen she was representing was Wiccan, she would
have to vote for principles that favor Wicca. Thus, it is vitally important to restrict such
information till the later phases of the four-stage selection and application process, which
will be discussed later.
Next, reasoning only in (non-moral) terms of the interests of those whom they
represent, Rawls argued that his principles of political justice are the ones these
symmetrically situated contracting parties would choose behind such a veil of ignorance.
That is, Rawls maintained that the lexically ordered principles of his special conception
of justice would do the best job of realizing the two moral powers possessed by free and
equal citizens of a constitutional liberal democracy. The two moral powers of citizens are
the capacity for conception of the good, and the capacity for a sense of justice.19 And the
principles most suited to actualizing these powers include: an equal liberty principle, a
principle of fair equality of opportunity, a difference principle (maintaining that social
and economic inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society20), a just savings principle, as well as the principles of public reason
and political legitimacy. All these principles (which will be used in my extension to his
18
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political liberalism), as well as citizens‘ moral powers, will be discussed in further detail
later.
The second component of Rawls‘s argument for his mature theory is practical. Given
that the aforementioned representatives within the original position of equality would
select the principles contained in his model, Rawls argued that his framework
additionally passes the test of stability. Due to the fact that his special conception of
justice is built on notions contained within the public political culture of pluralistic
democratic societies, it is capable of being the object of an overlapping consensus of
reasonable conceptions of the good. Again, instead of being a modus vivendi, a society
well ordered by his model of political liberalism would be stable for the rights reasons.
Therefore, Rawls argued that it could be viable as a real world theory of political justice.
Subsequently, a principal thought is that this conception of political justice could actually
secure background justice—a fair playing field for all persons and groups—if we actually
applied it to the major institutions of a pluralistic constitutional democracy. 21 Thus,
irrespective of whether Rawls‘s model can adequately serve as a comprehensive moral
theory, and thus as a basis for an environmental ethic (I do not think that it can), the aim
of what follows remains unscathed: to explore the possibility of utilizing Rawls‘s
political liberalism as a model for securing background environmental justice. Moreover,
following Rawls, if successful, a liberal democracy well ordered by my extension to
Rawls‘s political liberalism will be stable for the rights reasons, and not be a mere modus
vivendi. Accordingly, like Rawls, the hope is that the present framework of background
environmental justice will be a feasible theory for the real world—allowing free and
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equal citizens of constitutional democracies to peacefully cohabitate on fair terms with
each other as they grapple with the many controversial environmental matters that
humanity now faces.

11
Chapter 2

Examining the Anthropocentric Model
In the last chapter I introduced Rawls‘s political liberalism. I provided a brief
overview of how he argued for his mature theory, and why we should view it as a form of
political constructivism. As I mentioned earlier, Rawls said little regarding environmental
justice, and he never used the expression ―background environmental justice.‖
Is his theory, then, strong enough to complete such a task? Some, like Peter Wentz, have
complained that the Rawlsian framework cannot account for our duties of justice to nonsentient elements of the natural environment.1 In order to investigate the possibility of
extending such a framework in a manner that will assist us in grappling with real world
environmental issues and policy decisions that are required for securing background
environmental justice, it will thus be instructive to now review each of the key elements
of his polemic. My hope is that by taking each of the principle components of his theory
and assessing them for relevance to our relation to the non-human environment, we shall
be able to determine the ways in which Rawls‘s mature justice as fairness can be ―turned
green.‖
Within this chapter, then, we shall examine the six centrally interrelated ideas that
Rawls employs in the final construction of his theory. These ideas—which hang together
via reflective equilibrium—are Rawls‘s complex notions of: (a) society as a fair system
of cooperation; (b) a well-ordered society is characterized as being effectively regulated
by a political conception of justice; (c) the idea of the basic structure of society; (d)

1

See Peter S. Wentz, Environmental Justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), chapter 11.

12
Rawls‘s original positions of equality; (e) persons as free and equal; and (f) the idea of
public justification.
Why are these features most germane to his theory? Rawls used these concepts in the
construction of his theory because he thought that, except for the original position of
equality, these are the actual core ideas of liberal constitutional democracies. And, as a
form of Rawlsian political constructivism, my extension is ―constructed‖ from these same
ideas, which must match our considered convictions. In the remainder of this chapter,
then, we shall see how these core concepts of Rawls‘s political liberalism fit together, and
present them in the light of a number of pressing practical issues within contemporary
environmental philosophy. In the next chapter I focus on how these ideas hang together
and cohere with Rawls‘s notion of public reason, as well as his liberal principle of
legitimacy. Along the way, I show how some of the fundamental ideas and the principles
selected can be modified in order to fit together into the extended Rawlsian framework
we are now considering.
Society Viewed as a Fair System of Social Cooperation
Rawls began with the basic idea of society viewed as a fair system of social
cooperation over time, from one generation to the next. By social cooperation, he meant
those socially coordinated activities guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures. 2
Moreover, he viewed this cooperation as the joint activities and efforts of groups of
autonomous persons only. (The idea of free and equal persons will be discussed later.)
We are supposed to imagine this society as being self-contained, and having no
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relationships with other societies.3 One might undoubtedly find this unrealistic, as
societies are globally connected in important ways. While these concerns are legitimate,
they fall under supranational justice. As a result, they will be discussed later in chapter
six, when I make a fairly robust departure from Rawls‘s own framework.
Rawls maintained that the agreement that would be reached by free and equal people,
from the standpoint of what they regard as their reciprocal advantage (i.e., their good), 4
constitute the conditions of fair cooperation amongst the members of society. Moreover,
it is only if the bargaining process positions the persons fairly (i.e., no one is permitted to
have an unfair bargaining advantage over another 5) that the conditions of fair cooperation
are met. The principles selected from behind the veil of ignorance, then, identify these
fair requisites of social cooperation. And because the assumptions built into the selection
process are predicated on ideas that any reasonable citizen could embrace, the principles
the parties select also turn out to be the most reasonable principles of political justice.
Although Rawls ultimately regarded society as fair cooperation amongst people, he
did not think it is limited only to cooperation amongst human beings. For it appears that
following legal parlance, Rawls did not think that only a human being could be a person.
Regarding the word ‗person‘ Rawls says:
This expression is to be construed variously depending on the
circumstances. On some occasions it will mean human individuals, but in
others it may refer to nations, provinces, business firms, churches, teams,
and so on. The principles of justice apply to conflicting claims made by
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persons of all these separate kinds. There is, perhaps, a certain logical
priority to the case of human individuals: it may be possible to analyze
actions of so-called artificial persons as logical constructions of the actions
of human persons, and it is plausible to maintain that the worth of
institutions is derived solely from the benefits they bring to human
individuals. 6
Although many individuals involved in today‘s environmental movement cringe at the
notion of viewing the modern corporation (as well as other artificial non-human entities)
as a person, this is so not far-fetched—at least from the perspective of contemporary
political liberalism. For better or worse, there exist publicly recognized reasons for such
policies. The courts of constitutional democracies actually view many non-human entities
as legal persons. Standard cases include the following: subsequent to borrowing money, a
church has a legal obligation to repay it; a business can enter into a legally binding
contract with others; one might successfully sue a nation; and the 14 th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution protects corporations. Thus, to the consternation of numerous social
activists, many non-human entities, like corporations, presently possess legal rights and
duties, and it is not fantastic to view them at least as legal persons. Consequently,
although corporations (and similar entities) are not citizens, we must presume that, in this
sense at least, we are to conceptually include them as participants in society viewed as a
fair system of social collaboration from one generation to the next.
One might think, then, that one plausible method of extending Rawls‘s justice as
fairness into the domain of environmental decision-making would be to include nonhuman natural entities as members of society. For example, Paola Cavalieri and Will
6

John Rawls, ―Justice as Reciprocity,‖ in Collected Papers, p. 193–194.

15
Kymlicka (1996) contend that, besides Homo sapiens, all the other great apes should be
included as members of our society, and their interests should somehow be subsumed
within the contract doctrine. 7 Perhaps it would not be unreasonable to suppose that if our
society can grant legal rights to corporations, then it can do the same for the myriad other
entities comprising the natural environment. For example, we might embrace something
like Baird Callicott‘s land ethic as an attempt to expand the older connotation of
‗community‘ out to cover a newer sense of ‗biotic community‘. Similarly, we might
adopt Aldo Leopold‘s view, which maintains, ―The land ethic simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively:
the land.‖8 Or, perhaps we could follow Christopher Stone‘s suggestion that we somehow
grant many of these natural entities a legal standing of their own. 9 However, from the
perspective Rawls‘s justice as fairness, such non-anthropocentric approaches are
unreasonable.
Why are such maneuvers impermissible, according to Rawls‘s model? One reason is
simply because the idea of non-human natural entities (e.g., rivers or polar bears) being
members of society simply does not comport with notions that we can reasonably
produce from our public culture today. Later we shall observe that the viewing of water,
plants, non-human animals, and so forth, as members of society could not be an object of
an overlapping consensus, and is therefore not in compliance with Rawls‘s conception of
public reason. Indeed, no form of non-anthropocentrism can be part of a Rawlsian
overlapping consensus. As we will see, to publicly advance such views would be to
7
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violate our duty of public civility. As a result, it is permitted neither by Rawls‘s justice as
fairness, nor the extension we are now considering. Because any extension to Rawls‘s
view needs to proceed in accord with public reason, and must only employ ideas we find
latent in public culture, the resulting extended model of political justice must be
fundamentally anthropocentric. Will such a theory go against the most revered beliefs of
non-anthropocentric thinkers? One aim of my overall project is to show that an extended
Rawlsian framework is a political theory that even a reasonable ecocentrist citizen of a
constitutional democracy should adopt.
The Notion of a Well Ordered Society
The second of Rawls‘s basic organizing ideas is that a free democratic society—
viewed as a fair system of social cooperation—is well-ordered when citizens effectively
regulate their society in accord with a particular conception of political justice that they
all accept. This occurs when all the citizens within society concur with (and understand
that everyone else does, as well) the same principles of political justice, the basic
structure of the society is publicly known to satisfy those principles, and the citizens have
a sufficiently strong sense of justice to enable them to apply those principles of justice. 10
If the citizens of a society publicly recognize and embrace a particular conception of
political justice (i.e., the society is well-organized), then the citizens within that society
can agree upon the same principles of political justice. 11 In his JF, Rawls says: ―An
essential feature of a well-ordered society is that its public conception of political justice
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establishes a shared basis for citizens to justify one another their political judgments:
each cooperates, politically and socially, with the rest on terms all can endorse as just.‖ 12
Rawls did not always hold this view. To see this, consider that there are several ways
we can think of a society being well-ordered. First, we could think of a society being
well-ordered by a comprehensive moral doctrine. For instance, we can imagine what a
society would be like if all its citizens accepted some form of utilitarianism, and they then
applied it to the basic set-up of their society. Similarly, we can competently think
counterfactually about what a society would be like if it were to be well-ordered by some
variety of natural law theory, or even if it were to be well-ordered by the earlier model
found in Rawls‘s TJ—i.e., rightness as fairness. To connect with environmental
philosophy, in this sense of being well-ordered, we can imagine a society being wellordered by the ecocentrist principles of Deep Ecology.
Now, this idea of a well-ordered society is precisely what we find in Rawls‘s earlier
TJ. However, Rawls eventually concluded that it was unrealistic. 13 As mentioned earlier,
by the time he was writing PL, he believed that the burdens of judgment preclude
reasonable citizens from substantively converging on matters of morality and religion.
The upshot is that free constitutional democracies will always have to contend with the
fact of reasonable pluralism. A society of free and equal citizens will never become wellordered by a comprehensive worldview on its own. So, how can its government get all its
citizens to subscribe to a single comprehensive theory of the good? Without the coercive
use of force, it could not do so. Rawls called this ―the fact of oppression.‖ In JF, he says:
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…(A) continuing shared adherence to one comprehensive doctrine can be
maintained only by the oppressive use of state power, with all its official
crimes and the inevitable brutality and cruelties, followed by the
corruption of religion, philosophy, and science. If we say that a political
society is a community when it is united in affirming one and the same
comprehensive doctrine…, then the oppressive use of state power with
these attendant evils is necessary to maintain political community. 14
So, how can free and equal citizens—deeply divided on environmental values—come
together and form a just and stable society? It might be possible for humans to force a
comprehensive moral doctrine on a society. For example, we can imagine the military,
the police, the courts, and the educational system trying to convert everyone to Kantian
deontology. However, as I alluded to earlier, that is not the sort of stability that Rawls
wanted. Rawls did not want a political agreement (for a pluralistic constitutional
democracy) to be a mere modus vivendi. This relates directly to practical environmental
philosophy. For citizens of liberal democracies routinely see the Rawlsian burdens of
judgment within their environmental discourse. Simply put, reasonable citizens can (and
do) disagree about environmental values. Thus, like Rawls, we should not want our
extension to his theory—that of ―background environmental justice‖—to be acceptable
merely as a modus vivendi.
Since ecocentric principles could not be the object of a Rawlsian overlapping
consensus, the solution to the problem of how free and equal citizens—divided on
environmental values—might form a just and stable society is not to force all citizens and
policies to comply with ecocentrism. Again, it would require the oppressive use of state
14

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 34.

19
power to well-order a society by the tenets of Deep Ecology. This would most likely
involve some type of environmental fascism. 15 Instead, the answer the present Rawlsian
framework gives is that we are to place upon society a basic structure that can be the
object of an overlapping consensus made up of society‘s reasonable anthropocentric and
non-anthropocentric worldviews.
We can now see that as Rawls amended his account of stability from TJ to PL, his
own conception of a well-ordered society shifted as well. The main difference between
his mature framework and his earlier TJ is that in his earlier theory a well-ordered society
was one in which all citizens have the same comprehensive theory of the good—i.e.,
everyone has the same moral and religious views. In PL and beyond, we are to imagine a
society being well-ordered by a political conception of justice. Again, this happens when
almost all its citizens understand and accept the theory that contains that conception of
political justice. Rawls now says in his JF:
…(I)n a well-ordered society the political conception is affirmed by what
we refer to as a reasonable overlapping consensus. By this we mean that
the political conception is supported by the reasonable though opposing
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines that gain a significant body
of adherents and endure over time from one generation to the next. This is,
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I believe, the most reasonable basis of political and social unity possible to
citizens of a democratic society. 16
Of course, one might wonder what such a framework has to say about unreasonable or
irrational comprehensive doctrines that might float around any free society. Under the
―unreasonable‖ would include those fundamentalist elements of certain religions that
think that they are a ―special people,‖ or that the government should be run in accord
with their own particular religious ideology. It would also include those that—due to
extreme religious reasons—think that there is nothing wrong with the destruction of the
natural environment. As it relates to environmental concerns, perhaps the ―irrational‖
would include those that reject our best scientific results with regards to global warming
or the limits of human population growth. Regarding such unreasonable and irrational
theories, which will probably always be part of any free society, Rawls says: ―In their
case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of
society.‖17 In the next chapter I shall argue that background environmental justice
prohibits a liberal democracy to spend tax dollars on environmental policies and agencies
that promote unreasonable and irrational theories. But while much more needs to be said
on how the Rawlsian framework should grapple with the ―unreasonable‖ and ―irrational,‖
it is out of the scope of the present project to provide a comprehensive treatment of these
important matters.
The Basic Structure of Society
Let us now turn our attention to the third of Rawls‘s organizing ideas. This is his idea
of the basic structure of society. Rawls defined the basic structure of society as ―the main
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political and social institutions and the way they fit together as one scheme of
cooperation.‖18 It is the principal background framework for human activities and
associations. Accordingly, a proper basic structure of society (i.e., one appropriately
shaped by Rawls‘s model) will secure background justice. And it is this—the basic
structure of society—that is the central focus of his justice as fairness, and of my
extension as well. In fact, an important claim of the present work is that a basic structure
of society sufficiently formed by my extension to Rawls‘s framework will secure
background environmental justice.
What comprises the basic structure of society? Unfortunately, Rawls only gave us a
short list, which includes the constitution, an independent judiciary, property rights, the
economic system (e.g., capitalism), as well as the family. 19 In addition, no Rawlsian
characterization of the basic structure of society can ever be completely specified. That
is, we can never make an explicit list of what counts as part of the basic structure of a
society. As free liberal constitutional democracies can have different shapes, there are a
number of very different societies to which a Rawlsian model could apply. Furthermore,
important aspects of a society (e.g., resource levels and technology) always change, and
structures such as federal powers, offices, legislation, and agencies are always in a state
of flux. Moreover, an issue that is important to citizens at one time might become
irrelevant in the future (and vice versa).
If this is the case, then it might appear that a fully specified adumbration of the basic
structure of society is objectively indeterminate. So, again, how are we supposed to
determine what constitutes the basic structure of our society? According to Rawls, what
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we include as being part of the basic structure of society must always be constituted by
our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. In his JF, he says:
…(O)ur characterization of the basic structure does not provide a sharp
definition, or criterion, from which we can tell what social arrangements,
or aspects thereof, belong to it. Rather, we start with a loose
characterization of what is initially a rough idea. …(W)e must specify the
idea more exactly as seems best after considering a variety of particular
questions. With this done, we then check how the more definite
characterization coheres with our considered convictions on due
reflection.20
As will become clearer, my view of the basic structure of society—at least for the
purpose of the present project—is different than Rawls‘s own. I agree (broadly) with
Rawls that the basic structures of a society include the main social and political
institutions, and how they work together. However, I am not considering the delicate
issue of how the family should (or should not) be viewed as part of the basic structure of
society. The main focus of the present project is on democratic governments and federal
policies—as well as the many public entities supported by taxes imposed on the various
participants of contemporary democracies.
Now, by fixing the basic structure of domestic society as the target of justice as
fairness, we notice that the framework under consideration does not straightforwardly
apply to individuals. That is, Rawls‘s principles of justice are to directly apply to
fundamental political and social institutions, not moral agents.21 So, while Rawls might
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be pleased if an individual person were to use his theory to ascertain whether his or her
possible actions are just, that is well beyond the intended scope of Rawls‘s model. Rawls
thought that his theory is one an individual moral agent could use in a wide variety of
contexts, yet his model is not suited for determining whether a person is just—at least
when that person is not directly participating in the basic structure of society (e.g., acting
as a government official), or acting outside the domain of public discourse. Not only is
Rawls‘s justice as fairness not a moral theory, it is not even a complete theory of justice.
But many contractarians and contractualists think that moral principles are also to be
constructed in the contracting situation. What shall we say about such principles? Here I
will only note that in TJ Rawls claimed that moral agents have natural duties of justice,
which are also agreed to in the original position. Such duties are akin to the natural moral
duties all of us have. These include our natural duties of beneficence, non-maleficence,
the duty to promote justice, and so on.22 They also include a duty of justice, which is a
duty to support and comply with just institutions. 23 But as such duties are not part of
Rawls‘s political conception of justice (i.e., they do not apply to the basic structures of
society), they will be discussed no further in this project. There is one exception,
however, which is the duty of civility. This is a moral duty all citizens have when they
argue about matters of basic justice. Rawls contended that in these situations the duty of
civility requires citizens to listen to opposing arguments, to not be dogmatic, and to
provide counterarguments that are grounded in the political values of public reason. 24
What bearing does this have on background environmental justice? For one thing, as
the natural environment does not include human-made social structures, it cannot be
22
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viewed as part of the basic structure of society. Rather, in a variety of ways the natural
environment (including natural resources, such a coal and rivers) is to be regulated by the
basic structure of society—federal agencies, environmental legislation, etc. Moreover, the
Rawlsian model we are considering cannot directly say anything about the value of the
natural environment. Remember that Rawls says, ―…the status of the natural world and
our proper relation to it is not a constitutional essential or a basic question of justice, as
these questions have been specified…‖ 25
Thus, while not become divisive regarding intrinsic value or final ends, the Rawlsian
theory of background environmental justice must, at the same time, be worked out for a
system that will (amongst other things) regulate the natural environment. One concern
that must be addressed is that of scope—i.e., can the principles of Rawls‘s freestanding
model extend out far enough to cover the important public environmental agencies and
major environmental laws that exist in the real world? In this vein, I now wish to
illustrate how, in cases similar to the United States, the principles that Rawls‘s
framework generates can be extended out by his four-stage sequence to include domestic
agencies—e.g., the U.S. Department of Agriculture (along with its U.S.D.A. Forest
Service), the federal Bureau of Land Management (along with its authority to rent out
public lands), and so on.
To see how the Rawlsian framework extends out to include such governmental
agencies, we must remember that the original position of equality is only the first phase
of Rawls‘s four-stage process of selecting and applying his principles of justice. 26 The
original position is merely where citizens‘ representatives select basic principles that will
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give form to a particular society. During their deliberations at this point, we are to
envisage the contracting parties representing free and equal citizens from behind a fully
shut veil of ignorance. But after selecting basic principles for the society to whom the
person they represent belongs, we are to imagine the parties moving on and considering
the essentials of a society‘s charter (i.e., what Rawls called ―the highest-order system of
social rules for making rules‖27) during a constitutional convention. It is in this context
that—while making the constitution and a bill of rights—the parties are to apply the equal
liberty principle. (This is the focus of chapter four.) When this is finished, the contracting
parties then move on to the legislative phase where they apply other principles, such as
the principle of fair equality of opportunity, the difference principle, and the just savings
principle. This is followed by a final phase, where we are to suppose that the constitution
and its bill of rights is in effect, the citizens and administrators are applying the theory,
and the judiciary is proactively interpreting the laws.
Now, Rawls thought that the veil of ignorance is to be progressively relaxed during
the last three phases of his model. Accordingly, we are not to assess the justness of
particular federal environmental law or policy from the perspective of the original
position of equality. Rather, such matters are properly dealt with at the legislative phase
of the Rawlsian application process, and beyond. Imagine deliberating about a federal
environmental law, say, the U.S. Clean Water Act (1977). As we shall observe in
chapters five, six, and seven, this should be done (in terms of ideal theory) from the
perspective of the legislative stage of the contracting model. At this time, the parties still
do not know whom they represent (so, for example, they do not know what their citizen
thinks about the inherent value of Artic sea ice), but they have their constitution in place.
27
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Moreover, at the legislative stage, the parties have a rough understanding of the
society they are dealing with. For example, at this point in the heuristic, they will
understand the economic system (e.g., capitalism), as well as the levels of resources and
technology within the society. They will also be aware of population levels, along with
other basic scientific facts regarding extinction rates, pollution levels, the carbon cycle,
and so on. At this phase of the framework, the contractors will know, for example,
whether their society has the technology to use earthworms to remove lead contaminants
from polluted soil. They understand that it will be harder for their citizen to pursue his or
her conception of the good if a hurricane destroys his or her city. It is from this
perspective, then, that we must ask whether the contractors would agree to establish a
Bureau of Land Management, or some sort of Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Moreover, it is only after we have fully adopted this domestic (federal) stance through
each phase of the Rawlsian framework that we are finally permitted to move on and
consider international and local justice. Recall that in his JF, Rawls says:
Altogether then we have three levels of justice, moving from inside
outward: first, local justice (principles applying directly to institutions and
associations; second, domestic justice (principles applying to the basic
structure of society); and finally, global justice (principles applying to
international law). Justice as fairness starts with domestic justice—the
justice of the basic structure. From there it works outward to the law of
peoples [i.e. the global level] and inward to local justice. 28
So, at the domestic legislative phase of Rawls‘s framework, we can imagine the
parties deliberating and constructing federal institutions and agencies (e.g., a federal
28
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forest service), which are then included in the basic structure of the society they are
considering. At this point, they are aware of the resources of society, its technology (e.g.,
whether the society is able to produce hydrogen from algae), the population levels and
demographics, as well as all the known relevant environmental risks and hazards. Are
they aware of all of the environmental problems their society must deal with at this stage?
Probably not. However, they have all the information that we (you and I) have.
Accordingly, we are to imagine that before the parties move on to other domains of
the Rawlsian heuristic (i.e., the last federal phase, or down to local justice), they have
adopted a wide variety of federal structures—laws prohibiting lead in gasoline,
regulations on ozone-depleting substances, water quality standards, public carbon offset
policies, etc. Furthermore, as we shall see in chapter three, such domestic policies must
be argued for by appeals to anthropocentric risk management and sustainability, not the
positive intrinsic value of nature. (The exception of Rawls‘s proviso will be discussed
later.) And then, after fully considering the perspective of domestic justice, we can think
about the framework extending down to the local level.
Once we have fully considered the legislative phase of Rawls‘s domestic heuristic, we
can then adopt the stance of the last phase of the application process. We would do this,
say, if we wanted to consider whether a particular precedent or Supreme Court ruling was
just. So, this is the perspective we should take when we deliberate about the 2007
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (a case involving the issue of whether
the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gasses). Similarly, this is how we are to
think of the justness of Defenders of Wildlife vs. Hall (2008), in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the Endangered Species Act as it applied to the killing of wolves around
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Yellowstone National Park. Of course, when we think in terms of the present framework
at this point, we are not to imagine that our own Constitution and federal legislation is
well-ordering society. Our Constitution and legislation are less than perfect. Instead,
during the last stage, we are to imagine the parties deliberating with their own principles,
constitution, and federal legislation. And in this sense, we are considering ideal theory for
domestic society—i.e., a society well-ordered by Rawls‘s special conception of justice.
Then, after we have finished contemplating the level of domestic justice, we can,
following Rawls, imagine taking the parties into the spheres of international and local
justice. (Again, I will explain later why we should begin with supranational justice, and
then work ―down‖ to local justice.) So, when deciding upon issues of local justice, the
parties will always be deliberating with what they have consented to at the previous
federal level. We can then consider, for example, what ordinances the parties would
select for a local government—e.g., development plans, and wildlife management. And it
is by this process that we—you and I—are to judge whether local laws and policies are
just. Similarly, it is by subsequently adopting a local judicial perspective (a stance to be
taken after the local legislative phase) that we are to determine whether the decision of a
local judge is just. Admittedly, this is very rough. However, hopefully it serves to
animate the direction such a program will take, at least for our present purposes. And,
again, the central point I am now emphasizing is that the extended Rawlsian model under
consideration is able to consider environmental legislation and agencies as significant
political structures of society, and thus within the domain of a reasonable conception of
political justice.

29
Still, we must realize that because this extended Rawlsian framework only applies
directly to the basic structure of society, it does not straightforwardly apply to private
firms or groups. Thus, it will apply directly to federal offices (e.g., the Office of Fossil
Energy—U.S. Department of Energy) and agencies (e.g., the Central Intelligence
Agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency). But it will not apply directly to entities like the Carlyle Group, or
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Again, Rawls claims that his political
conception of justice does not apply directly to associations and groups.29 So, while this
model of political liberalism only indirectly relates (e.g., through law) to privately funded
think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute or the Heritage Foundation, it seems
like its principles can target (e.g., through law) publicly funded think tanks, such as
Georgetown University‘s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Of course, this framework
maintains that private entities and their agents still have a duty (ideally) to comply with
whatever structures (e.g., laws) the Rawlsian model generates. This is especially relevant
at the local level, where the principles selected apply directly to associations and
institutions. 30
However, Rawls thought that the family is also a part of the basic structure of society.
What bearing does this have on my extension to his theory, and background
environmental justice in general? Unfortunately, in what follows I spend little time
discussing Rawls‘s view of the family, and why it should be included within the basic
structure of society. 31 Nor shall I discuss my own view regarding the family. I shall only
note that for our present purposes, the family is to be regarded as an existing social entity
29
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within any liberal democracy. We should not think of Rawls‘s special conception of
justice as being straightforwardly applicable to daily family life. For example, we should
not think of the Rawlsian framework mandating that all family members should employ
the difference principle when making internal family policy—whether children should
receive allowances, which family members should clean the dishes, and so forth. As we
shall see later, the principles of justice are to be employed in a four stage series in order
to directly shape the constitution, laws, and policies of a constitutional democracy. We
should imagine that in a society well-ordered by the Rawlsian model, families (whatever
their form) are simply following all federal, state, and local laws—just like all other
participants and associations within society (e.g., corporations, churches, environmental
groups).
The Original Position of Equality
The next fundamental idea that Rawls used to organize his mature theory is the
original position of equality. As we have seen, the primary subject of political justice is
the basic structure of society, and society is a fair system of cooperation amongst free and
equal persons over time. Rawls maintained that the conditions of fair cooperation are
established by an agreement reached by those people, from the standpoint of what they
regard as their reciprocal advantage (i.e., their good).32 In his JF he noted, ―…these
conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not permit some to have
unfair bargaining advantages over others.‖33 Consequently, in sharp contrast with the
state of nature considered by the traditional social contract theorists, central to Rawls‘s
idea of an original position of equality is the notion that the fair terms of cooperation for
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a pluralistic liberal democracy are specified by an agreement reached in a optimally fair
situation—i.e., counterfactual circumstances precluding the possibility of unfair
bargaining advantages resulting from social and natural contingencies.
Furthermore, especially germane to Rawls‘s mature view is the notion that whatever
we use to build this hypothetical situation must be taken from certain core values of
modern liberalism. Again, Rawls‘s idea is that we start with a particular set of key ideas
from the tradition of political liberalism. Of course, there are many theories of political
liberalism. Accordingly, in terms of theory construction, the Rawlsian can only take from
them those core notions that can be an object of an overlapping consensus. If passing this
legitimizing muster, they can then be infused into a (hypothetical) contracting situation as
its central assumptions. Accordingly, what entities result as ―output‖ from this
constructivist model will be maximally fair—i.e., when used by citizens to regulate the
basic structures of a constitutional liberal democracy. In terms of my extension to
Rawls‘s framework, as a procedural theory, a distribution of environmental goods (and
environmental burdens) will be fair if it results within a society that is well ordered over
time by the present conception of background environmental justice.
Let‘s now consider the parties making this hypothetical agreement in the original
position of equality. These representatives are only ―theoretically defined‖ individuals. 34
We are not to view them as being fully human. They are not human at all. In his JF,
Rawls said, ―Rather, the parties are described according to how we want to model
rational representatives of free and equal citizens.‖ 35 As such, they are artificial persons,
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or ―analytical devices,‖ as Burton Dreben (2003) called them. 36 As we have already
noted, they are maximally rational, and have a fiduciary duty to secure the fundamental
interests of the citizens they are representing. Each of them knows that he or she is
representing the interests of a citizen of a pluralistic constitutional democracy. Every
representative in the original position is autonomous (i.e., completely free to choose) and
has the corresponding capacity for rational autonomy, which is then directed only at
maximizing the good of the citizen he or she represents. The parties understand that their
citizens exist in Humean circumstances of justice. And they believe that the society they
are considering will become well-ordered by whatever principles they select.
The contracting parties are given this information, a maximin rule (i.e., with certain
restrictions, they are to select principles with the best worst outcome), 37 and a set of
primary goods to use. At this point, they are behind a ―closed‖ veil of ignorance. So,
besides the aforementioned contingencies, this also precludes the ability for them to
know to what generation in society the citizen they represent belongs. (This will be
discussed in chapter seven, ―Just Savings and the Difference Principle.‖) They are then
tasked with deliberating upon, and selecting, a set of principles from a list of sets of
principles from some of our main political theories.38 We should imagine them thinking
in terms of hypothetical imperatives—i.e., ―If I wish to best secure the fundamental
interests of the citizen I am representing, then I should select principle X.‖ Thus, we are
not to view these theoretically specified contractors as being in anyway altruistic, moral,
just, or impartial. Rather, the entire selection process itself is fair, and the principles it
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generates comprise the most just solution to the question of how to well-organize a free
democratic society.
Now, some have considered (and almost all have rejected) the idea of representing
other environmental entities in Rawls‘s original position. 39 Yet, Donald VanDeVeer has
suggested that, besides humans, this might be accomplished for other creatures that
possess sentience. 40 This sort of proposal cannot be rejected straightaway. The entire
Rawlsian setup does seem to grant an unfair bargaining position to Homo sapiens, so to
speak. Why shouldn‘t the original position abstract away the contingency of species
membership? We can surely imagine a representative (who understands biology and
ecology) asking: if I wish to best secure the fundamental interests of Canis lupus (the
gray wolf), then I should select principles X, Y, and Z. So, why not allow the parties to
represent non-human natural entities within the original position of equality?
Earlier we saw that such an extension cannot be an object of an overlapping
consensus. And now we can also notice that we should not allow the contractors to
represent non-human entities because it would radically conflict with the first basic
organizing idea we discussed, which is that society is a fair system of cooperation
between free and equal persons. 41 Moreover, including other species in the Rawlsian
heuristic would greatly complicate an index of primary goods (if such an index could
even be coherently constructed). An incomplete list of Rawls‘s primary goods now
includes: freedom of thought and religion, political freedoms, freedom of association, the
right to freely choose one‘s occupation, the right to equal opportunity, the powers of
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offices and positions of authority, income, wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.42
This index is established only for citizens of a free constitution democracy who are
viewed as free and equal persons. For fairly obvious reasons, no single index of primary
goods could work for all species.
Furthermore, allowing the parties to represent nonhumans would also make the task of
applying the principles of justice at the later stages of his model virtually impossible. For
example, Rawls‘s first principle of justice (the equal liberty principle) secures a citizen‘s
right to participate in the fundamental political structures of society. This would include
the right to vote and hold office. However, we typically do not think that nonhumans
should have the right to vote or hold an office. Or, for another example, Rawls thought
that if a society were to be well ordered by his special conception of justice, then the least
advantaged citizens of our society would be the ones belonging to the class of citizens
possessing the amount of income and wealth with the lowest expectations. 43 But then,
according to the proposed non-speciesist model, all nonhumans would automatically
become least advantaged citizens of society. These sorts of problems would multiply
even further if we attempted to move past the level of sentience—e.g., by allowing the
contracting parties to represent entities like trees or entire ecosystems. In light of these
sorts of considerations, the present Rawlsian model of political liberalism cannot permit
its contractors to represent non-human entities.
All this holds at least for justice as fairness viewed not as a complete theory of justice,
but as a political framework to be directed only towards the basic structure of a liberal
constitutional democracy. Still, in this project I am arguing that non-speciesist
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ecocentrists or animal rights activists can tolerably embrace such a model. Certainly,
nothing in the present framework implies, for example, that we qua moral agents do not
hove moral duties to nonhuman entities. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that we do.
Nor does background environmental justice (a fundamentally procedural theory) entail
that citizens of liberal democracies could never adopt less strongly anthropocentric
approaches on Rawlsian grounds—e.g., Germany‘s granting of constitutional rights to
non-human animals. If Rawlsian background environmental justice were ever to be
attained, numerous environmental and animal welfare issues would still need to be
adjudicated by free and equal citizens working through just democratic processes.
So, what sort of principles did Rawls think the contracting parties would select in his
original position of equality? In the most mature form of his theory, Rawls thought that
the parties, who are acting as trustees for free and equal citizens, would select five things
from behind the veil of ignorance. Specifically, Rawls believed that they would select the
two familiar principles of justice for the basic structure of society. They would also
choose a just savings principle, the guidelines of inquiry of public reason, as well as the
liberal principle of legitimacy. So, before we discuss Rawls‘s idea of free and equal
persons, I shall make some brief remarks on these principles, which will be employed
throughout the remainder of the project.
For a mature Rawls, the first two principles of justice are slight variants of the familiar
two principles found in his earlier TJ. The first is the equal liberty principle, which says
that each citizen must have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties that complies with the scheme that grants the same basic liberties to
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all. 44 (This explains the use of the term ‗liberal‘ in the expression ―liberal egalitarianism,‖
which is sometimes used to describe Rawls‘s theory.) The second principle is comprised
of two parts (i.e., two principles), both of which regulate social and economic
inequalities. The first part of the second principle is the principle of fair equality of
opportunity, which says that social and economic disparities can only be tolerated when
they are attached to offices and positions open to all citizens under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.45 (This is the focus of chapter five.) The other part of the second
principle, which, again, deals with gaps in social and economic levels, is Rawls‘s
difference principle. This principle says that social and economic inequalities are to be to
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. (This explains the term
‗egalitarianism‘ in ―Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism.‖) If implemented, Rawls thought that
both parts of the second principle of justice would ensure the fair value of the political
liberties secured by his first principle of justice. 46
These principles of justice are somewhat well known, and discussed most frequently
in the literature. However, there are other important principles included within Rawls‘s
framework that are not discussed as much. The first of these is Rawls‘s just savings
principle, which applies between generations. Remember that, behind the veil of
ignorance, the contracting parties do not know the generation to which the citizens they
are representing belong. Rawls argued that under these circumstances, the parties would
select an intergenerational principle that requires society to save whatever proportion of
its resources, products, and wealth that accords with the principle citizens of any
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generation would want all generations to follow, no matter how far back in time. 47 As we
shall see (in chapter seven), if adopted this principle would have serious implications for
public policy. For one thing, irrespective of whether global warming is caused by human
activity (or, in fact, whether it exists at all), background environmental justice implies
that we still ought to drastically decrease our use of petroleum and coal, and switch to
alternative forms of energy.
Another principle that plays a large role in our extension of Rawls‘s model into the
domain of normative environmental philosophy is his principle of public reason. Rawls
articulates the ideal of this principle by saying, ―The point of the ideal of public reason is
that citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of what
each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that the others can
reasonably be expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that
conception so understood.‖48 Due to this, the framework of background environmental
justice that we are considering contends that reasons (and reasoning) publicly advanced
for environmental policies should be such that they can be embraced by all citizens—
irrespective of their comprehensive theory of the good. Accordingly, we shall also later
observe (in chapter eight) how exceedingly relevant this principle is to how the present
Rawlsian framework connects to environmental pragmatism.
And lastly, the contracting parties will select the liberal principle of legitimacy. This
principle says, ―…political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance
with a constitution (written or un-written) the essentials of which all citizens, as
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reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason.‖ 49
According to this principle, the powers of a liberal constitutional democracy are not
legitimate if the basic structures of the governments favor a particular comprehensive
worldview. Again, the bearing this principle has on background environmental justice
will be explained after we discuss the last two fundamental organizing ideas that Rawls
uses to erect his theory.
The Idea of Free and Equal Persons
The next organizing idea Rawls used in the construction of justice as fairness is the
notion of citizens being free and equal. Now, this is certainly not the idea that we have
(or should have) complete license, or that we are all biologically or physiologically equal.
When describing persons, Rawls‘s model of political justice does not merely depict us as
we are qua Homo sapiens. Instead, the theory expresses how we should view each other
when we—as citizens of a free democracy—adjudicate issues surrounding political
justice. 50 In this vein, we just observed how Rawls‘s original position models the idea of
free and equal people. For example, it models the equality of citizens squarely into the
original position by fixing the citizens‘ representatives in an initial situation of
symmetry.51
Moreover, key to Rawls‘s understanding of a person are the two moral powers that he
believes most of us possess. These are a conception of the good, and a sense of justice.52
A person‘s conception of the good is constituted by the rational system of intermediate
and final ends (or goals) that he or she possesses. It is what a person ultimately wants out
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of life, as well as how he or she plans on attaining it. Moreover, a person‘s conception of
the good also includes an interrelated arrangement of his or her moral and religious
beliefs, which frequently shape the person‘s ultimate aims in important ways.
Accordingly, ecocentrism could be part of one citizen‘s conception of the good, while a
speciesist theology could be part of another‘s.
On the other hand, the other moral power a normal person possesses is a sense of
justice. This is not the sum total of a person‘s actual and dispositional intuitions regarding
what is just or unjust. This, instead, is his or her ability to apply and act from the
aforementioned principles of political justice. And this, then, connects with one of the
highest values of modern liberalism, which is the tolerance and respect citizens show
towards others who have different conceptions of the good. (And at this point we need
not worry about corporations, as they are participants in society, not citizens.)
Now, different comprehensive theories will justify and express this tolerance and
respect in different ways. For example, under a Kantian-Rawlsian interpretation (i.e., that
of an early Rawls), it will manifest itself when citizens treat each other politically as
Kantian ends-in-themselves. The salient aspect of this view is the claim that to treat each
other politically as Kantian ends-in-themselves we must attempt to legislate in a way that
respects the moral powers of other citizens—i.e., other citizens‘ views of what they want
to do with their lives, and what they deem to be most meaningful in life in general. In
fact, in his ―The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness,‖ Rawls suggested that we
could view his original position as providing a ―procedural interpretation‖ for Kant‘s
notion of autonomy and the categorical imperative. 53 Nonetheless, while an early Rawls
thought that his original position contracting situation—a heuristic device—models
53
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Kantian autonomy, we can suppose that actual practices of tolerating other‘s autonomy
(e.g., through permitting others to freely vote, allowing the exchange of goods and
services, granting a person the right to practice whatever religion he or she sees fit to
follow) can be justified in various ways by other normative theories. This is significant,
due to the glaring fact that Kantian deontology cannot be the object of an overlapping
consensus.
Of course, a framework like the one we are considering, which ensures respect for
others who have different conceptions of the good, is not committed to the thesis that all
worldviews are equally valid. Nor does anything within the present model imply that
citizens ought not to cogently argue (either publicly or privately) amongst themselves
about religion, final ends, or environmental values. It does mean, however, that atheists
should not be punished for not publicly honoring the traditional religions of Western
civilization. Similarly, Christians should not in any way be required to publicly approve
of Islam (and vice verse). In fact, to do so within many contexts would amount to
institutionalized patronizing. Similarly, the Rawlsian model of background environmental
justice that we are considering maintains that anthropocentrists must not be forced to
publicly promote non-anthropocentrism—e.g., ecocentrism.
So, the idea that people have the two moral powers we have been discussing is a
salient aspect of Rawls‘s mature theory, and something to which other similar theorists,
such as Thomas Scanlon or Jürgen Habermas, for example, are less attentive. 54 And the
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notion that we have such moral powers connects with the notion of reasonableness in the
following way. While citizens of a pluralistic liberal democracy will subscribe to a wide
variety of philosophies, moralities, and religions, Rawls argued that if they are
reasonable, they should be able to embrace the same political ideology—i.e., his form of
democratic liberalism. One ramification of Rawls‘s freestanding mature framework, then,
is that we—as free and equal citizens of pluralistic democratic society—are to be careful
how we publicly justify many of our normative claims.
This is relevant to practical environmental philosophy and contemporary
environmentalism in general, because citizens of the world‘s constitutional democracies
do hold a number of ill assorted and irreconcilable conceptions of the good. As a result,
free and equal persons will invariably end up possessing a disparate and incompatible set
of environmental values as well. The fact of reasonable pluralism, to which Rawls was
deeply concerned, thus permeates the cultural and social settings in which today‘s
environmentalists and governmental agents must operate. For example, consider the
members of our society—both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric—who work in
the arena of public environmental policy. We shall soon see that the present model of
political liberalism maintains that if such individuals are to truly act in accord with the
view that they are members of a liberal constitutional democracy (i.e., of a group of free
and equal citizens), then they frequently must justify their views in accord with public
reason. That is, in the sphere of public discourse, they must sometimes provide reasons
that would be acceptable to any reasonable citizen—no matter her particular
philosophical or religious beliefs.
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The present Rawlsian theory of background environmental justice says that, like other
free and equal citizens, each environmental activist has her own conception of the good.
This includes what she ultimately wants out of life. Moreover, if she is a biocentrist, then
biocentrism—her believing that all life is equally intrinsically valuable—also forms a
significant segment of her overall theory of the good.55 So, her conception of the good
(i.e., her system of pursuits, along with her moral and religious beliefs that constrain her
system of ends) is one of her moral powers. Yet, we just saw that she will have another
important moral power, which is her sense of justice. This does not refer to the sense of
indignation she experiences upon hearing of aerial Wolf hunting in Alaska, or the
infuriation she feels upon hearing of another native species being extirpated. While this is
an important moral power that she has as a person, it is not what Rawls means when he
describes her as a free and equal political citizen—e.g., as a free and equal voter,
taxpayer, and so on.56 Again, her sense of justice, in Rawls‘s sense, is her ―…capacity to
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles
of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation.‖ 57
As we shall see, if the aforementioned biocentrist is reasonable, then she must be
willing to publicly act in accord with principles that any reasonable citizen could endorse.
Thus, according to the framework under consideration, if she is a reasonable citizen, she
will not repress non-biocentric worldviews, if given the opportunity. Although she
believes that all living nature ought to be conserved for its own sake, when she publicly
advances environmental policies, she must limit herself to reasons that other free and
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equal citizens could accept—no matter their particular conception of the good.
Accordingly, in her public engagements, when not speaking on behalf of herself, she will
frequently be delimited to prudential argumentation grounded only in ideas implicit
within the Rawlsian background culture of her society. 58 This means, for instance, that
even though she personally believes in the principle of biocentric equality, she is
sometimes not permitted to publicly invoke such a principle as justification for actual or
potential environmental policies that are to be implemented in the basic structure of a
society of free and equal citizens. This would hold, for example, if she were speaking as a
government agent, and not as a private citizen.
Public Justification
This then leads to the last fundamental idea organizing Rawls‘s mature justice as
fairness. This is that of public justification. Rawls says, ―Public justification proceeds
from some consensus: from premises all parties in disagreement, assumed to be free and
equal and fully capable of reason, may reasonably be expected to share and freely
endorse.‖59 And this connects with the aforementioned idea of a well-ordered society in
important ways. Again, Rawls says:
An essential feature of a well-organized society is that its public
conception of political justice establishes a shared basis for citizens to
justify to one another their political judgments: each cooperates, politically
and socially, with the rest on terms all can endorse as just. This is the
meaning of public justification. 60
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And, as we shall now see, this has significant implications for some of those involved
with public environmental policy and planning, as well as many of those who are tasked
to enforce public environmental regulations and policies.
To begin with, Rawls‘s idea of public justification directly applies to the arguments
given for (and against) the myriad governmental environmental policies at the federal,
state, and local level. According to the model under consideration, they must be such that
any reasonable citizen could accept them. Furthermore, according to our extension to
Rawls‘s own model, public justification will also apply to the government‘s agents.
Examples at the level of domestic justice (i.e., the federal level) will include: The
President of the United States, members of Congress, political candidates, The
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Administrative Officers of
the National Park Service, environmental planners for the federal government, and
national park rangers. As further illustrations of public justification at the domestic level,
this extended Rawlsian framework maintains that the President of the United States must
publicly justify his or her political appointments to top environmental posts via reasons
that all citizens can endorse—irrespective of their comprehensive theory of the good.
Similarly, background environmental justice beseeches individual members of the U.S.
House of Representatives to argue for (and against) resolutions to permit the drilling of
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge by only giving reasons that any reasonable
citizen could embrace. On the other hand, although there will most likely be prudential
reasons for doing so, the environmental fact sheets distributed by the Natural Resources
Defense Council need not be such that all reasonable citizens will endorse them. This is
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because the NRDC is a private group (and receives no funding from the government),
and, as we shall see, more like an association.
At the level of local justice, the contracting parties finally have full knowledge of local
ecosystems. When we extend the framework of political liberalism down towards this
level, we can see that public justification will similarly apply to state and local
environmental project managers, fish and game wardens, as well as rangers at state and
local parks. For example, if a state park ranger explains to a group of teenagers why they
should not litter in a state park, he or she ought to use neither purely ecocentric, nor
Christian, reasons. This generally holds at least when the ranger is on the job, or publicly
acting while wearing his or her uniform. Similarly, if a city mayor gives an interview to
be broadcast on a local public radio or television station, he or she must not argue in a
way that favors any religion, or shows a bias towards any divisive theory concerning the
value of the natural environment—e.g., ecocentrism. On the other hand, according to the
present model of background environmental justice, local members of the ecology
movement are generally permitted to freely utter true descriptive statements such as, ―I
think that nature is sacred,‖ or ―I believe that this species has a natural right to exist.‖
However, the present model of political liberalism obliges such citizens, when publicly
speaking as an agent of the state or local government, to ground his or her arguments in
reasons that other citizens could accept—no matter their particular conception of the
good.
However, Rawls thought that there was a proviso. He says that ―…reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons—and not
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reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to
support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support. 61 So, if we
accept Rawls‘s proviso on public justification, it seems like public officials and
governmental agents are permitted, in certain contexts, to give non-anthropocentric
reasons for public environmental policy, under the condition that reasons that could be an
object of an overlapping consensus (and thus that any reasonable citizen could embrace)
will eventually be given. So, for example, it is legitimate for a Native American legislator
to say that she supports a particular environmental policy because it will defend land that
members of his or her tribe believe is sacred. The present freestanding framework of
political justice implies, however, that she must, at some point, publicly provide an
argument that does not contain normative content that will contradict any of the
reasonable moral and religious doctrines that constitute part of our background culture
(and especially that of her constituency). Of course, more details regarding how the
present Rawlsian framework handles such matters of public environmental discourse still
need to be explained. This will now be done in the next chapter, when we more closely
examine Rawls‘s important notions of public reason and political legitimacy, and
demonstrate their bearing on background environmental justice.
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Chapter 3

Anthropocentric Public Reason and Political Legitimacy
Like the theories of Rawls and other political liberals, the present model does not
subscribe to the view that legitimate political authority emanates from a divine mandate
from heaven. Governments do not receive their rightful power from God or the Pope,
and, more generally, ―might‖ does not make ―right.‖ Rather, taking ideas that were
discussed by the ancients, and brought to fruition during the European Age of Reason, we
are taking seriously the view that governments are human constructed entities that only
possess legitimacy when they are run in accord with the consent of the governed.
Following Rawls, we are then taking certain key notions of modern liberalism, and then
using them as ―input‖ to build a partially specified model of political liberalism. We are
then slowly and carefully applying the resulting framework to the issue of how we can
collectively—as free and equal citizens—grapple with the many looming environmental
problems that constitutional democracies now face. If I am correct, if successfully
applied, the resulting model would secure background environmental justice.
We earlier took note of the many principles that Rawls thought the contracting parties
would select in his original position of equality. The political principles of justice, which
Rawls thought are most basic for organizing a well-ordered pluralistic liberal democracy,
are the equal liberty principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and the
difference principle. Moreover, the just savings principle goes along with the difference
principle. Recall that in his TJ, Rawls says, ―…the complete statement of the difference
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principle includes the savings principle as a constraint.‖1 However, there is a genuine
unease about the application of these political principles of justice. Throughout most of
his writing, Rawls focused on issues of basic justice. That is to say, most of his
discussion is limited to Constitutional essentials, Supreme Court rulings, and very
fundamental legislative matters at the federal level. Nonetheless, Rawls recognized that
reasonable citizens could disagree about the details of how we are to apply these
principles throughout the entire heuristic. That is, reasonable disagreements will
invariably arise when we use the entire four-stage selection and application process
through to all spheres of justice—local, domestic, and global. How then should we
proceed? Here, we need to employ the second part of the agreement Rawls thought the
parties would make in his original position of equality. In PL, Rawls says:
…the parties in the original position, in adopting principles of justice for
the basic structure, must also adopt guidelines and criteria of public reason
for applying these norms. The agreement for those guidelines, and for the
principle of legitimacy, is much the same as, and as strong as, the
argument for the principles of justice themselves. 2
The idea, then, is this. Under the extended Rawlsian model, whatever counts as
admissible ―input‖ for the contractors in the four-stage selection and application process
must be such that it is able to pass the test of public reason. That is to say, the contracting
parties are only permitted reasons (and forms of reasoning) that all reasonable citizens of
a pluralistic liberal society would accept—irrespective of their comprehensive theory of
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the good. Accordingly, whatever we provide the parties with—in terms of the model‘s
―input‖—must be neutral with respect to the various competing comprehensive
worldviews that reasonable citizens of a pluralistic democracy might hold. While this can
include scientific results and theories, these must be limited to what most members of the
scientific community recognize as legitimate. This restriction is accordingly upheld in the
next four chapters—when we work through many of the details involved in relating
Rawls‘s special conception of justice to the environmental policies and agencies of a
particular liberal constitutional democracy.
But public reason not only serves as a constraint for the contracting parties within
Rawls‘s heuristic. The Rawlsian framework specifies that in the real world, the public
deliberations that citizens of liberal democracies engage in must be conducted in accord
with the principle of public reason. Thus, in some contexts, public reason is also to
constrain us—you and I—as we actually deliberate on matters of political justice. Recall
that in his ―The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,‖ Rawls says, ―A citizen engages in
public reason, then, when he or she deliberates within a framework of what he or she
sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that
expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be
expected reasonable to endorse.‖3 Accordingly, when we—as citizens of a liberal
democracy—publicly deliberate about matters regarding our political society, we must
limit ourselves to reasons (and forms of reasoning) that all other reasonable and rational
citizens will accept—irrespective of their comprehensive theory of the good. When we
authentically do this, we are engaged in a type of reasoning Rawls thought is appropriate
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for free and equal citizens who, as a corporate body, make laws and policies that are
enforced by the coercive use of state power.4
Now, I am proposing extending Rawls‘s framework—and here we are focused on
public reason—further than perhaps Rawls himself would feel comfortable. Again, for
the most part, when considering domestic justice, Rawls concerned himself with the very
top structures of federal government. Again, he was primarily concerned with the issue of
how public reason applies to Supreme Court rulings, fundamental legislation, and
constitutional essentials. Moreover, Rawls did not think that environmental policy is a
matter of basic justice. In JF, Rawls says:
…(W)e are concerned solely with the way the idea of public reason holds
for questions of constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.
Most legislative questions do not concern these matters, although they
often touch upon them, for example, tax legislation and laws regulating
property; legislation protecting the environment and controlling pollution;
laws establishing national parks and voting funds for museums and the
arts.5
So I am explicitly pushing the Rawlsian model further than Rawls intended. And as we
observed earlier, the most cogent way to accomplish this is by using Rawls‘s four-stage
selection and application sequence to expand the framework out to include the
constitution, legislation, and judicial processes and rulings. And then we are to drop the
model down to the state and local arena of our extended basic structure of society.

4
5
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Still, even if my proposed extension can be made coherent, there are a number of
concerns it will eventually have to address. With respect to public reason, consider that
our Rawlsian model maintains that the cases publicly made for controversial proposals
must be couched in reasoning that contains only what is implicit within the background
culture of society. But is this even possible? Can only items that can be an object of an
overlapping consensus of reasonable worldviews adjudicate the countless controversial
issues that liberal democracies now face? Ted Preston (2004) imagines a vegetarian
―…scoffing at appeals to reasonableness, if reasonableness demands that he tolerate the
‗murder‘ of billions of non-human animals each year.‖6 Similarly, why should a
passionate environmentalist publicly limit herself to reasons (and forms of reasoning) that
all reasonable citizens of a pluralistic liberal society could accept, especially when a
portion of a temperate rainforest is at stake? Perhaps Rawlsian public reason—even in
our extended form—can only reflect the status quo, which arguably got us into our
environmental mess in the first place.
A number of things must be said. First, Rawls never claimed that all the divisive
issues that liberal democracies must deal with could be resolved by the content of public
reason. He knew that they could not. Secondly, we do not need to understand the content
of public reason as being true (although some individuals might do so). Rather, in the
mature form of Rawls‘s theory, we should understand the content of public reason as
being the most reasonable means to publicly reason about such controversial matters.
Rawls says:
6
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Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual
understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive
doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of reasons they
may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are
at stake. I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth
or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to
citizens as citizens. 7
The present model accordingly recognizes that some citizens are passionate about
outlawing factory farms and perhaps industrial agriculture in general. But it also
recognizes that some citizens firmly believe that we should make all abortions illegal.
Some citizens want our government to apply the death penalty to those who rape
children. And just as some citizens believe that we should outlaw same-sex sexual
activities, some citizens wish to stop the harvesting of timber in old growth forests.
Disputes such as these will be a part of any free pluralistic society. Given this fact, the
present framework specifies how we—if we are to meet the demands of background
environmental justice—should ideally proceed as free and equal citizens.
Moreover, fervent environmentalists should keep in mind that Rawlsian pubic reason
does not criticize or attack minority positions—such as the lifestyles or philosophies
associated with biocentrism or veganism. In this vein, ecocentrists should recognize that
some citizens view their belief system as a fanatical type of nature worship. Passionate
ecologists and animal rights activists must also remember that the first principle of justice
is the equal liberty principle, which plays a vital role in protecting their freedom of
thought and religion. This should be extremely important to environmentalists who have
7
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non-standard religious beliefs (e.g., neopaganism), or perhaps no religious convictions at
all. And, again, any attempt to publicly force non-anthropocentric principles (e.g.,
biocentrism, ecocentrism) on our society would most likely lead to civic turmoil. But
even if such a society could be made stable, it would be made stable for the wrong
reasons. Again, it would seem to require some sort of environmental authoritarianism,
which is antithetical to any form of political liberalism.
Let‘s now consider what our extended Rawlsian model has to say about political
legitimacy. Again, Rawls‘s liberal principle of legitimacy says, ―…political power is
legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the
light of their common human reason.‖ 8 But we are concerned with expanding the model
to all areas of the basic structure of society. Accordingly, under our extended Rawlsian
framework, we will say that political power is legitimate only when it is exercised by a
basic structure of society that all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the
light of their common human reason. Background environmental justice, then, requires
that the political powers of society not to favor any particular comprehensive worldview.
Similarly, the spending of tax dollars on environmental policies and agencies that
promote unreasonable and irrational theories violates the requirements of background
environmental justice.
Many of our present environmental policies do pass this modified test of legitimacy.
Consider, for example, that the rationale behind the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency‘s Clean Air Act involves no non-public reasons. Its justification is simply that
―…the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
8
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urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has
resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including injury to
agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of property, and hazards
to air and ground transportation…‖ 9 This sort of public justification includes no
controversial claims about the intrinsic value of natural entities, nor does it contain
language that would contradict any unique moral or religious doctrine. The reasoning is
such that any reasonable citizen could embrace it—irrespective of his or her
comprehensive theory of the good. Thus, it is legitimate under the theory we are now
considering.
But exactly how far do the requirements of public reason and political legitimacy
extend under our present framework? Do they include Churches and other associations?
What about a non-profit organization such as Energy Action Coalition? No. Following
Rawls, the present framework makes a key distinction between our political society, and
an association.10 In a liberal society, nobody is forced to go to a Church, Mosque, or a
Synagogue. On the other hand, in order to finance the public structures of our society, all
citizens are required to pay local, state, and federal taxes. The same goes for jury duty. If
selected for jury duty, one must serve. One escapes a political society only by death or
emigration.
But, in contrast, one‘s membership in (or support of) an association is voluntary. For
example, in a liberal democracy, when citizens give money to religious groups, they
always do so freely. And, in a liberal democracy, citizens are free to devote time and
financial resources to environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, or the Nature
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Conservancy. We—as free and equal citizens with a number of divergent worldviews—
pool our money to collectively support our political society. Our political society, then,
must not favor any comprehensive theory of the good. Accordingly, the principles of
public reason and legitimacy apply directly to federal, state, and local governments.
However, they do not directly apply to the myriad non-public associations and
organizations that are found within our society—e.g., political action committees. The
present model maintains that non-public associations merely have a duty to comply with
laws and regulations of political society—i.e., legitimate government.
To consider the bearing on contemporary environmental policy, then, consider the
following illustrations. It follows from the Rawlsian model we have been considering
that, just as they ought not to favor any of the traditional Western religions or
worldviews, signs in national parks—qua part of our political society—ought not to be
(axiologically) ecocentric or biocentric, as well. For example, a sign in a national park
attributing inherent value to a natural entity would not pass the Rawlsian constraint of
public reason. However, a sign with purely descriptive content such as, ―Native
Americans considered this place to be sacred‖ would pass without difficulty.
Furthermore, the principle of legitimacy requires that other policies—such as taxpayer
funded sex education programs—must not be religiously biased, as well.
Moreover, according to background environmental justice, public explanations of why
the environmental rules of our public society ought to be followed must be couched in
language that complies with public reason. For instance, U.S.D.A. Forest Service signs,
pamphlets, websites, and publications ought not to contain expressions such as, ―Don‘t
pollute mother earth, she is sacred!‖ In this sense, most, if not all, of U.S. federal
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environmental legislation passes the requirements of public reason and legitimacy. For
example, the actual justification of the Endangered Species Act of 1974 is not nonanthropocentric. It does not appeal to biocentrism, ecocentrism, or any sort of ecological
ethic. It appeals simply to mainstream values that any reasonable citizen can accept—no
matter her particular worldview. Instead of claiming that natural entities protected by the
act possess intrinsic value, it maintains: ―…these (protected) species of fish, wildlife, and
plants are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific
value to the Nation and its people…‖ 11 While many other examples could be mentioned,
hopefully these sufficiently illustrate the important role of anthropocentric public reason
and political legitimacy within the present framework.
However, many environmental philosophers will surely complain that the framework
we are considering—Rawlsian background environmental justice—is simply an outdated
model of humanism. For example, many non-anthropocentric Deep Ecologists and
ecological feminists might object that this pragmatically humanist conception of political
justice, with its permitting only the public advancement of anthropocentric values and
prudential reasons, will not sufficiently raise ecological consciousness to a level that will
permit our species to reconcile its destructive relationship with nature. Fritjof Capra, for
instance, could very well argue that the present model is not adequate as a shared political
basis for our society because, ultimately, it will not bring about the stability required to
assuage the pending environmental crisis. Capra and other Deep Ecologists might argue
that due to its anthropocentricism, what such a theory will do is institutionalize a shallow
perception of natural entities as mere resources, and consequentially solidify the hideous
crisis of perception that is at the core of our environmental woes. For example, Deep
11
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Ecologists might argue that a society well-ordered by the present model will legitimize
the notion that we own the natural world and have the right to do with it as we wish. It is
only by adopting a new ecological paradigm at all levels—one that recognizes that
humans are essentially part of nature—that we can respect the natural interrelatedness of
everything, and then pull ourselves back from the brink of anthropogenic ecological
destruction. 12 Consequently, a Deep Ecologist might argue that the human centered
perspective of the Rawlsian framework is simply not conducive to our long-term
survival.
With the exception of Rawls‘s wide view of public reason (i.e., the proviso we
discussed earlier), it is true that the present model stipulates that advocates for the natural
environment should only publicly provide reasons for (or against) environmental policies
that could be acceptable to every reasonable person—regardless of his or her particular
comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine. However, we should note that
our present conception of Rawlsian public reason does not directly affect citizens who
openly discourse in public settings, but are not acting as an agent of the government. A
short list of such individuals who might be in positions of publicly justifying
environmental value judgments would include: local grassroots organizers, private
environmental educators, executives and directors of environmental companies, members
of the independent media, associates of non-profit environmental law firms,
representatives of conservation organizations and societies, and perhaps even potential
eco-saboteurs. The present procedural model of background environmental justice
maintains that, so long as they are not violating their duty of public civility, such
12
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individuals are free to employ whatever reasoning seems appropriate to themselves, or
their associations.
Moreover, the extended Rawlsian model does not simply represent the status quo. For
example, Joseph Grcic (2007) has pointed out that because it cannot be an object of an
overlapping consensus, the U.S. Electoral College is not in compliance with the Rawlsian
test of public reason.13 I mention this only to underscore the fact that while it is built upon
core ideas of liberalism, the present model of background environmental justice is not
wedded to what is established in the real world—whether they are electoral colleges or
environmental policies. Moreover, the Rawlsian model does not maintain that we must
limit ourselves to beliefs that ―typical‖ citizens hold. It says that we are limited to what
citizens could endorse in the light of their common human reason. So while reasonable
people might disagree about the true value of wilderness, it is still possible for rational
and reasonable citizens to agree on many important matters. Accordingly, to the
aforementioned objection, the environmentally minded political liberalist must note that
saving the planet from the brink of ecological destruction is, in fact, a shared value.
Hence, if it could be shown that the only way we can save ourselves from environmental
ruin is by turning our political society (e.g., the government) ―dark green,‖ then nonanthropocentric public justification could easily be embraced by our extended
freestanding Rawlsian model of political liberalism.
Further, it is instructive to note that this framework does not maintain that individual
eco-saboteurs operating in secret have to comply with public reason. This Rawlsian
model is merely a political conception of justice. Hence, ―lone wolf‖ monkeywrenchers
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(like Edward Abbey‘s fictional character, George Hayduke), who are not participating in
public reason, only have to comply with the non-political demands of their own
conception of the good.14 Moreover, the present framework does not maintain that radical
environmentalists, such as members of Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth First!, or
Earth Liberation Front (ELF), are always constrained by the demands of public reason—
even when they publicly justify their group‘s actions (in the sense we have been
describing).15 Of course, like all citizens, such individuals do have a moral duty (not a
duty of justice) of civility. Recall that Rawls says, ―The duty of public civility goes with
the idea that the political discussion of constitutional essentials should aim at free
agreement reached on the basis of shared political values, and that the same holds for
other questions bordering on those essentials, especially when they become divisive.‖16
Thus, when arguing about fundamental matters, radical environmentalists have a moral
duty to not be dogmatic, to listen to others, and to support their positions (to the extent it
is possible) with reasons that other reasonable citizens could embrace. Some situations
where this duty could be important—even when such individuals are acting merely as
private citizens—would include public rallies, organized protests, as well as blogging,
texting, and other forms of environmental cyber-activism. Of course, we are only
working out the details of a model of political liberalism specified for a free
constitutional democracy. Thus, it is sensible to assume that the Rawlsian constrains of
public reason, political legitimacy, and citizens‘ duty of civility might be different in
nonliberal contexts—e.g., when worked out for citizens living within a fascist regime.
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But a political climate properly well organized by the present freestanding framework
of political liberalism is one that resonates with an air of civility. It is an atmosphere
where citizens are asked always to not to pick up arms to settle their differences. Rather,
we—as citizens of a pluralistic free democratic society—are asked to publicly provide a
better argument for our fellow citizens with whom we disagree. While there are many
other issues Rawlsians need to consider regarding the application of public reason and
political legitimacy to environmental issues, the hope is that the framework of
background environmental justice we have considered so far can serve as a cogent model
that citizens of liberal democracies can realistically use and promote. I believe that this is
especially relevant today as free and equal citizens of liberal democracies collectively
grapple with the myriad controversial issues surrounding our generation‘s global
environmental crisis.
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Chapter 4

Domestic Environmental Justice—The Constitution
I shall now begin to substantively extend the Rawlsian contractualist model into the
domain of domestic society and, at the same time, continue to demonstrate the
framework‘s bearing on many environmental issues that liberal democracies now face. In
chapter two we mentioned the equal liberty principle, which is Rawls‘s leading principle
of justice. We also commented on Rawls‘s second principle of justice. We noted that it is
comprised of two principles: the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and the
difference principle. Within what follows in this and the following three chapters, I shall
closely examine all these principles—which comprise Rawls‘s special conception of
justice—and focus on their application to domestic environmental policy issues. By
working out the remaining details of how the present Rawlsian framework can be
employed to well-order a liberal constitutional democracy (and, thus, help it achieve
background justice), the hope is that the present extension to Rawls‘s theory can assist
citizens as they now grapple with many of the most pressing environmental concerns
facing humanity, and at the same time secure background environmental justice.
Other environmental philosophers have attempted to connect Rawls‘s theory to
environmental policy. However, they have all overlooked the importance of Rawls‘s
four-stage contracting and application procedure. Moreover, while some environmental
philosophers have employed the difference principle when considering the distribution of
environmental goods, the distributive effects of the prior principles of justice have not
been fully appreciated. A good example would be Derek Bell. In his ―Environmental
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Justice and Rawls‘ Difference Principle‖ (2004), he argues that Rawls‘s theory can serve
as an adequate basis for environmental justice. 1 However, he does not discuss Rawls‘s
four-stage sequence. Also, by manly focusing on Rawls‘s difference principle, he misses
many of the distributional effects of the prior principles of justice. Moreover, he does not
consider environmental justice for future generations, or how the just savings principle
relates to Rawls‘s difference principle.
This sort of misapplication of Rawls theory is unfortunate. No doubt, the difference
principle is an important component of Rawls‘s account of distributive justice. However,
the Rawlsian framework is procedural—maintaining that a distribution of goods and
hardships (within a free constitutional democracy) is just only if it meets the requirements
of all the principles. In JF, Rawls says:
It is sometimes objected to the difference principle as a principle of
distributive justice that it contains no restrictions on the overall nature of
permissible distributions. It is concerned, the objection runs, solely with
the least advantaged. But this objection is incorrect: it overlooks the fact
that the parts of the two principles of justice are designed to work in
tandem and apply as a unit. The requirements of the prior principles have
important distributive effects. Consider the effects of fair equality of
opportunity as applied to education, say, or the distributive effects of the
fair value of political liberties. We cannot possibly take the difference
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principle seriously so long as we think of it by itself, apart from its setting
within prior principles. 2
Accordingly, in what follows I aim to demonstrate how the principles of the Rawlsian
framework are supposed to work together, and should be applied to environmental
concerns in a four-stage sequence. By doing this, I hope to fill a gap in the literature
concerning the relevance of Rawlsian contractualism to contemporary environmental
policy, and at the same time illustrate what background environmental justice would look
like for a liberal constitutional democracy. So for now I shall not focus on Rawls‘s
original position of equality, but rather on second stage of his contracting procedure,
which is the constitutional convention.
The Constitutional Convention
In order to demonstrate the potential for the present model to help us consider just
domestic environmental policy, we must recall that we are dealing with a four-stage
contracting procedure for a particular constitutional democracy (instead of a majoritarian
democracy)3 that is comprised of free and equal citizens. As discussed earlier, the
citizens‘ representatives argue for, and agree upon, the principles of justice during the
primary phase of the heuristic—i.e., the original position of equality. These principles are
to distribute Rawls‘s primary goods—i.e., freedom of thought and religion, political
freedoms, freedom of association, the right to freely choose one‘s occupation, the right to
equal opportunity, the powers of offices and positions of authority, income, wealth, and
the social bases of self-respect.4 The first principle the representatives apply after they
leave the original position is the equal liberty principle, which is to distribute basic rights
2
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and liberties. Specifically, they apply this principle to the essentials of their society‘s
charter during a constitutional convention.
During this stage of the framework, the symmetrically situated representatives (still
behind a veil of ignorance) will agree upon a constitution that will ensure that every
citizen has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties
(and rights)—compatible with the same scheme of liberties (and rights) for all. 5 One
should not think of the parties using the second principle of justice during the
constitutional convention. According to Rawls:
The first principle applies at the stage of the constitutional convention, and
whether constitutional essentials are assured is more or less visible on the
face of the constitution and in its political arrangements and the way they
work in practice. By contrast the second principle applies at the legislative
stage and it bears on all kinds of social and economic legislation, and on
the many kinds of issues arising at this point…6
Thus, like Rawls, the parties of the present extension will only employ the second
principle of justice (i.e., the principle of fair opportunity, the difference principle, and the
just savings principle) during the legislative stage—when they are shaping federal
agencies, laws, and policies.
Before we move on to the details of applying the first principle of justice to the
constitutional essentials of a liberal democracy, I should note three assumptions that will
hold throughout the remainder of the project. First, the constitution that we are
considering will establish the familiar three branches of government: executive,
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legislative, and judicial. Second, while the Rawlsian project (broadly construed) could be
fruitfully adapted for both a welfare-state capitalist society and a liberal socialist regime,
I shall follow Rawls in assuming that the society for which we are working out the details
of extension is a property-owning democracy. 7 Third, we are assuming that the ―real
world‖ societies to which we might apply the present framework come close to
constitutionally guaranteeing the liberties that are to be secured by the first principle of
justice.
Of course, the third assumption is not true of many societies today. In such cases,
Rawls maintained that we are permitted to use his general conception of justice. In his TJ,
Rawls expressed the general conception of justice in these terms: ―All social values—
liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to
everyone‘s advantage.‖8 But the use of this general conception—with its rejection of the
priority of equal basic liberty—is only permitted in contexts where it is needed to
establish equal basic liberties. Thus, following Rawls, the framework we are developing
shall suppose that that the society we are considering is reasonably close to a
constitutional liberal democracy that can secure a sensible list of basic liberties for its
citizens.9
The Equal Liberty Principle and Constitutional Essentials
Again, for Rawls, the first principle of justice—the equal liberty principle—maintains
that every person must have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for
7
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all. 10 A note of caution is in order here. While a fundamental idea is that basic liberties
can only be restricted for the sake of other basic liberties, one should not understand the
equal liberty principle as being a maximizing strategy. 11 In his earlier TJ, Rawls did
articulate the principle by saying ―each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.‖12 But consider that a
society can always do more to enable its citizens to utilize their basic liberties. In fact, it
is theoretically possible for a society to devote all its resources to ensuring that the
scheme of equal basic liberties (whatever it turns out to be) is as extensive as possible. Of
course, this would leave no resources for ensuring fair equal opportunity. It would also
deplete assets that could be used to make sure that social inequalities are distributed to
the greatest advantage of the least well-off members of society (as required by the second
principle of justice). Moreover, it would leave society with no resources to meet the
intergenerational requirements of just savings. Accordingly, we shall follow Rawls in
relaxing the equal liberty principle so as to guarantee only a fully adequate scheme.
This fully adequate scheme that the parties are to deliberate upon during their
constitutional convention is comprised of basic rights and liberties. But most of the
legitimate freedoms that citizens enjoy are not absolutes, and here it is very important to
note the distinction between basic and non-basic liberties. Rawls was like the traditional
social contract theorists in thinking that the parties to the social contract would agree to
give up some of their liberties to the state. But what sort of liberties would the parties
agree to exchange for the benefits of social cooperation? What are the most rational and
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reasonable principles to use when thinking about trading off autonomy for the gains of
having a government in place that will allow the parties to escape the (traditionally
understood) state of nature? We need a methodological approach to comprising a list of
those rights and liberties that are never to be violated or traded off (within a well-ordered
constitutional liberal democracy), and are thus to be considered ―inalienable‖ and basic.
Rawls thought that the way one should draw up a list of basic liberties is by
connecting them with his conception of the person.13 Recall that people have two powers
of moral personality: the ability to have, to revise, and rationally pursue a conception of
the good (i.e., the capacity to be rational); and a sense of justice (i.e., the capacity to be
reasonable).14 Rawls thought that basic rights and liberties are justified only to the extent
that they provide the political and social conditions required for the adequate
development and full use of these powers. There are two specific cases he had in mind. 15
First, citizens need certain rights and freedoms in order to develop and use their moral
powers to make proper judgments regarding the justness of institutions and policies.
Second, certain rights and freedoms are required for citizens to develop and use their
moral powers in forming and rationally pursuing their conception of the good. One must
accordingly ask: if the basic structure of society were to not guarantee a particular liberty
(or right), would citizens then be able to develop and fully exercise these moral powers
(over a complete life) at a level that could adequately meet the demands of these two
fundamental cases?16 If the answer is no, then we are to view the liberty (or right) as
being basic.
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What will such a list look like? Rawls‘s list of equal basic liberties (and rights)
includes the following.
1. Freedom of thought
2. Freedom of conscience
3. Political liberties (e.g., the right to vote, the right to participate in politics) 17
4. Freedom of association
5. Rights and liberties related to the freedom and integrity of the person
6. The rights and freedoms related to the rule of law 18
7. The right to hold and to have exclusive use of personal property19
Unfortunately, it is out of the scope of the present project to explicate Rawls‘s arguments
for why each of these is required for citizens to develop and effectively use their moral
powers as persons. Rather, we shall simply presume that Rawls was correct in thinking
that these liberties (and rights) can be given some such proper grounding. With this
supposition noted, I shall soon relate many of these basic rights and liberties to
contemporary environmentalism, and to the establishment of background environmental
justice within a liberal democracy. But I will first show how the Rawlsian can cogently
argue that certain environmental rights ought to also be viewed as basic rights that must
also be constitutionally protected.
The Rawlsian Case for Fundamental Environmental Rights
There is considerable debate over whether fundamental environmental rights should
be constitutionally protected. When considering the possibility of enforceable
environmental rights, the Rawlsian has several options. One strategy would be to argue
17
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that, at some point, the contracting parties would agree that certain environmental rights
should be constitutionally protected. This is not unrealistic, as political interest in
constitutionally guaranteeing certain rights and principles has been rising for the last
thirty years. James May (2006) points out that there are about one hundred and thirty
countries that now have provisions within their constitutions that address environmental
norms; and in about sixty of these countries, the constitution contains fundamental
environmental rights.20 Tim Hayward (2003) notes: ―No recently promulgated
constitution has omitted reference to environmental principles, and many older
constitutions are being amended to include them.‖ 21 Thus, we must at least consider
whether the Rawlsian framework can be cogently expanded to include such provisions.
As we observed in chapters three and four, additions to Rawls‘s conception of basic
rights and liberties must be supported by reasons that comply with our conception of
public reason. However, I think that the idea that certain basic environmental rights are
required for people to develop and pursue a reasonable worldview is now uncontroversial
enough to be an object of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus. If this is correct, then the
inclusion of basic environmental rights should be able to comply with pubic reason.
According to our earlier discussion of how Rawls connected basic rights to his
conception of the person, the specific argument for such an extension is fairly
straightforward.
1. If citizens of a liberal democracy need certain environmental rights in order to
develop and use their moral powers in forming and rationally pursuing their
20
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conception of the good (over a complete life), then the contracting parties would
agree to treat those environmental rights as basic rights.
2. Citizens of a liberal democracy need certain environmental rights in order to
develop and use their moral powers in forming and rationally pursuing their
conception of the good (over a complete life).
3. Thus, the contracting parties will agree to treat certain environmental rights as
basic rights.
The justification for the second premise is fairly simple. Air pollution (e.g., from fine
particulates, carbon monoxide, lead) can cause a wide array of serious health problems,
and even premature death. The same holds for anthropogenic contamination found in
water (e.g., industrial chemicals, pathogenic organisms) and soil (e.g., herbicides,
pesticides, heavy metals). Such pollution can clearly be an impediment to pursuing a
reasonable conception of the good.
At this point nothing substantial hinges on whether we view such claims as positive or
negative rights—e.g., the right to clean air vs. the right not to be poisoned. The Rawlsian
framework could effectively ground either sort of claim. But since negative rights are
perhaps less controversial, I shall now simply maintain that the contracting parties will
agree that the list of equal basic rights and liberties must include certain negative
environmental rights—i.e., not to have harmful levels of air, water, and soil pollution
interfere with one‘s rational and reasonable life plans.
If this reasoning is sound, then fundamental environmental rights must also be
included as primary goods within the Rawlsian framework we are developing. Recall
Rawls‘s original position. Beyond the fact that it is a pluralistic constitutional democracy
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existing in circumstances of justice, the contracting parties do not know what type of
society they are dealing with, or the person they represent. During this phase of the
heuristic, we are to understand primary goods simply as the (thinly defined) fundamental
rights and liberties (e.g., freedom of thought, speech, and religion, as well as other
political freedoms of association), freedom of movement and free choice of opportunity,
the right to equal opportunity, powers of offices and positions of authority and
responsibility, income, wealth, and the social basis of self-respect.22
While not all primary goods are basic rights and liberties, Rawls thought that all the
basic rights and liberties are primary goods. So, the inclusion of environmental rights as
human rights (basic rights) will cause a swelling of Rawls‘s index of primary goods. Are
we permitted to modify Rawls‘s list of primary goods? We are. Rawls himself advised us
to make his index of primary goods more specific at the constitutional, legislative, and
judicial state of his four-stage sequence.23 In his JF, Rawls says:
As citizens we are the beneficiaries of the government‘s providing various
personal goods and services to which we are entitled, as in the case of
health care, or of its providing public goods (in the economists sense), as
in the case of measures ensuring public health (clean air and unpolluted
water, and the like). All of these items can (if necessary) be included in the
index of primary goods.24
So, we know what primary goods are. In the hyperbolically thinnest sense, Rawls told us
that they are simply the ―…various social conditions and all-purpose means that are
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generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two
moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good.‖25 Some
environmental rights undoubtedly fit this description—e.g., the right not to be poisoned
by unhealthy levels of carbon monoxide in the air. Thus, in principle, their inclusion
should not be excessively difficult—even if it causes our list of primary goods to become
thicker during the later phases of the Rawlsian model.
The Case for Deferring Environmental Rights
While I am arguing that the Rawlsian model should include fundamental
environmental rights within its listing of constitutionally protected basic rights and
liberties (and this suggestion will be employed in the following chapters), there is another
option for the Rawlsian system. This is to not argue that environmental rights must be
included in the constitution of a liberal democracy. Rather, one might wish to simply
defer such issues to the legislative stage of the Rawlsian model. The idea is that during
the legislative phase the contracting representatives will agree to environmental agencies
and legislation that will sufficiently protect the other basic rights and liberties—e.g.,
those related to the freedom and integrity of the person. Perhaps even without being
grounded in fundamental constitutional environmental rights, such systems of federal
agencies and law might be sufficient to establish background environmental justice.
This approach has several virtues. First, by keeping the list of basic liberties as small
as possible, it will ease the problem of balancing the weight of basic liberties when
conflicts arise. In his PL, Rawls noted: ―Whenever we enlarge the list of basic liberties
we risk weakening the protection of the most essential ones and recreating within the
scheme of liberties the indeterminate and unguided balancing problems we had hoped to
25
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avoid by a suitably circumscribed notion of priority.‖ 26 Also, by deferring constitutional
environmental rights, there will be no need to define the content of environmental rights
or modify a list of primary goods during the constitutional convention. Again, the
Rawlsian could cogently maintain that such matters might be more properly handled at
the later stages, when the veil of ignorance is opened more.
However, there could be a significant drawback to deferring fundamental
environmental rights—i.e., not constitutionally granting citizens inalienable
environmental rights. Specifically, in situations where there is lax international
environmental law, citizens might be left institutionally unprotected from harmful levels
of air, water, and soil pollution. James May (2006) correctly points out that the ―need to
entrench fundamental rights in a national constitution is especially important when extant
international, national, and subnational legal mechanisms do not protect the right.‖27 He
goes on to note that the same applies in the case of fundamental environmental rights.
While this explains the importance of illustrating the best Rawlsian case for
constitutionally protecting certain environmental rights, it should be noted that there is a
certain degree of flexibility in the overall Rawlsian framework. While I have just
explained how basic environmental rights could be cogently included in the list of basic
rights and liberties, nothing essential to the overall Rawlsian project turns on whether
environmental rights are constitutionally protected per se. Again, a Rawlsian could
maintain that the environmental policy developed during the legislative stage will be
strong enough to sufficiently protect citizens‘ basic rights and liberties related to the
freedom and integrity of the person.
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A Constitutional Minimum
Moreover, while both of the aforementioned strategies are quite viable, there could be
another option for the Rawlsian. This would be to simply cover fundamental
environmental protections under Rawls‘s constitutional minimum. Recall that Rawls also
thought that a social minimum, which provides for the basic needs of all citizens, must be
a constitutional essential. 28 The idea is that citizens are to be constitutionally entitled to
enough of a minimum of social goods so that they can effectively exercise their basic
liberties. However, the constitutional social minimum is not to be established by using
the more demanding difference principle. 29 While the stronger demands of the difference
principle are grounded in the idea of reciprocity between free and equal citizens, the
demands of a constitutional social minimum are merely rooted in what people are owed
in virtue of their humanity. 30
Following Rawls, then, the present model maintains that what the difference principle
specifies should not be viewed as a constitutional essential. 31 Rather, the constitutional
social minimum simply covers the basic needs that are ―essential for a decent human
life.‖32 Nonetheless, during the legislative stage, the contracting parties will understand
that many environmental goods are essential for a decent human life. As a result, I shall
soon argue that—irrespective of the model‘s position on basic environmental rights—
because citizens need certain environmental goods in order to effectively exercise their
other basic rights and liberties, the contracting parties will then ensure that certain
environmental goods are contained within the constitutional minimum. This, then, will
28
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play a significant role in the overall shape of Rawlsian background environmental justice
when I later include the requirement of just savings for future generations (in chapter
seven).
Property Rights and Economic Liberties are Not Basic Rights
Before moving on to the legislative stage, we should note that the Rawlsian system is
compatible with the Lockean rights of life, liberty, and property. However, the charter
agreed to by the contracting parties during their constitutional convention will not protect
property rights as traditionally understood by libertarians. Rather, following Rawls, the
framework I am laying out distinguishes between the right to hold personal property and
the right to own and control non-personal property. While the former is a basic freedom
that must be constitutionally protected in any society well-ordered by the Rawlsian
framework, the latter is not. Specifically, Rawls argued that one should not view the
following as basic property rights:
(i)

the right to private property in natural resources and means of production
generally; including rights of acquisition and bequest;

(ii)

the right to property as including the equal right to participate in the control of
the mean of production and of natural resources, both of which are to be
socially, not privately, owned.33

But why should the system under consideration not treat the right to own and control
society‘s means of producing goods and services as a fundamental constitutionally
protected right? The answer is that free and equal citizens can still develop and pursue a
reasonable conception of the good without the absolute right to own a phone company or
a coalmine. Denying a citizen the basic property right to a river or a forest will not
33
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undercut the social basis of her self-respect. But unlike owning the means of production,
personal property is undoubtedly required for reasonable citizens to pursue their
conception of the good. Yet, suppose that a liberal democracy were to view economic
rights as basic rights. If this were to occur, then the constitutionality of regulating
concentrations of wealth and power would become precarious. But, as we shall see in the
next chapter, this is required to ensure fair equality of opportunity and the full value of all
citizens‘ equal liberties. Rawls‘s student, Samuel Freeman, correctly notes:
…instituting the economic liberties as basic liberties would undermine the
ability of many free and equal persons to achieve economic independence
and enjoy income and wealth adequate to their leading a wide range of
reasonable plans of life. Unregulated economic liberties then render
practically impossible many persons‘ adequate development of their moral
powers, and therewith freedom and equality and their having fair
opportunities to pursue a reasonable conception of the good. This is the
underlying message in Rawls‘s explicit rejection of basic economic
liberties. 34
Thus, like Rawls, the present conception of political justice does not view the
aforementioned economic liberties as basic rights. This will be a salient feature of the
extension we are now considering. For the procedural model of background
environmental justice implies that not only do citizens lack the basic right to do whatever
they want to the natural environment (e.g., pollute), no citizen (let alone a corporation)
should have the basic (constitutionally guaranteed) right to mine coal or drill for
petroleum.
34
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Moreover, the present model implies that it is not possible for environmental laws that
apply to businesses and corporations to violate any of the basic property rights and
economic liberties.35 Such laws would also include those that guarantee adequate
sanitation, regulate pollution in mines, control greenhouse gasses in factories, mandate
solar panels in manufacturing facilities, etc. In a society that has secured background
environmental justice, basic environmental rights must always trump the right to control
non-personal property. And when there is a conflict between them, the right to a basic
minimum of environmental goods—as well as to secure the rights and liberties related to
the freedom and integrity of the person (e.g., not to be poisoned)—will always be prior to
the right to non-personal property. With these items in place, let us now move on to
Rawls‘s principle of fair equality of opportunity, and the legislative phase of our
extension to Rawls‘s special conception of political justice.

35
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Chapter 5
Environmental Justice—Fair Equality of Opportunity
We are slowly piecing together a theory of procedural justice for a particular
constitutional democracy. Accordingly, with the constitution of the preceding chapter in
place, let us now move on and consider the legislative stage of the Rawlsian framework.
During this phase—which is the third of the four stages of Rawls‘s heuristic—the veil of
ignorance is partially lifted, and the parties are aware of the availability of natural
resources, as well as the levels of available technology. They will be advised of the best
scientific predictions regarding the effects of deforestation, pollution, greenhouse gasses,
etc. The contracting parties are aware that, in many ways, a healthy natural environment
contributes to the prosperity of a society of free and equal citizens. However, the parties
understand that, at some level, any well-ordered society (which is a fair system of social
cooperation over time from one generation to the next 1) will need to pollute the natural
environment and emit greenhouse gasses. Thus, in order to secure the interests of those
whom they represent, they will agree that limits must be set. Also, they will agree that, in
order to ensure compliance, regulatory bodies must be implemented.
Irrespective of whether the Rawlsian system implements basic environmental rights,
or simply takes advantage of Rawls‘s social minimum, the parties will now agree to
federal environmental institutions (i.e., laws, agencies, and policies) designed to protect
the constitutionally secured rights and liberties related to the freedom and integrity of the
person, which were discussed in the last chapter. The reasoning is fairly straightforward.
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1. If, during the legislative stage, the contracting parties understand that certain
environmental laws, agencies, and policies are needed to protect citizens‘ basic
rights and liberties related to the freedom and integrity of the person, then the
parties will agree to implement them.
2. Certain environmental laws, agencies, and policies are required to protect
citizens‘ basic rights and liberties related to the freedom and integrity of the
person.
3. Thus, during the legislative phase, the parties will agree to implement certain
environmental laws, agencies, and policies.
Again, at this point within the heuristic, the contracting parties have all the scientific
information relevant for constructing federal law and policy. And while the veil of
ignorance is shut enough for the parties to not be aware of who they represent, they are
aware of the constitution to which they have consented, the levels of the human
population, which species are endangered, levels of natural resources, what sort of
technology is available, and so on. They also have the same understanding our experts
have regarding the dangers of mercury, arsenic, and so on. We could even imagine that at
this point the symmetrically situated parties are given our best environmental hazard
reports, environmental health data, toxicology reports, etc.
Each of the contracting parties is to then secure the fundamental interests of the citizen
he or she represents. Under these circumstances they will accordingly agree that strong
health safety laws, environmental impact assessments, and so on, will be required to
protect the constitutionally protected environmental rights of the last chapter—or at least
to protect the basic rights and liberties related to the freedom and integrity of the person
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whom they represent (if fundamental environmental rights are not constitutionally
protected). To this end, they will then agree to establish an environmental protection
agency, clean water legislation, clean air legislation, clean soil legislation, environmental
laws pertaining to the disposal of hazardous wastes, etc. However, we should not think of
the parties establishing the policies we presently find—e.g., the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, the U.S. Clean Water Act, or the U.S. clean air acts. In fact, there is
presently no ―U.S. Clean Soil Act.‖ At this point we are simply imagining the contracting
parties agreeing to establish federal environmental laws, agencies, and policies. The
overall shape such entities must have will become clearer as we consider fair equality of
opportunity, the difference principle, and the just savings principle.
The Right to Environmental Goods Through a Social Minimum
But before examining the remainder of Rawls‘s special conception of justice, we
should note another viable route for the Rawlsian. This is to reason in terms of citizens
being entitled to something (e.g., clean air), instead of being protected from something—
diseases, toxic chemicals, etc. Consider the following ―social minimum‖ argument.
Recall that during the constitutional convention the parties will agree to some sort of a
constitutionally guaranteed social minimum—one that provides for the basic needs of all
citizens. This minimum is determined by what citizens need to effectively exercise their
basic rights and liberties. During the legislative stage, the parties are aware of their
mandate to meet this minimum, which, again, has nothing to do with the difference
principle. Rawls thought that merely in virtue of their humanity, citizens are at least
entitled to the bare minimum needed to cover the fundamental needs ―essential for a
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decent human life.‖2 So, since citizens need many environmental goods (e.g., clean air,
safe water) in order to make an effective use of their basic liberties, we can argue that
these environmental goods must be included within the constitutionally guaranteed social
minimum. Here is the argument.
1. If the contracting parties are aware that citizens need certain environmental goods
in order to effectively exercise their basic rights and liberties, then the parties will
agree to include these environmental goods within the constitutionally guaranteed
social minimum.
2. Citizens do need certain environmental goods in order to effectively exercise their
basic rights and liberties.
3. The contracting parties will agree to include certain environmental goods within
the constitutionally guaranteed social minimum.
There are a wide variety of environmental goods. An incomplete list would include:
protection from ultraviolet radiation (i.e., a functioning ozone layer); clean air; clean
water; clean soil; protection from noise pollution; a safe workplace; access to natural
surroundings (e.g., parks); aesthetically pleasing vistas; compensation for environmental
burdens; and perhaps the preservation of traditional environmental practices connected to
local natural resources.3 Within an adequate inventory of environmental goods (whatever
it might look like), we must distinguish between those that are primary (or basic, or
fundamental), and those that are not to be guaranteed by the constitutional minimum. But
where do we draw the line? The present extension of Rawls‘s program maintains that if
an environmental good is generally needed for citizens to exercise their fundamental
2
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rights and liberties, then it is to be considered within the domain of the constitutionally
protected social minimum. We cannot demand precision at this point. However, we might
suppose, for example, that the rights to clean air and water and to a safe workplace would
be examples of rights to be included within the guaranteed social minimum. And, as such
rights are required for citizens to exercise their moral powers and pursue a reasonable
conception of the good, they must also be included within a list of primary social goods.
Securing Environmental Goods For All Citizens
Suppose, then, that the parties—who are aware of the nature of environmental
diseases (e.g., cancer, asthma, lead poisoning)—consent to certain environmental
policies, and legislation. For example, we might imagine the parties agreeing to
something like the U.S.‘s Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which was
designed ―to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions…‖ 4 The idea, again, is that such legislation is required
to ensure that all citizens can effectively use their basic liberties. Moreover, the parties
must also agree to some sort of limits. But while a complete analysis of how such limits
are determined will require the remainder of Rawls‘s special conception of justice, the
nature of many restrictions can be ascertained without the use of the difference principle
and the just savings principle.
For example, if required for all citizens to exercise their fundamental rights and
liberties, some chemicals (e.g., arsenic) will be tightly regulated, and some chemicals
(e.g., DDT) might be completely banned. Under the present model, background
environmental justice requires ensuring that all citizens have clean air to breathe, access
to clean drinking water, and so on. This starts with safe breast milk for citizens to
4
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consume while in infancy, and ends with clean air for them to gasp at the end of their life.
Again, the difference principle is not needed to show that justice requires these things.
The parties simply understand that having safe air to breathe, healthy food to eat, and
access to clean drinking water are things that all people need in order to lead a decent life
and exercise their basic liberties.
The Precautionary Principle
Recall Rawls‘s familiar thought experiment involving two rational self-interested
individuals, each of whom wants the most of a certain piece of pie. A fair procedure for
these two people to cut and distribute the piece of pie would be for one of them to cut the
pie, and then the other to choose which resulting piece of the pie each individual
receives.5 The fact that her opponent will likely choose the biggest piece of pie then
constrains the rational self-interested pie cutter to slice the pie as best she can down the
middle, thus guaranteeing her the least bad outcome—i.e., she will most likely receive
the biggest smallest piece of pie. Similarly, although Rawls did not want us to imagine
the representatives as assuming (falsely) that their citizen‘s placement within society is
determined by a ―malevolent opponent,‖ he thought that his principles would be selected
by contracting parties who held such a thought.6
It is similarly instructive to contemplate what sorts of agreements the contracting
parties would produce at the legislative phase if they were thinking in terms of an
enemy‘s selection of their citizen‘s placement within society. Admittedly, this is a nonstandard use of the maximin rule under Rawls‘s own theory. Nonetheless, referring to the
maximin rule, Rawls says in JF:
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It is simply a useful heuristic device. Focusing on the worst outcomes has
the advantage of forcing us to consider what our fundamental interests
really are when it comes to the design of the basic structure. This is not a
question that we would often, if ever, ask ourselves in ordinary life. Part of
the point of the original position is that it forces us to ask that question and
moreover to do so in a highly special situation which gives it a definite
sense. 7
So, when shaping legislation to ensure that all citizens can effectively use their basic
liberties, we must suppose that the contracting parties understand that a citizen‘s physical
environment can play a large role in determining his or her prospects for attaining a
reasonable conception of the good. For example, the symmetrically situated parties will
understand that lead in soil, air, and drinking water can poison children, and that the
serious damage caused by lead poisoning (e.g., brain damage, neurological problems)
typically engenders a precipitous decline in the likelihood that the victim will attain
positions of power within society (when contrasted with those individuals not poisoned
by lead). Thus, the parties understand that the citizens they represent would generally
find it more difficult to secure primary goods, were they to be poisoned by lead.
Moreover, following Rawls, we must suppose that the symmetrically situated parties
behind the veil of ignorance are not gamblers. 8 In his TJ, Rawls says:
…the veil of ignorance excludes all but the vaguest knowledge of
likelihoods. The parties have no basis for determining the probable nature
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of their society, or their place in it. Thus they have strong reasons for
being wary of probability calculations if any other course is open to them. 9
Of course, if the parties were gamblers, then if they knew that a policy would benefit
90% of the citizens and harm the other 10%, then they might be inclined to support it.
But from the perspective of the contracting parties, the agreements made from behind the
veil of ignorance are irrevocable. The parties will therefore adopt a maximin posture (and
accordingly be particularly concerned with worst-case possibilities). So, when voting on
federal policies, the parties always ask: if society were to adopt policy P, what would be
the worst that could happen to the citizen I represent?
Now, even though he maintained that the contracting parties must make their
selections based upon the fundamental interests of the citizens they represent, Rawls was
no utilitarian. Imagine, for example, that the parties are considering two policies, A and
B, for a society comprised of three individuals, i1, i2, and i3. Suppose the parties
understand that policy A will lead to i1 having –10 units of utility, i2 having 100 units of
utility, and i3 having 400 units of utility. Suppose that policy B will result in i1 having 70
units of utility, i2 possessing 100 units of utility, and i3 obtaining 110 units of utility. The
expected net utility of policy A (290 units) is then more than that of policy B (280
units).10 A utilitarian maximizing strategy would accordingly have the parties choose
policy A over policy B. However, having adopted a maximin strategy, the parties will
select policy B, which leaves the worst off citizen (i1) with 70 units of utility, instead of
minus 10.
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Along these lines, Stephen Gardner has cogently provided a Rawlsian ―maximin‖
argument for ―core‖ uses of the precautionary principle. 11 Nobody thinks it would be
rational for all of us to always employ conservative precautionary reasoning. For
example, it would lead to the conclusion that nobody should every go skiing, hiking, or
camping. (While unlikely, such activities involve the possibility of serious bodily injury
or death.) But this does not show that precautionary reasoning is always irrational. And in
this fashion Gardner contends that there are some ―core uses‖ in which a precautionary
approach seems entirely befitting. One of these, he thinks, is to be found within the
contracting situation of Rawls‘s model.
Gardner is correct. There are certain things the parties are not willing risk losing for a
greater amount of expected utility. We cannot demand precision, but examples might
include the possibility of losing clean air, water, or food. So, too, would be the danger of
being poisoned by toxic substances in manufactured products, as well as the risk of being
an environmental refugee. Given their unique situation, and the stakes involved, this is
not a foolish posture for the contracting parties to take. Freeman points out:
It is not being risk-averse, but rather entirely rational, to be unwilling to
gamble, in the face of no information whatsoever about probabilities, with
the liberties, opportunities, and resources needed to pursue one‘s most
cherished ends and commitments, all for the sake of gaining the
marginally greater income and wealth that may be available in a society
governed by the principle of utility. 12
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Thus, contra Harsanyi (and other Bayesians), if the contracting parties understand that
there are potentially terrible risks involved, they will use a conservative decision-making
strategy. For example, they will ask themselves what could be the worst to happen to
their citizen if society places a ban on children‘s toys that contain phthalates (which
affect citizens‘ hormones and cause cancer).13 Similarly, they will ask: what will be the
worst outcome for their citizen if society fails to place a ban on such toys?
Gardner focuses precautionary reasoning on the important issue of global climate
change, to which we shall soon turn. Still, I think that the same basic argument would be
embraced by the parties during the legislative stage of the domestic model, and would
thus constrain them to adopt a precautionary principle, which would then be used when
deliberating on a wide variety of federal environmental policies. Perhaps the most famous
articulation of a precautionary principle is found in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development: ―where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, the lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.‖ 14 A constitutional liberal
democracy well-ordered by the present Rawlsian framework will then adopt a
precautionary approach to environmental policy—perhaps along the lines of (what is at
least stated by) the European Commission. 15
Therefore, instead of using a statistical cost-benefit analysis, the parties will employ a
precautionary principle. If a policy might cause citizens to fall below the constitutionally
guaranteed social minimum (e.g., it might cause health problems or death), or if it could
13
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cause citizens to lose the environmental goods they need in order to effectively exercise
their basic rights and liberties (safe levels of air, water, soil, etc.), the parties will not
permit it unless the scientific consensus is that it is safe. Of course, the implications of
injecting this sort of reasoning into the Rawlsian model are significant. During the
legislative phase of Rawls‘s model, the contracting parties will design legislation that will
force the participants within society (e.g., companies, industries) to demonstrate the longterm safety of many products (e.g., industrial chemicals) before their general use is
permitted. So, the burden of proof would then fall on the chemical industry, for example,
to prove that the many herbicides and pesticides that companies wish to manufacture and
put on the market have no unsafe long-term synergistic health effects. The federal
legislation enacted by the contracting parties will also mandate that before genetically
modified organisms are made available for public use, it must be proved that their longterm use will not be dangerous to human beings. And, as we shall observe in chapter
seven, the legislation agreed to by the contracting parties will require proof that the long
term use of genetically modified organisms (for example) will not undermine the
sustainability of core aspects of the natural environment.
Fair Equality of Opportunity
We have seen that in order for a constitutional democracy to establish Rawlsian
background justice, it needs to first guarantee equal basic liberties for all in accord with
the equal liberty principle. We are imagining that the contracting parties have used the
first principle of justice during their constitutional convention, and that they have settled
upon a charter for their society that ensures that all citizens have the same indefeasible
claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with the same
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scheme of liberties for all other citizens. I have shown that certain environmental rights
and legislation are justified through the Rawlsian notions of basic rights and liberties, as
well as a constitutional minimum. Moreover, we have seen that due to the ―maximin‖
strategy adopted by the contracting parties, a precautionary approach must be taken when
settling on human health and environmental policy. Thus, a society well ordered by the
present model would not permit the implementation structures that would allow unsafe
levels of environmental burdens.
But we should also suppose that the contracting parties understand that the social
cooperation required for any well-ordered society will require the production of myriad
goods and services. Such production, however, requires energy, and along with it,
anthropogenic pollution, the emission of greenhouse gasses, and other harms to the
natural environment. Background environmental justice requires that, once safe levels are
established, disparities in environmental goods only then be tolerated if they arise in
accord with the principle of fair equality of opportunity—i.e., all citizens must have a fair
equal opportunity to be made more or less advantaged by the disparities. This is part of
how the present model explains the wrongness of environmental racism, sexism,
classism, etc. Again, this has nothing to do with the difference principle.
So, imagine that the contracting parties are in the legislative phase of the domestic
model. The principle of fair equality of opportunity says that offices and positions must
be open to all citizens—irrespective of sex, race, social status, sexual orientation, and so
forth—under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. But for Rawls, this is much
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stronger than formal equality, or what Nagel called ―negative equality of opportunity.‖ 16
In his JF, Rawls says:
…(F)air equality of opportunity is said to require not merely that public
offices and social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should
have a fair chance to attain them. To specify the idea of a fair chance we
say: supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those
who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to
use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of
their social class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop
until the age of reason. In all parts of society there are to be roughly the
same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated
and endowed.17
Accordingly, we shall now see that the sort of equality possessed by citizens of many
―liberal democracies‖ (e.g., the U.S.) is much weaker than what is embraced by the
present model. For while the principle of fair equality of opportunity will require
institutional measures to make sure that society does not have monopolies, it will also
require similar measures to ensure that society does not contain excessive concentrations
of wealth, eliminate organized crime, as well as to make sure that citizen groups (e.g.,
consumer, environmental, labor) can compete for political influence on the same footing
as corporations and business groups. In a society well-ordered by fair equality of
opportunity, the poorest citizens and the wealthiest citizens (who are similarly motivated
and talented) must have the same chance of attaining the highest offices within society.
16
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Thus, the present Rawlsian model also entails universal education and healthcare, as well
as the prohibiting of political dynasties—Kennedy, Bush, Clinton, etc.
Avoiding Excessive Concentrations of Wealth
Rawls thought that a democratic society well-ordered by his theory will take measures
to avoid excessive concentrations of wealth. We cannot be precise when addressing the
issue of when a concentration of wealth becomes excessive. Nonetheless, we might
suppose that a concentration becomes excessive when it causes some to fall below a
social minimum under which they cannot exercise their basic liberties. Also, a
concentration of wealth is excessive when it tends to act as a barrier to both short and
long term fair equality of opportunity. Rawls says: ―A free market system must be set
within a framework of political and legal institutions that adjust the long-run trend of
economic forces so as to prevent excessive concentrations of property and wealth,
especially those likely to lead to political domination.‖18 In this vein, in ―Distributive
Justice and Social Policy: Some Reflections on Rawls and Income Distribution‖, (2002)
Olli Kangas has discussed the fact that citizens living in countries with a high Gini
coefficient—a measurement of income and asset inequalities—generally have less of
income mobility. 19 Accordingly, background justice requires that redistributive measures
be enacted to ensure that fair equality of opportunity in society‘s competition for
environmental goods and hardships is met for all citizens.
Taxation
The present model follows Rawls in maintaining that in order to subvert such
concentrations of wealth, governments (of property owning democracies) are permitted to
18
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institute methods of progressive taxation, wealth taxes, inheritance taxes, and the like. 20
One way to imagine Rawlsian taxation is to compare the idea of progressive taxes with
the ideas of flat and regressive taxes. Under a flat tax scheme, all citizens are taxed in
accord with the same percentage of their income. And regressive taxation involves the
payers paying fixed amounts of money. These are not to be generally adopted under the
Rawlsian framework.
Consider the following illustration:21
Income Level

Progressive Tax

Flat Tax

Regressive Tax

Tax/% of income

Tax/% of income

Tax/% of income

$200,000

$50,000/25%

$40,000/20%

$5,000/2.5%

$80,000

$16,000/20%

$16,000/20%

$5,000/6.25%

$20,000

$2,000/10%

$4,000/20%

$5,000/25%

First, it is clear that since the parties are following a maximin strategy, they will adopt the
progressive taxation scheme. Behind the veil of ignorance, the parties understand that the
worst off (i.e., those at the $20,000 income level) will be best off if, of the available
options, they pay the rate that constitutes the smallest percentage of their income (10%,
instead of 20% or 25%). But the parties also understand that progressive taxes (as
opposed to regressive or flat taxes) make it easier for the underprivileged to secure their
final ends in life. So, as it relates to Rawls‘s second principle of justice, progressive
taxation schemes (and inheritance taxes) will be required to ensure that there are not
excessive concentrations of wealth acting as barriers to positive fair equality of
opportunity.
20
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So suppose, for example, that society wishes to devote tax money to environmental
restoration, public infrastructure, and to the creation ―green jobs.‖ The present model
maintains that forcing consumers to pay regressive sales taxes (e.g., on clothes, beer,
cigarettes, gasoline) for such expenditures is extremely offensive. Generally speaking, a
Rawlsian fair playing field means reducing the negative effects of taxation on the least
well-off members of society through progressive taxation. Of course sales taxes (which
are regressive) might be permitted if the aim is to lower consumption—e.g., of coal,
gasoline. However, such regressive tax measures will only be permitted if they are
needed for society to maintain a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties or to secure their
fair value. We shall return to this point later.
Universal Education
Rawlsian political liberalism is committed to universal education. There are a number
of reasons for this. One is that a ―brainwashed‖ or highly deceived populace lacks serious
autonomy. Political authority is illegitimate if it is not exercised in accord with policies
freely chosen by a body of educated and informed citizens who view themselves as
equals. Accordingly, education is required for citizens to view each other as free and
equal—a core constraint entailed by Rawls‘s version of political liberalism. 22
Moreover, the efficacy any democratic regime has at maintaining just institutions will
depend on an educated and informed electorate. For example, being less naïve, educated
voters are less likely to fall prey to deceptive advertisements paid for by those who would
benefit the most from not regulating markets, safety standards, pollution, greenhouse
gasses, etc. Furthermore, a democratic regime with an uninformed electorate is
potentially unstable due to the terrible choices it is most likely to eventually make—in
22
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terms of the president it elects, the policies it lacks the political will to adopt, and so
forth. 23 And citizens can only learn from past mistakes (collectively) if they are properly
informed of them—e.g., nuclear disasters. Thus, if a problem (e.g., climate change) is
serious, an educated public must be made aware of it.
But besides that fact that the parties are aware that they are organizing a democracy,
and that the effectiveness of any democratic society requires an educated and informed
citizenry, universal education is required for fair equality of opportunity. For one thing,
universal education generally leads to less ignorant citizens. Thus, universal education
makes possible a citizenry that is more adept at recognizing environmental injustices—
e.g., environmental racism. But, more generally, within a society well-ordered by
Rawls‘s principle of fair equality of opportunity, any two babies that enter society must
have the same chances of attaining the highest positions of authority within society (if
they have the same talents, and if they are so inclined to strive for them). The contracting
parties will accordingly ensure that structures are in place to guarantee that citizens who
possess equal natural aptitudes (and an equal desire for a superior position within society)
have the same prospects of attaining that position—no matter their sex, race, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, religion, etc. The idea, then, is that such structures
will undoubtedly include universal education, which incidentally might include vouchers
schemes. 24

23

Along these lines, Ben Block (2010) has argued that the decline of ―traditional journalism‖ is a real
concern for environmental causes. He laments: ―While online news and social media are spreading more
information more widely and rapidly, the growing lack of explanatory journalism may nonetheless result in
a less informed public. The trend should be a concern for anyone dedicated to environmental sustainability.
Journalism‘s economic adversity not only diminishes the ability of newsrooms to generate insightful,
balanced reports on science-related topics such as climate change, it also limits our understanding of how
governments and industry are responding to our global environmental crisis. Ben Block, ―Covering Climate
Change: reporting on the climate gets wider but shallower,‖ World Watch Vol. 23, No. 2 (2010): 20.
24
See Freeman, Rawls, p. 90.

95
Lobbying and Selling of the Public Trust
At the legislative phase, the contracting parties will deliberate on the privatization of
natural resources—e.g., water, petroleum, copper. They will also consider mandatory fuel
efficiency standards, the availability of public mass transportation, funding for green
chemistry, and (if they know that one of the main sources of fuel is petroleum) subsidies
for alternative fuels—such as biodiesel, or hydrogen. So at this stage, the principle fair
equality of opportunity constrains the contracting parties to not agree upon political
structures that permit certain industries (e.g., oil, coal) to unduly influence environmental
standards.25 The parties will similarly not consent to structures that allow special interests
(e.g., corporations, specific industries) to have more access to elected officials,
congressional committees, governmental agencies, and so forth, than other citizens.26 If
required to meet the demands of fair equality of opportunity, the parties will furthermore
agree to criminalize the selling of the public trust.
We can again see that we should not think of the United States when we think of a
well-ordered liberal democracy (in the sense being described). In fact, at this point it is
worth noting that Rawls, himself, was concerned with the authenticity of democracy in
America. In The Chronicle Review (2002), Samuel Freeman, who was a student and long
friend of Rawls, reports the following:
The rightward drift of American politics distressed Jack [John Rawls 27].
He said of Congress under Newt Gingrich's management, ―They are
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destroying our democracy.‖ He was appalled by the practice of allowing
business lobbyists into committee meetings to help draft legislation. He
condemned it, along with our system of corporate financing of political
campaigns, as ―selling the public trust.‖ He judged the current [George W.
Bush] administration and Congress by the same high standards. 28
Within a representative democracy organized by the Rawlsian model, powerful special
interests should not be able to interfere with the legislative process. The details of federal
energy policy are not to be worked out in secret meetings in the White house.
Background environmental justice requires that all citizens with the same talents and
inclinations have the same chances of proposing federal bills and amendments regarding
bioorganic fuels, solar power, fuel subsidies, and the like. This will accordingly require
safeguards against corporate cronyism, as well as tough regulations on political lobbying,
especially by those that would benefit the most from non-regulation—coal and oil
companies, the automobile industry, etc.
Free Speech
With this in mind, let us not turn our attention to the issue of free speech, which is
historically an indelible part of the liberal tradition, and an important factor to consider
with thinking about background environmental justice. Rawls says: ―…(W)ithin the
framework of background justice set up by the basic structure, individuals and
associations may do as they wish insofar as the rules of institutions permit.‖ 29 Once
background justice is secured, then as long as all participants observe the publicly
recognized rules, then any resulting distribution of social goods (including environmental
28
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goods/hardships) are to be viewed as just. Important components of these publicly
recognized rules, then, are the rules pertaining to media ownership, advertising, the
content of television, cable, internet, and so forth. Accordingly, we have already seen that
Rawls‘s first principle is to guarantee everyone the same right to free speech. But clearly
the value of this liberty is not the same for everyone. Freeman observes:
…(H)ow can there be equal freedom of expression when the worse off are
without the means to communicate their views to others? The wealthy
control mass communications (TV, radio, newspapers, book publishing,
etc.) and mainly publish positions that favor and indoctrinate others in
their views. Equal liberty without equal worth of liberty is an empty
abstraction. 30
Now, Rawls did not think that a constitutional democracy should secure the fair value of
all the basic liberties. However, he did believe that in order for a society to become wellordered by his principles it would have to guarantee the fair value of all the political
liberties—fundamental rights and freedoms that enable citizens to partake meaningfully
in public life. 31
Consider free speech, which is a political liberty. I shall follow Rawls and presume
that the second principle of justice is to secure the fair value of free speech—i.e., fair
equality of opportunity is to ensure that the value of free speech is not worth more only to
the most advantaged citizens (and other powerful participants, such as corporations).
Recall, then, that during the legislative stage, the contracting parties are privy to a wide
variety of social facts. Among these will include the fact that public opinion can be
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shaped by the media in a wide variety of ways. With the aim of ensuring the fair value of
free speech, the contracting parties will therefore agree to number of policy measures.
For example, it is likely that they will agree to use public money to support a variety of
media outlets—public radio, television, internet, etc. If required to maintain a ―fair
playing field,‖ as specified by the second principle of justice, they might also consent to
the public support of free and independent journalism (including environmental
journalism).
The Rawlsian model also permits a number of restrictions on free speech. Consider
that in order to obtain the autonomy required by political constructivism, free and equal
citizens—and not demagogues or powerful corporate interests—must settle the content
public reason. Political power is illegitimate when enacted by an ill informed public—
e.g., one that has been mislead by biased media coverage, extreme rhetorical tricks, or the
deliberate dissemination of falsehoods. Moreover, due to the fact that not all speech has
the same purpose, not all speech should be considered to be equally free by the
fundamental structures of society. Hate speech (and other forms bigoted expression)
generally has a different purpose than political speech. And political expression normally
has a different end then commercial speech. The question posed by the Rawlsian
framework, then, is what sorts of speech are required for citizens to fully develop and
exercise their moral powers? While a comprehensive answer is out of the scope of the
present project, it is clear that commercial speech is not needed for free and equal citizens
of a constitutional democracy to expand and employ their moral powers. Thus, the equal
liberty principle will not protect commercial speech in the same way it does political
speech (those forms that are needed for citizens to develop and exercise their moral
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powers).32 Thus, restrictions on commercial speech are permitted if, for example, they are
required to ensure objective media reporting on international agreements (e.g., trade,
environmental), to guarantee impartial media coverage of environmental disasters, or to
combat certain excesses of human consumption (e.g., those that could disrupt the stability
of a just society).
Of course, it might be objected that such restrictions violate a corporation‘s right to
free speech. At the time of this writing, the U.S. Supreme Court has made a ruling on free
speech that would appear to be exceptionally odious according to the model we are
examining. On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court ruled—in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission—that, because corporations have a right to free speech, for-profit
corporations are permitted to use corporate profits to purchase political campaign
advertisements. However, corporations do not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to
free speech under the Rawlsian framework. As we have previously noted, corporations
are participants in society, not citizens. Thus, they lack a standing (they have no
representation) within the Rawlsian contracting procedure. During the legislative stage,
the contracting parties understand that corporations exist within society, but they are not
concerned to secure their fundamental interests.
But could the Rawlsian model simply extend the fundamental right to free speech
(along with the other basic liberties) out to corporations? This is unlikely. Recall that
Rawls said, ―the worth of institutions is derived solely from the benefits they bring to
human individuals.‖33 As we noted earlier, the significance of a liberty depends on how
much it is required to ensure the full use of citizens‘ moral power in at least one of the
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fundamental cases—i.e., the ability to develop a sense of justice, and the capacity for a
comprehensive conception of the good.34 But corporations are not natural persons. As
unconscious social participants, they lack a capacity for a sense of justice. Lacking
practical reason, corporations cannot even philosophize about the good. Thus their
commercial speech is not to be protected as a basic liberty. 35 Restrictions made on
corporate ―greenwashing,‖ misrepresenting scientific studies, and the like, are therefore
fully justified under the present model of background environmental justice.
Some of the implications for procedural environmental justice should be clear. The
society for which the present model of political liberalism is being worked out is
characterized as being pluralistic. As such, it will have citizens who possess a wide
variety of beliefs regarding the inherent value of the natural environment. While the
Rawlsian model is anthropocentric, background environmental justice insists that
powerful interests must not dictate citizens‘ attitudes towards the natural environment.
So, consider the raising ecological consciousness, which is an important goal of many
environmentalists (and environmental groups). A society well-ordered by the present
model will not require the general development of an ecological consciousness. Such a
policy would be closer to political authoritarianism than political liberalism.
Nevertheless, a liberal democracy shaped by the present theory would be one in which
the development of a common ecological consciousness is possible.
Campaign Finance Reform
Moreover, unfair elections have no place in any Rawlsian world—and this means
much more than ensuring that all citizens can freely vote, that voting machines are not
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rigged, that all citizens can access election records, etc. Recall that during the legislative
phase, the contracting parties are working out the details of the fair value of the political
(and other) liberties—e.g., the freedom to vote, run for political office, campaign, etc.
Formal equality of opportunity guarantees that everyone has the right to run for any
office. But the ideal specified by Rawls‘s principle of fair equality of opportunity when
applied to political liberties (what Rawls calls the ―the fair value of political liberties‖) is
that the least well off citizens must have the same chance of being elected to the highest
positions as the wealthiest citizens.
How is this possible if powerful entities within society control the political debates,
the media, and so forth? In his PL, Rawls says: ―…the fair values of the political liberties
is required for a just political procedure, and that to insure their fair value it is necessary
to prevent those with greater property and wealth, and the greater skills of organization
which accompany them, from controlling the electoral process to their advantage.‖36
Thus, at this point in the heuristic, the parties will agree to establish regulations on the
financing of elections. Specifically, (following Rawls) the parties will agree that elections
should be publicly financed. Moreover, they will be in agreement that restrictions on
political advertising should be implemented. Again, the rationale is that such measures
are required to ensure the fair value of political liberties. 37 In terms of background
environmental justice, the function of the equal liberty principle is to protect the political
liberties (e.g., the right to protest and form political parties) of those citizens who are
concerned about the status of the natural environment. With elections being publicly
financed and tightly controlled in accord with fair equality of opportunity, those powerful
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interests who would benefit the most from lax or discriminatory environmental standards
will not be able to ―purchase elections‖ or ―buy candidates‖ favoring their own special
agendas.
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Chapter 6

Diverging from Rawls’s Framework
So far, our examination of John Rawls‘s mature theory has focused on demonstrating
its applicability to normative environmental philosophy and policy at the level of
domestic justice—i.e., the level of a particular society. However, even as a model of
political liberalism (as opposed to a comprehensive moral doctrine), the theory we have
so far considered is far from complete. One salient feature of this incompleteness is the
system‘s supposition that domestic societies bear no relation to other societies. This is a
crucial aspect of Rawls‘s domestic model, which constrains the reasoning of the parties
when they are undergoing their deliberations, contracting with each other, and applying
the entities that they agree upon—e.g., principles of justice, a constitution, legislation,
and so on.
Consequently, by viewing society as totally ―closed,‖ it so far has nothing substantive
to say, for example, about when a liberal democracy is permitted to go to war (with
another country), or what its foreign trade policies should look like. The model also
remains silent on timely issues such as how a society of free and equal citizens should
react to world poverty, or global terrorism. And, as it relates to contemporary normative
environmental philosophy, if it is separated from a global context, the framework that we
have so far considered will provide inadequate guidance on supranational environmental
concerns—e.g., global warming. The model hitherto conceived is simply not fit for
background environmental justice above the level of nation state.
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Consider, then, the Rawlsian program above the level of nation-state. In his The Law
of Peoples (LP), Rawls described his own extension of justice as fairness into the
international arena as a ―realistic utopia.‖ His extension is not simply an application of
the principles of his domestic theory (e.g., equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity, the
difference principle) to the entire world. Rather, he claimed to be following the lead of
Kant—i.e., in Perpetual Peace (1795)—in adopting a second contracting situation where
representatives of liberal peoples make a compact with representatives of other liberal
peoples. Rawls asked us to imagine a group of reasonable liberal peoples coming together
and forming what he called a ―Society of Peoples.‖ He wanted us to suppose that they
would make an agreement that would regulate all further relations between the members
of the Society of Peoples.1 While this might never actually happen, Rawls thought that
the result—The Law of Peoples—is an ideal theory for thinking about a liberal
democracy‘s foreign policy.
For Rawls, then, we are to imagine a second agreement that will govern ―the basic
structure of the relations between peoples.‖2 If successful, such a heuristic device might
be useful in addressing the question of how a free constitutional democracy should deal
with other non-liberal societies, which do not permit all their citizens certain basic
liberties—freedom of speech, religion, association, participation, and so on. This second
agreement is Rawls‘s The Law of Peoples. Like his mature justice as fairness, it is a
political conception of justice. Yet, unlike his domestic framework, his international

1

In his LP, which was his last own published work on the topic, Rawls was very clear that he meant
peoples and not nation-states. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 23–30.
2
Ibid., p. 33.
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extension contains principles that are to regulate the mutual political relations among the
free and equal peoples of a reasonable Society of Peoples. 3
How should we imagine peoples coming together to make an agreement? Whereas the
parties participating in Rawls‘s contracting process at the level of domestic justice
represent citizens, the contractors of Rawls‘s LP represent peoples. That is, instead of
representing individual citizens within a liberal constitutional democracy, Rawls
envisaged each of the parties in the second original position as representing a liberal
democratic people. Like the first (domestic) original position, Rawls‘s second
(international) original position has a veil of ignorance. However, the veil of ignorance
imposed upon the contractors at the international level ensures that they are unaware of
the particular people within the Society of Peoples whom they are representing.
Moreover, Rawls claimed that the parties are ignorant of the strength, population size,
and geographical domain of the peoples they represent. They also do not know their
people‘s level of economic development and natural resources. Nonetheless, Rawls says
that the contractors in the second original position understand that the people they
represent exist in conditions that permit the establishment of constitutional democracy. 4
Within this contracting situation, then, Rawls argued that the parties would select the
following eight principles. Note that these are quite different than the principles of his
earlier justice as fairness. For Rawls, these principles tell peoples (the ―actors‖5 within

3

Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 86.
See his ―Two Original Positions.‖ Ibid., pp. 30–35.
5
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decent peoples are ―the actors‖ in his Society of Peoples. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 23.
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the Society of Peoples) how to treat each other as peoples, and not how liberal democratic
societies should treat their citizens. 6


First, peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are
to be respected by other peoples.



Second, peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.



Third, peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.



Fourth, peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.



Fifth, peoples have the right of self-defense, but no right to instigate war for
reasons other than self-defense.



Sixth, peoples are to honor human rights.



Seventh, peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of
war.



And, lastly, peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 7

For Rawls, these constitute the Law of Peoples. Some (e.g., Beitz and Pogge) have
wondered why these principles should be different than Rawls‘s principles of domestic
justice? For instance, why does the Law of Peoples not include a supranational difference
principle? Why do the parties to this agreement not compare sets of principles like they
did behind the veil of ignorance of Rawls‘s heuristic for a liberal society? Beitz notes:
―Assuming that Rawls‘s arguments for the two principles are successful, there is no
reason to think that the content of the principles would change as a result of enlarging the
scope of the original position so that the principles would apply to the world as a
6
7

Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 83.
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 37.
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whole.‖8 In fact, why should the contractors at the international level represent free and
equal peoples, while the parties at the domestic level represent individual free and equal
citizens? Consider Singer‘s critique. Like other authors, he has noted that if we were to
apply ―…[Rawls‘s] method globally rather than for a given society, it would immediately
be obvious that one fact about which those making the choice should be ignorant is
whether they are citizens of a rich nation such as the United States or of a poor nation
such as Haiti.‖9
Many other contemporary thinkers have argued that a truly global perspective is
required if moral philosophers are to adequately deal with contemporary issues we now
face. For example, Peter Singer (2004) also contends:
We have lived with the idea of sovereign states for so long that they have
come to be part of the background not only of diplomacy and public
policy but also ethics. Implicit in the term ―globalization‖ rather than the
older ―internationalization‖ is the idea that we are moving beyond the era
of growing ties between nations and are beginning to contemplate
something beyond the existing conception of the nation-state. But this
change needs to be reflected in all levels of our thought, and especially in
our thinking about ethics. 10
In light of the fact of globalization, why should we take social contract theory seriously if
it must begin (conceptually) with the level of domestic society? In this vein, Martha

8
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Peter Singer, One World: the ethics of globalization 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p.
8.
9

108
Nussbaum (2006) has recently argued that social contract theorists should not use the
nation-state as the central starting part for their theories. 11
I wholeheartedly agree with Singer, Nussbaum, and others. No account of justice can
be complete without addressing phenomena above the level of nation-state. For example,
as it bears on environmental justice, it is especially odious that those that bear the biggest
responsibility for causing global climate change (i.e., individuals in developed countries
like the U.S.) are doing the least to help assuage the problem. No account of background
environmental justice can ignore supranational contexts. As a result, one major difference
between Rawls‘s own theory and the Rawlsian version that we are now considering is
this. Following themes developed by Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, and
others, I contend that the Rawlsian framework should begin at the level of supranational
justice, and then proceed ―downward‖ to the spheres of domestic and local justice. 12 As
was discussed in chapter two, Rawls‘s own heuristic begins at the level of domestic
justice, and then expands to other areas—i.e., local and global justice. Under my
extension to Rawls‘s theory, the international sphere is prior to the domestic. However,
by embracing the notion that parts of the national policy of a liberal constitutional
democracy cannot be established without reference to the global context, I shall also
depart from Rawls‘s own system in the following manner. Under my extension to
Rawls‘s theory, during the legislative stage of the domestic model, we are to imagine that
the parties are constrained by important structures—such as reasonably just international
laws and treaties.

11

Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: disability, nationality, species membership (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press, 2006), p. 228.
12
The notion of starting the contract heuristic with a global original position is not new. Rawls considered
(and rejected) the idea. Thomas Pogge, Brian Barry and Thomas Scanlon have also explored this approach.
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What can justify such a change to the Rawlsian framework? First, it is worth noting
that prioritizing the supranational (when thinking about a perfectly just society) is not a
recent idea. For example, in his ―Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
Intent,‖ Kant contends: ―The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution depends
on the problem of law governed external relations among nations and cannot be solved
unless the latter is.‖13 But, while intuitively sensible, this is just a claim. What reasons
can be provided? To begin with, one form of justification for my divergent extension to
Rawls‘s model stems from de facto globalization. For example, the United Nations, the
International Court of Justice, the United Nation‘s Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and the International Criminal Court have been established, and are
real entities to which liberal democracies must pay heed. Moreover, federal legislation
made by liberal democracies can be constrained by international treaties. For instance,
most countries have signed on to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. And the U.S.
Clean Air Act has been amended by Congress to instruct the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency to phase out the production of ozone depleting substances in accord
with an international treaty—The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer.14
It seems perfectly reasonable to maintain, then, that it is in a federal legislature (or
congress, or parliament, etc.) that a constitutional democracy should work out it its
relations with its world neighbors, as well as other international bodies. For example, at
the time of this writing, the U.S. Congress is considering an appropriations bill that

13

Immanuel Kant, ―Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,‖ in Perpetual Peace and
Other Essays translated by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), p. 34.
14
John H. Knox, ―Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency. 464 F. 3d 1.,‖
The American Journal of International Law 101 (2007): 473.

110
would provide millions of dollars for international family planning. Thus, this manner of
modeling national-supranational relations—i.e., imagining that during the legislative
stage of the domestic model the contractors are constrained by supranational
agreements—is quite realistic.
Furthermore, there is simply no question that world citizens, as well as their
governmental structures, are now joined in important ways. Countries are connected
through global trade and international markets. The Internet and other technological
advances allow people around the world to communicate virtually instantaneously. One
result is that a wide variety of goods and services can now be immediately bought, sold,
or traded on increasingly globalized markets. Peak oil is an important international
concern. And energy or food shortages in one country can have dramatic effects in other
countries. In addition, multinational corporations now often can muster more financial
resources than countries, and, without much difficulty, have the ability to easily move
their operations from nation-state to nation-state.
Accordingly, many thinkers have correctly argued that global problems require global
solutions.15 But environmental problems are also not limited by national boundaries.
National boundaries are human made entities that are crossed by gas pipelines, rivers, and
migrating birds. Hydrological systems extend over national boundaries. And while all
people in the world share the same atmosphere, 16 pollution and greenhouse gasses
emitted in one country can have extremely damaging effects in countries thousands of
miles away. Thus, it is reasonable to think that solving our most important environmental
problems will require various forms of international cooperation.
15

A good recent example is Jeffrey Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet (New York:
The Penguin Press, 2008)
16
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Moreover, domestic societies cannot work out many of the most important issues
(e.g., global warming, global pandemics, regulating of world markets) on their own. But
it seems reasonable to conjecture that the solutions to such problems can be more or less
fair. This leads us to think, I believe, that a supranational theory of justice must be
possible. For consider (as Beitz and other have argued) that, due to many of the
aforementioned concerns, the circumstances of justice presently apply above the level of
nation-state. Note that, somewhat following Hume, Rawls described the circumstances of
justice as ―the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and
necessary,‖17 These include objective circumstances of justice, which are ―circumstances
of moderate scarcity and the necessity of social cooperation for all to have a decent
standard of life.‖18 They also include subjective circumstance of justice, which are ―the
circumstances that reflect the fact that in a modern democratic society citizens affirm
different, and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable, though reasonable,
comprehensive doctrines in the light of which they understand their conceptions of the
good.‖19
But this is a fairly close description of the situation people around the world are in as
they attempt to grapple with global climate change. (We shall return to this topic shortly.)
World citizens are not members of a global constitutional democracy. Yet, people all
around the world—with divergent conceptions of the good—share the same territory
(planet earth). But now world citizens (and their governments, associations, corporations,
et cetera) must cooperate in order to avoid an irreversible environmental catastrophe. So,
while we now share a common interest in significantly reducing greenhouse gas
17

Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 126.
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 84.
19
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112
emissions, the solutions will inevitably involve conflicts of interests. Policies could be
adopted to satisfy most everyone‘s basic needs, but no policy can fulfill everyone‘s
wishes and desires. 20 It seems possible, then, that there are principles of justice that can
guide us as we distribute the benefits and burdens of the social cooperation involved in
combating global climate change.
Now, while this is admittedly a timely problem that any adequate theory of justice
must eventually address, it is not the focus of the present project. I am presently assuming
that a reasonable theory of justice can be worked out for the supranational arena—
perhaps along the lines of Beitz, Pogge, Barry, Nussbaum, etc. Of course, if a Rawlsian
extension above the level of nation-state is successful, international limits might be
determined during the legislative and judicial stages of a supranational contracting
procedure For example, if a form of Rawlsian contractualism is eventually made viable
above the level of nation-state, then perhaps we could consider the parties in the domestic
model constrained by agreements made at the legislative stage of a supranational
contracting and application procedure. That would be one method of modeling federal
strategy (for a society of free an equal citizens) around supranational policy. But whether
the Rawlsian model can serve as a global conception of political justice, or whether it is
delimited to international cooperation, is an issue that is out the scope of the present work
to resolve.
For now, we are focused on a framework of background environmental justice for a
single constitutional democracy. I am suggesting that we should suppose that the parties
(still behind a partially opened veil of ignorance) are settling upon legislation to regulate

20
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greenhouse gas emissions for their society. Like legislatures in the real world, the
legislative stage of the domestic model is the conceptual theater for where (and when) the
parties are to deliberate on federal energy and environmental policies, including energy
security. (In fact, it the time of this writing, a climate change bill is working its way
through the U.S. Senate.) It is important, then, that the parties are informed of all the
trade relations with other societies, for only then will they gauge the amount of their
societies‘ natural resources that will be required at various population levels. As it relates
to environmental concerns, we are now supposing that the parties are constrained by
international treaties regarding how much pollution and greenhouse gasses their society is
permitted to emit. (We shall return to this point.) After noting this divergence from
Rawls‘s own system, I will continue to apply the rest of the special conception of justice
(i.e., the difference principle and the just savings principle) in the next chapter. But we
need to first begin to examine what the model so far has to say about how a constitutional
democracy might handle the problem of climate change.
Handling Greenhouse Gases
We shall suppose that one foreseen consequence of the human activity required in
establishing and maintaining any well-ordered society is the emission of greenhouse
gasses. And we shall assume that these greenhouse gasses cause global warming.
Furthermore, we shall presume that an overall increase in the earth‘s (near surface)
temperature will be bad for the constitutional democracy we are considering. 21 This is not
only a prime example of an important environmental challenge that all liberal
21
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democracies must now face—it is a case in point of a problem for which the solution is
extremely divisive.
Note, then, that the extension to Rawls‘s theory that we are developing is built upon
ideas that can be an object of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
theories of the good. To attune the Rawlsian model to the issue of how to control
greenhouse gas emissions, imagine that the parties—still in the legislative phase of the
domestic model—are constrained by a number of just institutions—international treaties,
agreements, conventions, etc. To explain how the Rawlsian model bears substantively on
how liberal democracies should handle important complex issues regarding greenhouse
gasses, we shall now imagine the contracting parties considering the following three sorts
of ―carbon rationing‖ options: micromanaged direct regulation, direct taxation of
greenhouse gasses, and cap and trade schemes.
The first sort of national policy is not a ―free-market‖ solution. It involves neither
taxes on greenhouse gas emissions nor allocation trading schemes. Instead, the idea
would be to have the government directly manage all the details of release. This would
involve federal policies dictating which entities (e.g., industries, companies, factories,
and individual citizens) can release greenhouse gasses, how much gas can be released, as
well as when and where releases are permitted. This ―tight control‖ process could begin
with policies limiting the amount of resources (e.g., trees, petroleum, natural gas, coal)
that can be legally extracted. Perhaps it would involve a federally managed phasing out
of coal. It could also involve strict fuel efficiency and emission standards on vehicles. It
might involve price floors for nonrenewable forms of energy. It could also entail
localized prohibitions on the use of petroleum, coal, natural gas, etc. This strategy would
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most likely also involve the setting of tight limits for power plants and other facilities. It
could also involve mandatory carbon offset programs.
Of the three strategies for controlling greenhouse gas emissions, this would be
considered the most micromanaged and obtrusive. This ―command and control‖ approach
is consequently extremely vulnerable to government corruption and cronyism. Thus, the
efficacy of such policies at helping to secure background environmental justice will be
inversely proportional to the corruption and incompetence of the system of government
implementing them. Furthermore, this option leaves open the question of how society
should pay for the costly research, development, and implementation of ―clean energy‖
alternatives. As Kant noted, ought implies can. But what if the relevant industries
(automobile, coal, etc.) do not have the capital resources available to produce goods and
services (―clean‖ cars, electricity, etc.) that can meet the regulatory requirements? 22 The
Rawlsian model maintains that public funds cannot be used to subsidize the required
research and development of ―green alternatives‖ unless all citizens within society will
benefit—including the least well off. For as we shall see later (when we consider the
difference principle), the contracting parties will not consent to using taxes levied on the
least advantaged members of society in a manner that only advantages better off
participants within society.
These are justifiable concerns. However, nothing in the Rawlsian model we have so
far considered prohibits the use of this sort of tough regulatory strategy for combating
greenhouse gas emissions per se. It appears, then, that the parties might adopt this sort of
approach—especially if it is needed to guarantee the equal basic liberties (which might

22
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include basic environmental rights), to secure a constitutionally guaranteed social
minimum (that will provide for the basic needs of all citizens 23), or to ensure the fair
value of an adequate scheme of basic liberties. Moreover, as we shall observe later, this
guarantee is to also include future citizens—not only those who presently exist and
benefit the most from today‘s greenhouse gas emissions.
Consider the environmental position frequently defended by political libertarians,
which is known as ―free-market environmentalism,‖ or ―third-wave environmentalism.‖
According to this sort of theory, society should treat environmental goods as social
goods—e.g., privatize them and treat them as capital resources and other fungible goods.
Structures within society should then ensure that externalities are internalized (e.g., make
sure that miners, loggers, and polluters pay the true costs of production), and then let the
free-market run its course. Now, the Rawlsian model is certainly not committed to robust
free-market environmentalism. However, if properly implemented, the following two
free-market approaches for handling greenhouse gasses might be compatible with some
elements of the Rawlsian framework we are considering.
The next approach, then, that the contracting parties might consider at the legislative
stage would be the direct taxation of greenhouse gas emissions. 24 As noted earlier, to
assess this strategy we conceptually begin above the level of domestic society—i.e.,
when presented with the best information scientists can provide, we assume that the
contractors would agree to global limits on greenhouse gas emissions. The core idea of
this strategy is that a constitutional democracy is to then meet its required limits on
greenhouse gasses (whatever it may be) by controlling the tax rates imposed on
23
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emissions. Under this sort of national plan, there would be no explicit limit on the amount
of greenhouse gasses any single participant within society can discharge. Rather,
greenhouse gas emissions would be strictly monitored (perhaps by the government or by
competent private contractors) and then taxed. For example, each coal plant would then
have to pay a tax based upon the amount of carbon dioxide it emits into the atmosphere.
Similarly, individual households might have to pay a tax on the carbon dioxide emitted
from burning natural gas. Such schemes would not constitute energy taxes per se—but
would, rather, be taxes on ―dirty energy.‖
Many economists prefer this sort of strategy because, when compared with the
―command-and-control‖ policies of direct regulation, it is believed to be more efficient,
cost less, and be easier for society to implement. 25 If society deems it necessary to lower
its greenhouse gas emissions, it simply raises the taxes on them, thus constraining
purchasers to utilize alternatives. Consider the coal industry as an illustration. As the
taxes on greenhouse gas emissions increase, the running of coal fired electricity
production facilities will become more cost prohibitive. This should then constrain the
coal industry to develop and employ alternatives—e.g., carbon-capture coal plants,
thermal solar electric plants, and so forth. In the case of the automobile industry, the idea
is that society would be using the free market—along with consumer choice—to raise the
fuel efficiency of vehicles. As the cost of automobile fuel becomes more expensive (due
to the additional emissions tax), consumers will want to purchase more fuel-efficient cars
that emit less greenhouse gasses, or perhaps utilize more mass public transportation.
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However, one concern here is that such taxes could be regressive.26 For example,
imagine (albeit unrealistically) that all members of society need to drive automobiles in
order to have gainful employment. Suppose that the least well off members of society
must spend roughly the same amount of money to drive to work as the most advantaged
members of society. Let‘s say this cost amounts to one thousand dollars a year. In a
situation like this, any consumption tax in the form of a sales tax per gallon/liter of fuel
will force the least well off—especially those most dependent upon personal automobiles
(like those in rural areas)—to pay a larger portion of their income when compared to the
most well off members of society. Thus, for reasons discussed earlier, the Rawlsian
model will generally eschew such policies. 27
With this anxiety duly noted, we can point out some ways the direct taxation of
greenhouse gas emissions (and other forms of ―eco-taxes‖) can be justified. While the
Rawlsian model mandates that regressive taxes not be levied on citizens (and as we shall
soon see, especially the least advantaged citizens) if the aim of the taxation is simply to
generate governmental revenues, the parties still might agree to implement these sorts of
policies if they are required to support the existence of a just and stable society over time.
That is, if ―eco-taxes‖ taxes are necessary to ensure that all present and (as we shall see)
future citizens can develop and pursue a reasonable conception of the good, then such
measures would be agreed to during the legislative phase of the Rawlsian heuristic. But if
the situation becomes so grave that such regressive measures must be taken, then it would
appear that other (non-regressive) measures would have to be taken as well. These would
include the aforementioned ―command and control‖ carbon rationing measures, along
26
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with government funded advertisements aimed at reducing carbon emissions, the
development of alternative public transportation, bicycle trails, and so forth.
Moreover, we have already seen that corporations are participants in society, not
citizens. They are socially constructed entities (to borrow an expression from Searle 28),
not natural people. Therefore (as I already argued), they are not to be granted
constitutionally guaranteed property rights. During the legislative stage of the contracting
process, the parties within the Rawlsian system understand that they represent the
fundamental interests of people, not corporations. The upshot, then, is that in principle
the parties will easily consent to the application of regressive ―polluter pays‖ taxes on
non-human participants, such as corporations. (In the next chapter we will address the
concern that such higher costs will be transferred to consumers, and especially the least
well off members of society.)
The third type of strategy the contracting parties might consider would involve ―cap
and trade‖ policies. As before, we begin with the idea that greenhouse gas emissions
limits for particular societies have been fixed at some sort of supranational level.
However, instead of taxing greenhouse gas emissions, the liberal democracy we are
considering will meet its limits by selling the right to emit greenhouse gasses. While the
general idea is that the government allocates permits (allowances) to release greenhouse
gasses, there is some degree of flexibility in the application of this market-based
approach. For example, cap limits might be set for particular regions, industries,
companies, and so forth. But once the distributional scheme is drawn up, the allowances
are to be sold on the free-market—e.g., through an auction. Moreover, participants could
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also be able to sell unused allowances (through some sort of open market) to other
participants, thus constraining all parties to use their allowances as efficiently as they can.
At the time of this writing, liberal democracies are only beginning to implement such
policies on a serious scale. Within the past year, Barack Obama and Cass Sunstein have
expressed preference for this method of combating global warming. It is the method
embraced by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
And, in the U.S., ten states are now cooperating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI)—a cap and trade scheme for carbon dioxide emissions. 29 However,
experts have been considering such policies for over two decades. Bruce Yandle (1984)
cogently describes the rationale in the following manner:
Such a market would make it possible both to hold air emissions to a
desired level and to allocate them to those who produced the greatest
economic benefits to society… Second, having to pay for air emission
rights would make the value of air quality obvious to both buyers and
sellers, thus leading to conservation and an efficient use of pollution
control devices… After all, by reducing emissions…, a firm could
generate a saleable emission right… Air quality would be maintained or
even improved, efficiency enhanced, and social conflict reduced. 30
Thus, due to the monetary incentives involved with such schemes, many economists
believe that such programs are the most efficient and effective method for controlling
greenhouse gas emissions.
29
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Once again, in principle it does not appear that anything we have discussed so far
precludes market based ―cap and trade‖ systems from being amalgamated into the
Rawlsian model. However, it is clear that, during the legislative stage, the contracting
parties would consent to such schemes only if no citizen‘s basic rights will be violated.
So, for us to determine whether a particular federal cap and trade scheme (which might
also include carbon credits, emission reduction credits, etc.) is just, we must first ask if it
will undermine any citizen‘s basic rights or liberties (as specified by the first principle of
justice). In the next chapter, we shall note that this includes future citizens as well as
presently existing ones. The upshot is that the contractors will not agree to free-market
environmental solutions that ―underprice‖ risks—especially those risks that could violate
citizens‘ basic rights (including the basic environmental rights of future citizens).
Second, the parties will only agree to a policy if the conditions of fair equality of
opportunity are met. In his JF, Rawls says, ―With background institutions of fair equality
of opportunity and workable competition required by the prior principles of justice, the
more advantaged cannot unite as a group and then exploit their market power to force
increases in their income.‖ 31 Accordingly, if the scheme involves the auctioning off and
trading of greenhouse gas allowances, then such auctions and trading systems must be
publicly open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity—e.g., so that smaller
participants can compete on par with the more advantaged. Moreover, the Rawlsian
model eschews the political lobbying of powerful energy industries (like coal) in order to
receive allowances for free, or even at a reduced price. (This will be discussed in more
detail shortly.) No allotment and trading scheme is just if it allows those who are better
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off to take advantage of their market power, unless (as we shall see) such advantages are
an improvement to all—including the least well-off citizens.
While we have considered three approaches to controlling greenhouse gas emissions
(micromanaged direct regulation, direct taxation of greenhouse gasses, and cap and trade
schemes), it would be a false dichotomy to think that these are the only options available.
While these sorts of policies are the ones presently being most fiercely debated, there are
surly other possibilities—e.g., mandatory decreases in human population levels.
Moreover, it is theoretically feasible for a property owning constitutional democracy to
bring about background justice by using combinations of these strategies—e.g., by using
the tax method and the trade method. Still, we are beginning to see some of the main
concerns and compatibilities the Rawlsian framework we have so far considered has with
these types of policies regarding how free and equal citizens can deal with the important
issue of global warming. But a more complete description of what such strategies should
look like will require an examination of the last principles of Rawls‘s justice of fairness.
These are the difference principle and the principle of just savings, to which we shall now
turn our attention.
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Chapter Seven

Just Savings and the Difference Principle
A principle aim of a theory of environmental justice is to answer the question of what
constitutes a just distribution of environmental goods (e.g., benefits related to natural
resources) and environmental hardships (e.g., burdens related to the despoiling of the
natural environment).1 We can now perceive that other attempts to connect Rawls‘s
freestanding theory to environmental justice have been grossly oversimplified—a full
account of Rawlsian environmental justice requires more than simply utilizing the
difference principle. Moreover, any account of Rawlsian environmental justice will be
procedural (not ―allocative‖2). That is, a distribution of environmental benefits and
burdens is just only when it arises within a system of processes (within a liberal
democracy) that is itself fair. I have been referring to this as ―background environmental
justice.‖ As we have observed, this means that disparities in environmental
goods/hardships (e.g., pollution levels) can only be tolerated if nobody is below the safe
level (as required by the first principle of justice). The disparities also must arise in
accord with the principle of fair equality of opportunity—i.e., all citizens must have a fair
equal opportunity to be made more or less advantaged by the disparities. Background
environmental justice thus requires preventing excessive concentrations of wealth, as
well as ensuring that structures within society do not distribute environmental
goods/burdens capriciously—based upon race, sex, age, sexual orientation, religion,
1
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disability, and so forth. It also requires measures to ensure the fair value of all the
political liberties—voting, political speech, running for political office, and so forth. But
this still does not suffice as a complete description of background environmental justice
within a constitutional liberal democracy. To complete our description of background
environmental justice, we must consider the last two key elements of the framework: the
principle of just savings, and the difference principle. We shall do so now.
Just Savings and Sustainability
In chapter four we observed how fundamental environmental rights could be
incorporated into the Rawlsian system. In chapter five I began to provide a Rawlsian
justification for the existence of federal environmental agencies and policies. I also
explained how the contracting parties would employ the principle of fair equality of
opportunity in making various environmental policies. We have seen that while meeting
the target level ―caps‖ on pollution and greenhouse gasses that have been established, a
liberal constitutional democracy must secure fair equality of opportunity for all its
citizens to participate in the production of goods and services. Thus, while competition is
permitted, fair equality of opportunity prevents certain industries (e.g., petroleum, coal)
from dishonestly impairing others—solar, wind, etc. Once these prior conditions—
mandated by the principles of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity—are met, it
seems like Rawls‘s difference principle will then permit differences in environmental
goods/hardships only if everyone (including the least well off) will benefit from the
disparities.
However, a Rawlsian theory of background environmental justice cannot be
successful unless it can account for justice between generations. Referring to the basic
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structure of society, Rawls says ―…as a framework that preserves background justice
over time from one generation to the next it realizes the idea (central to justice as
fairness) of pure background procedural justice as an ideal social process…‖ 3 While
presently existing citizens of liberal democracies possess myriad legitimate claims to
environmental goods (e.g., natural resources), they must be counterbalanced by the
claims that future generations also have to a wide variety of environmental goods.
Moreover, it seems intuitive that citizens of liberal democracies should allocate some of
their society‘s resources to ―handing off‖ to future citizens a society with just institutions
in place. This, then, raises a number of significant questions for the present Rawlsian
framework.
For example, during the legislative stage, would the contracting trustees agree to trade
off certain liberties, like the right of present citizens to drive SUVs that get four miles per
gallon of gasoline (merely for the purpose of recreation) in order to protect the claims of
future generations? Would the representatives consent to curtail certain property rights,
like the legal right of a corporation to purchase and remove the top of a mountain in order
to extract coal, in order to protect claims that future generations might have to the same
mountain (and the buried coal)? Recall, then, that Rawls thought that the difference
principle also included a principle of just savings, which is to then provide a constraint
upon the difference principle‘s application. 4 And it is the principle of just savings, then,
that should assist citizens of free democracies when grappling with issues surrounding
justice between generations. Thus, before concentrating of the difference principle (in the
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second part of this chapter), we shall first examine this constraint of just savings, and
examine its proper connection to background environmental justice.
Let us momentarily leave the legislative stage and return to the first stage of Rawls‘s
contractualist apparatus—the original position of equality. While the parties in the
original position do not know their citizen‘s generation, Rawls embraced a ―present time
of entry‖ interpretation—under which the contracting parties understand that the citizens
who they represent are contemporaries. 5 Now, in his Theory, Rawls asked us to view the
contracting parties as ―representative men‖ who represent family lines, and who care
about their successors.6 Thus, according to his Theory, ―…the persons in the original
position are to ask themselves how much they would be willing to save at each stage of
advance on the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rates.‖ 7 But
Rawls eventually thought that his account of just savings in Theory was defective.8
Due to suggestions given to him by Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit, Rawls amended
his earlier account of just savings.9 Specifically, a mature Rawls did not think that one
must view the contracting parties as men, or heads of families, or as having any sort of
sentiments regarding future generations. Rather, Rawls simply argued that the principle
the parties would select would be the one that the representatives would want all previous
generations to have followed. In his JF, Rawls says:
The correct principle… is one the members of any generation (and so all
generations) would adopt as the principle they would want preceding
generations to have followed, no matter how far back in time. Since no
5
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generation knows its place among the generations, this implies that all
later generations, including the present one, are to follow it. In this way we
arrive at a savings principle that grounds our duties to other generations: it
supports legitimate complaints against our predecessors and legitimate
expectations about our successors.10
So, consider the perspective of the contracting parties during the legislative stage. One
might think that at this point they understand that there is the real possibility that their
citizen might end up being a member of a future generation. If this were the case, then the
symmetrically situated representatives would be constrained to produce federal
legislation that would ensure the least bad outcome for their citizen—irrespective of the
generation of society that the citizen might be placed. Indeed, due to the maximin rule,
the parties might attempt to secure the best worst outcome for their citizen—irrespective
of the generation in society that he or she will be placed. This is not the case. When
considering intergenerational justice, one should not think of a contracting situation in
which the contractors are unaware of the generation into which their citizen will be
placed when the veil of ignorance is lifted. 11 Again, due to the present time of entry
feature of the Rawls‘s contractualist project, during the legislative phase the parties
understand that the citizens whom they represent are contemporaries.
Now, Rawls‘s definitive statement regarding the relation between the difference
principle and the just savings principle is the following: ―The principle of just saving
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holds between generations, while the difference principle holds within generations.‖ 12
But which principle is prior—i.e., which ―trumps‖ the other? Rawls maintained that the
contracting parties would agree to the just savings principle after the difference principle
in the original position of equality. Nonetheless, the principle of just savings is to
constrain the application of the (intragenerational) difference principle during the
legislative stage.13 If this is the case, then ascertaining the proper restrictions on the
difference principle (after the requirements of the equal liberty principle and the principle
of fair equality of opportunity have been met) requires us to specify what, and how much,
must be saved for future generations.
In terms of just savings and sustainability, there are many environmental goods that
cotemporary members of constitutional liberal democracies might save for future
generations: species of plants and animals, pristine vistas, clean air, unpolluted water,
uncontaminated soil, and the like. If these environmental goods are not saved, then
perhaps future generations should somehow be compensated. For example, Brian Barry
has argued that our generation should take measures to pay future generations for our use
of natural resources that future citizens could have used. He says, ―As far as natural
resources are concerned, depletion should be compensated for in the sense that later
generations should be left no worse off (in terms of productive capacity) than they would
have been without the depletion.‖14 Perhaps, then, if our generation uses up most of a
natural resource, like petroleum, then it has a duty to recompense future citizens by
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leaving them other social goods—money, an internet, new forms of energy technology,
and so forth. However, while the citizens of a free pluralistic society might have a duty to
bequeath future generations such entities, from the perspective of the present model, such
a duty is not grounded in compensation for our use of natural resources. For, in fact,
nothing we have so far considered even suggests the notion of compensatory justice.
On the other hand, one might suppose that citizens of democratic regimes are to view
themselves as collectively holding the natural environment as trustees for all citizens—
including future generations. However, Rawls never explicitly made this claim. 15
Nonetheless, the idea that members of any particular generation are trustees of the natural
environment for future generations can be an object of an overlapping consensus of
reasonable conceptions of the good.16 Thus, this would be an acceptable extension to his
theory. And, along these lines, others have argued that our generation is obligated to
―hand off‖ to future generations a natural environment that is in no worse an overall
condition as when our generation received ―control‖ over it.17 But if all citizens (present
and future) collectively ―own‖ presently existing environmental goods, and if citizens of
any generation are then trustees for future generations, then how much of society‘s
natural resources is any generation permitted to use? Rawls asked us to view society as a
fair system of social cooperation (i.e., those socially coordinated activities guided by
publicly recognized rules and procedures), over time, from one generation to the next. 18
But there is no theoretical limit to the number of generations to be included within
society. Thus, no generation of citizens could use (non-renewable) natural resources (e.g.,
15

It might, however, be modeled into the original position of equality.
See Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, pp. 18–21.
17
Again, see Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations. Her model is international, not
domestic.
18
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 5–6. This was discussed in chapter two.
16

130
coal, oil) if doing so would not leave future generations with a natural environment in at
least as good of a condition as when the citizens inherited it. If this type of constraint
were placed upon the application of the difference principle, then society would not be
permitted to use any of its nonrenewable natural resources—even if this would be to the
detriment of the least advantaged members of society.
No doubt, a case for very strong sustainability could be made along those lines.
However, from the perspective of the present framework, a more reasonable approach is
as follows. In his JF, Rawls maintained that the salient issue for the symmetrically
situated contracting parties is: ―…how much (what fraction of the social product) are they
prepared to save…‖19 By viewing the natural world (or parts of it) as natural capital,
perhaps it can be included in ―the social product‖ of society, and thus be included in the
items to be saved in accord with Rawls‘s just savings principle. Dorrothee Horstkötter
(2004) has suggested something like this. 20 She is correct. However, there are several
caveats. First, Rawlsian background environmental justice requires more than saving
sources of energy, trees, mountains, clean water, and other forms of ―natural capital‖ for
future generations. Background environmental justice also requires the development and
preservation of human-made social and political entities that can meet the demands of
Rawls‘s special conception of justice over time. I shall return to this point momentarily.
Second, as we have been observing, like the difference principle, the intergenerational
principle of just savings is not to be straightforwardly applied willy-nilly. In his JF,
Rawls says:
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Real saving is required only for reasons of justice: that is, to make
possible the conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic
structure over time. Once these conditions are reached and just institutions
are established, real savings may fall to zero. If society wants to save for
reasons other than justice, it may of course do so; but that is another
matter.21
Thus we must investigate what is needed to establish and preserve the institutions of
background environmental justice that we have so far examined. Specifically, we must
ask: what entities are needed to meet the requirements of the equal liberty principle and
the principle of fair equality of opportunity, for an indefinite number of future
generations? Let us begin with the first principle of justice.
Securing Basic Environmental Rights for Future Citizens
Suppose, again, that we are at the legislative stage of the Rawlsian heuristic. We have
so far imagined that the contractors have institutions in place to meet the requirements of
the equal liberty principle as well as the principle of fair equality of opportunity for
presently existing citizens. Now, I have noted that the intragenerational difference
principle is constrained by the intergenerational principle of just savings. This means
that—before they apply the difference principle—the contracting parties will first agree
to adopt policies for society that will secure basic environmental rights for future citizens.
Recall, then, that the equal liberty principle requires that all citizens have the same
indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all. 22 We have seen that these basic
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rights and liberties include the freedom of thought, the freedom of conscience, the basic
political liberties (e.g., the right to vote, the right to participate in politics), freedom of
association, the rights and liberties related to the freedom and integrity of the person, the
right to hold and to have exclusive use of personal property, and the rights and freedoms
related to the rule of law. In chapter four, I suggested that the contracting parties would
agree that this list of equal basic rights and liberties should include certain negative
environmental rights—i.e., not to have harmful levels of air, water, and soil pollution
interfere with a citizen‘s rational and reasonable life plans.
In order to meet the demands of background environmental justice, it is accordingly
necessary for liberal democracies to adopt legislation and policies that will restore,
protect, and maintain the natural environment at a level that can secure these
environmental rights for all citizens—present and future. This means that the policies
designed to guarantee a safe level of environmental health (plans related to the control of
environmental diseases, sanitation procedures, access to safe water, and so forth) have to
be preserved for future generations. For example, policies must be in place to ensure that
Mercury pollution from coal-fired plants is at safe levels that will not injure the health of
any present or future citizen. It also means that society must devote resources to doing
things like removing soil contamination—at least to levels at which no (present or future)
citizen‘s basic environmental rights are violated. Thus, federal superfund laws and
agencies must be in place to deal with unhealthy pollution. Nuclear power plants might
be banned if no safe long-term solution to handling nuclear waste is available. Also, the
government must maintain tight control of many synthetic chemicals. From the Rawlsian
perspective, these are simply matters of basic justice. Moreover, the parties would also
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agree to enact human population control measures if such measures are required to secure
basic rights (including environmental rights) for future generations.
Accordingly, the previously discussed environmental impact assessments must include
the long-term effects of society‘s proposed policies. With environmental impact
assessments (to which the parties already agreed) in place, many proposed projects that
could violate future citizens basic environmental rights would also be prohibited. One
cannot be precise, but examples might include banning clear-cutting or mountaintop coal
removal projects—if they have the potential to disturb hydrological cycles, increase the
likelihood of mudslides and soil erosion, cause flash flooding, and so forth. More
generally, then, the environmental laws and enforcement agencies of a constitutional
democracy must not only be maintained for presently existing citizens—they must be
preserved for future citizens, as well. In addition, background environmental justice
accordingly requires that the system of law to bring environmental polluters to justice be
preserved for an unbounded number of generations.
Intergenerational Justice: A Social Minimum
Another feature of Rawls‘s theory that bears on the present discussion is Rawls‘s
insistence on a social minimum that people are owed in virtue of their humanity. 23 In
chapter four we saw that Rawls thought that this minimum ought to cover citizens‘ basic
needs, and that it should be a constitutional essential. Accordingly, the parties at the
legislative stage will agree to take measures to ensure that the environmental goods
contained within the constitutional minimum are guaranteed for future citizens, as well as
presently existing ones. All citizens (present and future) are to be constitutionally entitled
to enough of a minimum of social goods so that they can effectively exercise their
23

Ibid., pp. 129–130.

134
abovementioned basic rights and liberties. Accordingly, besides the aforementioned
negative environmental rights, the parties will also agree to enact measures that will
ensure that future citizens are provided whatever positive environmental goods are
required for a decent human life. 24
If the parties were to then understand that particular environmental polices (e.g.,
replacing petroleum with locally grown biomass, providing public incentives to reduce
one‘s carbon footprint) are needed to guarantee that future citizens have the myriad goods
needed to pursue a decent human life, they would do so. Moreover, as I argued earlier in
chapter five, the contracting parties will employ precautionary reasoning when
deliberating on such matters. For these reasons, the present freestanding framework
supports sustainable development (or ―sustainability,‖ 25 for short)—i.e., policies that
(following the World Commission on Environment and Development) require
―development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.‖26 The contracting representatives will
consent to measures that, for example, will ensure that agricultural activities do not
disrupt long-term ecological sustainability. And, more generally, if, within the confines
of the other principles of justice, the risk-averse parties at the legislative stage understand
that sustainable practices (sustainable agriculture, sustainable fishing, sustainable
forestry, and so forth) are needed so that future citizens can exercise their basic liberties
and live a decent life, they will agree to adopt them. Similarly, if the parties (who are
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employing precautionary reasoning on such important matters) realize that a policy (like
permitting the long term general use of genetically modified organisms) could undermine
any citizen‘s ability to exercise his or her basic liberties or pursue a decent life, they will
not consent to it.
Securing Fair Equality of Opportunity for Future Citizens
We are spotlighting the idea that besides physical environmental goods (e.g., clean
water, trees), Rawls‘s principle of just savings implies that each generation has a duty to
develop and sustain just environmental policies and institutions (laws, environmental
protection agencies, etc.) for future generations. We have just seen that background
environmental justice requires a society of free and equal citizens to take measures to
secure basic rights and liberties (including basic environmental rights) and a social
minimum for future citizens. However—and again this is independent of the difference
principle—liberal democracies must also take measures to secure fair equality of
opportunity for future citizens, as well. Recall, then, that referring to the aim of the
principle of fair equality of opportunity, Rawls says ―In all parts of society there are to be
roughly that same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and
endowed.‖27 To this end, background environmental justice requires the previously
discussed policies of chapter five—universal education, prohibitions on corporate
lobbying, the criminalization of selling the public trust, campaign finance reform,
prohibitions on monopolies, policies to avoid excessive concentrations of wealth, etc. The
present model maintains that if such institutions are not in place, a liberal constitutional
democracy has a duty of justice to enact them. Moreover, the intergenerational
requirement of just savings now stipulates that these structures be maintained not only to
27
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guarantee basic rights and liberties (along with fundamental environmental rights) and a
social minimum for future generations—they must also ensure fair equality of
opportunity for future citizens.
Suppose, then, that the parties are aware of the fact of corruption. That is, the
contracting representatives understand that when unchecked, governmental structures
tend to become corrupted. The parties will agree to measures to mitigate corruption as
much as possible, within the constraints of the basic principles of justice. For example, as
the wealthy will have a general tendency to complain and fight certain types of taxation
(progressive taxation, a wealth tax, etc.), measures must be taken so that the wealthiest
citizens of any generation cannot prevent the adoption of various measures a society
might take to prevent excessive concentrations of wealth. Also, if it has not done so, a
liberal democracy must take measures like ensuring that large chemical companies, say,
cannot interfere (e.g., by lobbying) with the legislative and regulatory processes.
Of course, certain amounts of natural capital will also undoubtedly need to be restored
and saved to meet the demands of the principle of fair equality of opportunity over time.
Suppose, for example, that enjoying wilderness is part of a reasonable conception of the
good. Parks and wildlife refuges will then be needed so that all (similarly motivated and
talented) future citizens will have the same fair chance at hiking, camping, and other
forms of enjoying or communing with nature. Rawlsian background environmental
justice also necessitates liberal democracies developing wildlife corridors, protecting
roadless areas, maintaining coral reefs, and so forth, if failing to do so would deny
present and future generations a fair chance at partaking in such opportunities. The same
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holds for legitimate government purchasing land (e.g., for ―green-spaces‖) if doing so is
required to ensure the fair equality of opportunity for all (including future) citizens.
Nevertheless, is the framework so far considered sufficiently strong to defend all
citizens‘ (including future citizens) right to commune with nature—in a religious sense? I
have already shown that the equal liberty principle justifies constitutionally protecting
citizens‘ freedom of thought and religion. As was discussed in chapter two, this is
relevant to environmentally minded citizens who have non-standard religious beliefs
(e.g., neopaganism), or perhaps no religious convictions at all. In this vein, Aaron
Lercher (2006) has argued that a person‘s right to freedom of ecological conscience—
―the human capability of having an idea of natural value and pursuing this as a human
end‖—is very similar to his or her right to freedom of religion. 28 Moreover, Lercher
argues that destroying the natural environment is akin to destroying a church, a mosque,
or a temple. While the present model of political liberalism is compatible with a general
freedom of ecological conscience, it cannot embrace the latter aspect of Lercher‘s
polemic. This is due to the fact that the notion of the natural environment being
analogous to a temple cannot be the object of an overlapping consensus of reasonable
conceptions of the good. Nonetheless, the requirement of just savings maintains that if
future generations are to be able to effectively utilize their right to freedom of ecological
conscience, then our generation must preserve a certain amount of the natural
environment for them.
Admittedly, this is still a rough sketch of what a Rawlsian framework of background
environmental justice looks like. Nonetheless, at this point in the heuristic the general
idea is that as a procedural theory, background environmental justice requires that fair
28
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equality of opportunity in competing for environmental goods be secured for all citizens
(including future citizens). More requirements will be discussed below. Again, with such
institutions in place, Rawlsian procedural justice requires that effective court systems and
the rule of law then be established and preserved for future generations. The hope, then,
is that a liberal democracy well-ordered by the present model would be one in which,
within any generation, all citizens with the same natural aptitudes (and who are similarly
motivated) have the same chances of being elected for public office, determining the
society‘s energy policy, shaping environmental regulations, and so forth. With such
institutions in place, we can consider the application of the intragenerational difference
principle. We shall do so after we briefly consider the non-identity objection, which some
philosophers take to be a barrier to sufficiently grounding justice to future generations.
The Non-Identity Objection
No person‘s parents could possibly be different than his or her own. It follows, then,
that nobody has any other possible ancestors than his or her own ancestors. There is no
reason to suppose that this does not hold for future generations of citizens, as well. While
it might appear counterintuitive, one might argue, then, that future citizens cannot be
wronged (i.e., in term of basic environmental rights violations, being denied a social
minimum, being subjected to unfair equality of opportunity) by our society‘s political
corruption, lax environmental standards, and the destruction of numerous environmental
goods. The idea is that if, one hundred years ago, a political culture existed that enacted
and enforced stringent environmental legislation (or, in general, society had a more just
basic structure), the world would be so much different than it actually is that presently
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existing citizens would not exist. Other people—who are not identical to presently
existing citizens—would exist, instead.
However, it is prima facie plausible that people are better off existing than not
existing. Annette Baier has called this Parfit-style non-identity concern ―The Futurity
Problem.‖29 If the argument is sound, then we have good reasons for thinking that future
citizens are not entitled to environmental goods—e.g., clean water, untrammeled forests,
unpolluted soil—that are still found within our present society. The same holds for the
human-made institutions that are needed to secure background environmental justice.
Perhaps, then, present citizens need not concern themselves with securing basic rights
and liberties, a social minimum, or fair equality of opportunity for future members of
society.
Imagine that toxins in the environment cause a future citizen (say, one hundred years
from now) to develop a debilitating terminal disease. Suppose that she criticizes her
predecessors—arguing that she suffers because precautionary measures were not taken to
sufficiently control the toxins. According to the ―Futurity Problem‖, she has no legitimate
complaint. Because the possible worlds in which precautionary measures are taken to
control the toxins are so different than the actual world, she should be grateful that the
toxins that caused her disease were not banned. If they had been banned, she and her
family and friends would not have come into existence. Different people would exist
instead.
The way to properly grapple with these Parfit-style worries is not to employ Lewisstyle modal realism. Rather, the way to skirt the non-identity problem is to avoid
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subjunctive comparisons altogether. That is, one does not want to compare the actual
world with possible worlds in which certain environmental injustices did not occur.
Every generation leaves a legacy for future generations—irrespective of such Parfit style
objections. For example, many people suffer today because of high concentrations of lead
and arsenic found in the soil. This is not a subjunctive comparison. Perhaps these (very
same) individuals would not have existed if, one hundred years ago, tougher
environmental standards had been in place to prevent the lead and arsenic pollution. Still,
past pollution serves as a causal explanation for many social hardships today, like cancer
and lead poisoning. This is not a counterfactual claim. The actions of past generations
have harmed presently existing individuals. Likewise, many of our actions today—like
using toxic manufacturing and agricultural techniques—can make it harder (or easier) for
future people to secure primary goods. Thus, future citizens are entitled to environmental
goods. Thus, within a constitutional democracy, cotemporaneous citizens of any
generation must take measures to guarantee basic environmental rights for future citizens,
to secure a social minimum of environmental goods for future citizens, as well as to enact
and maintain social and political structures that will enable future citizens to compete for
all other environmental goods and hardships in accord with the requirement of fair
equality of opportunity.
The Difference Principle
Again, the difference principle says that social and economic inequalities are to be to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 30 However, this principle
is not to be applied unsystematically. We have already seen that both the equal liberty
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principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity both are prior to the difference
principle. In his JF, Rawls says:
This priority means that in applying a principle (or checking it against test
cases) we assume that the prior principles are fully satisfied. We seek a
principle of distribution (in the narrow sense) that holds within the setting
of background institutions that secure the basic equal liberties (including
the fair value of the political liberties) as well as the fair equality of
opportunity. 31
This explains why we considered the equal liberty principle in chapter four, and the
principle of fair equality of opportunity in chapter five. These prior principles are
―pulling their weight‖ in terms of reducing inequalities of wealth (via progressive
taxation), providing universal health care, prohibiting monopolies, setting limits on
campaign contributions and lobbying by large corporate interests, ensuring that all
citizens have a healthy environment in which to reside and work, etc., even before the
difference principle comes into play.
As has already been noted, one should not suppose that the difference principle
requires constitutional democracies to adopt policies that will steadily improve the
expectations of the most disadvantaged members of society over time. Rawls says, ―That
would not be a reasonable conception of justice.‖ 32 Rather, Rawls thought that once the
difference principle is fully realized, inequalities in the worth of equal liberties within
society will be arranged so that the value of the basic liberties are maximized for
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society‘s least well off citizens. 33 In fact, Rawls thought that the difference principle
expresses concern for all members of a society of free and equal citizens. This is because
it says that the only justification for inequalities is their making the worse off members of
society better off than they would be under any other scheme. 34
So as an example, suppose that during the legislative stage the contracting parties
agree to implement some sort of policy aimed at creating ―green jobs.‖ The difference
principle implies that this sort of policy cannot be shaped in a way that betters the most
advantaged citizens in society unless it betters the least well off members, as well.
Similarly, the Rawlsian model maintains that if a liberal democracy adopts the previously
discussed straight ―eco-taxes‖ (e.g., carbon taxes) or ―cap and trade‖ policies, then such
schemes must not only benefit the most advantaged. Everyone in society must gain—
including the least well off. In fact, ideally, such emission (and pollution) policies would
be to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged members of society. Thus, a public
subsidy, in term of simply giving away the right to emit greenhouse gasses to big energy
companies (as has been done in Europe, Australia, and the United States), is unjust
according to the present conception of political justice.
One might think, then, that the revenues from such ―cap and trade‖ policies must be
directly distributed in accord with Rawls‘s difference principle—i.e., distributed directly
to the benefit of the least advantaged citizens. This is not the correct application. In fact,
such a reading would be a drastic oversimplification of the framework. Instead of
thinking of the difference principle as implying that a constitutional democracy should
take the revenues from a carbon tax (or the proceeds from the auctioning off of permits to
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pollute) and simply distribute them to the least well off members of society, the idea is
that Rawlsian background justice requires that revenues from these programs be used to
protect basic rights (including a right to a healthy environment), to ensure a social
minimum (as required by the first principle of justice), as well as to guarantee fair
equality of opportunity for all citizens (including future citizens). This does not mean,
then, that the government is to print checks to all its poor citizens (although it might
sometimes be justified in doing so). Rather, along with all other government money, the
revenues should be spent on law enforcement, housing, food (or food vouchers),
healthcare, education, job training, and so on, in a manner that benefits all citizens. Under
the present extension, this means that money should also be devoted to environmental
projects when required by the equal liberty principle (e.g., to ensure the safety of all
citizens) and the principle of fair equality of opportunity (e.g., providing ―clean‖
affordable public transportation, ensuring open and fair markets for electric or hydrogen
cars).
As noted earlier, the Rawlsian model generally eschews regressive tax policies.
Nonetheless, under certain sorts of contracting circumstances, the parties would consent
to some regressive types of ―eco taxes‖ during the legislative stage of the framework we
are considering. First, one can see now that the contracting parties would agree to such
measures if they were needed to secure fundamental environmental rights for present or
future citizens. For example, the contracting parties would agree to ―eco-taxes‖ that are
truly needed to prevent harms to human health. Second, the parties would agree to
regressive ―eco taxes‖ if they are required to ensure that present or future citizens have
the required social minimum of environmental goods (or other social goods) owed to
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them in virtue of their humanity. Third, the parties would agree to regressive ecological
taxes if required by the principle of fair equality of opportunity. In all of these cases,
however, the aim of such taxes (e.g., a gasoline tax) must not be simply to raise revenues
for the government, but to change the behavior of participants within society—to use
―clean‖ energy, transportation, consumer products, and so forth. However, as was noted
in the last chapter, if such regressive measures are truly required, then a variety of nonregressive measures have to be taken as well—environmental education, stricter
environmental regulations, ―clean‖ public transportation, publicly funding home energy
audits for the least well off citizens, and so forth.
Let us now turn out attention to possible disparities in the rates of greenhouse gas
taxation—say between different industries, industrial facilities, households, etc. Can this
type of differential treatment by a constitutional democracy‘s basic structure be justified?
It can. But there are two key points to note. The first is that the Rawlsian model only
condones this sort of discrimination when it will maximally benefit the least advantaged
members of society, and when the requirements of the prior principles of justice are
satisfied. Imagine, for example, that society embraces a carbon tax solution to controlling
greenhouse gas emissions. And suppose that the government considers a policy
exempting commercial airlines from paying the additional carbon tax when purchasing
aviation fuel. The present framework would only allow this sort of plan if the best
evidence indicates that the tax scheme will benefit the least well-off citizens of society,
and if the requirements of fair equality of opportunity are not violated.
As I argued earlier, the second key point is that corporations are merely participants in
society. As such, they cannot even be considered as the least advantaged citizens. This is
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not anti-capitalist. Again, capitalism, along with free market strategies for combating
global warming (and other types of rationing of environmental goods), is permitted under
the Rawlsian model. However, capitalist structures must be regulated so that—assuming
the constraints of the prior principles are met—not only the most advantaged participants
(e.g., large for-profit corporations) benefit from them. Furthermore, not only is it
permissible to treat corporations differently than citizens—the implication of Rawls‘s
difference principle is that a constitutional democracy must do so if it will benefit the
least advantaged members of society. Therefore, in principle a government is obligated,
for example, to set the carbon taxes for corporately owned coal plants at a much higher
rate (than other participants within society) when doing so will benefit the least well-off
citizens.
However, we are still left with several related problems. As we have seen, the
Rawlsian model can embrace certain aspects of free market environmentalism. According
to this creed, one method of distributing the right to pollute and emit greenhouse gasses is
to sell it—i.e., through allocations. Another is to place taxes on pollution and the
emission of greenhouse gasses. Once such measures (e.g., ―cap and trade,‖ carbon taxes)
are in place, society is to then let the free market run its course. It seems, then, that
besides complying with the prior principles of justice, with the requirement of the
difference principle, such measures must make the least advantaged members of society
better off than if they were not implemented. With free-market solutions, the polluter
must pay. However, what if those who are polluting are the least advantaged members of
society? Also, it seems like many polluters (e.g., energy companies) will simply pass the
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increased costs of polluting on to consumers—many of whom are the poorest members of
society.
It is reasonable to assume that energy costs for the poorest members of society will
increase if energy companies are permitted to pass the costs of carbon allowances (and
taxes) on to customers. But while such measures would eventually end up being
regressive, the result should be a decrease in ―end level‖ consumers‘ carbon-based energy
usage. Perhaps, then, liberal democracies should provide vouchers for the least well off
citizens. However, what motive is there for economically disadvantaged families to
decrease their energy usage if the government is paying their utility bills? It appears that
if a constitutional democracy merely reimburses poor citizens for their energy bills, then
there will be little incentive for economically disadvantaged members of society to
decrease their energy consumption.
Several points must be noted. First, as I alluded to earlier, no free-market based
approach will be accepted by the risk-averse contracting parties if it permits participants
within society to ―underprice‖ environmental risks—especially risks that could
undermine basic environmental rights or the social minimum of environmental goods that
are required for a decent life. (So, perhaps the prices of gasoline, coal, home heating oil,
etc., should be more expensive than they presently are in the United States.) Second, note
that the equal liberty principle (along with a guarantee of a social minimum), the
principle of fair equality of opportunity, and the principle of just saving all have priority
over the difference principle. Thus, it is not the case that the parties would permit the
shifting of the costs of allocations and environmental taxes on to human ―end consumers‖
only if (assuming the conditions of the prior principles are met) doing so would benefit
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the least advantaged members of society. Such regressive measures are permitted once
basic rights and liberties (including basic environmental rights), a social minimum, and
fair equality of opportunity are secured for all citizens. Indeed, once these conditions are
satisfied, such measures (which are aimed at modifying behavior) could be mandatory if
required by the previously discussed intergenerational principle of just savings. But,
again, if such regressive policies are taken, then other non-regressive measures must be
enacted as well—e.g., public subsidies for alternative forms of energy and transportation.
This, then, leads to the topic of socializing externalities.
Socializing Externalities
As was noted earlier, some of the research and development of alternative energy
solutions to global warming and other environmental concerns will be expensive. So too
will be the costs of environmental cleanup. So, one overriding concern with free-market
―solutions‖ is that they will not be able to generate the amount of capital required to
properly fund such programs. What should happen if companies are unable to fund
―clean‖ energy alternatives or pay for environmental restoration. More generally, then,
one must ask: to what extent should a liberal democracy ―socialize‖ externalities—e.g.,
have the government pick up the tab for research and development, environmental
cleanup, and so forth?
The first thing to be said is that a strictly market-based approach would insure that the
price of goods and services includes all the costs of development and production. For
example, the price of carbon-based energy (e.g., petroleum or coal) would have to
include all the costs of producing the energy. A coal plant paying its carbon tax is simply
rendering what it should (according to free-market environmentalism) for emitting
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greenhouse gasses. Moreover, reductions in tax rates for such facilities provide
disincentives for efficiency and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The same
holds for environmental cleanup. Any truly market-based solution should maintain that
coal companies employing mountain top removal techniques must take full responsibility
for all the consequences of their coal extraction—including the effects to human health,
hydrological systems, etc. Having the government and nonprofit organizations cleanup
and restore the natural environment discourages coal companies from employing only
methods of ―clean‖ extraction—if such techniques are possible. But what if carbon-based
energy industries are truly incapable of fully internalizing externalities? In this case, it
seems like the inability of such pricing systems to reflect the actual costs of goods and
services would then demonstrate a serious flaw with market-based approaches to
environmental policy.
This does not show, however, that the Rawlsian model cannot endorse the socializing
of many externalities in principle. All citizens (including the least advantaged) need
transportation and energy. So perhaps a liberal democracy is justified in using public
funds in the development of hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles or wind-electricity. In fact, with
the difference principle in place, background environmental justice maintains that the
socializing of externalities is permitted when doing so maximally benefits the least
advantaged members of society. This might occur in terms of green business paying
fewer taxes, government investment in environmental restoration, public funding of
alternative transportation fuels, taxpayer financing of electricity transmission lines, et
cetera.
Several Illustrations
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With all the principles of Rawls‘s special conception of justice now in place, I shall
now turn to several illustrations of how the present model of background environmental
justice might be applied. Recall, then, the (idealized) cap and trade policies of the last
chapter. The first illustration I now wish to consider involves ―sky trust‖ proposals for
curbing global warming. The basic idea behind these forms of ―polluters pay‖ policies is
to cap greenhouse gas emissions and then sell the allocations (the right to emit
greenhouse gasses) in some sort of open auction. The allocations would then either be
used or sold in some sort of competitive carbon trading market. I have argued that the
Rawlsian framework can embrace such policies. And sky trust policies do follow roughly
along these lines. However, the unique feature of sky trust initiatives is that the revenues
from the sale of allocations are to be placed in a ―sky trust,‖ and then distributed equally
to all citizens. James K. Boyce and Matthew Riddle (2007) have defended this sort of
strategy, which they call ―Cap and Dividend‖ 35 They claim that the capping of emissions
and the selling allocations will raise fuel and energy prices. Thus, they contend (correctly,
I think) that as spending on fuel and energy represents a smaller fraction of wealthy
citizens‘ income, such policies would regressively impact poorer citizens.
However, a point of contention with the Rawlsian framework is this. Boyce and
Riddle (along with others who defend sky trust policies) contend that the fairest way to
then rectify such policies would be to ensure that every citizen receives an equal dividend
from the sale of the carbon allocations. In the case of a pure sky trust policy (which
would be independent of the government), everyone would receive the same size piece of
the sky trust. As the dividends paid to all citizens would offset the higher energy and fuel
35
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costs, Boyce and Riddle argue that the cap and dividend strategy would act as a
progressive form of cap and trade. This is correct—and it seems like the contracting
parties in the Rawlsian heuristic would generally prefer this sort of policy to any sort of
regressive measure.
However, I do not think that the Rawlsian model (ideally) supports the strict
egalitarian distribution of the revenues generated from the sale of carbon allocations.
Note, first, that it is unlikely that such proposals would be countenanced even by
utilitarianism. For example, sending every man, woman, and child in the U.S. a monthly
(or yearly) check would probably not constitute the most efficient use of revenues from
selling carbon allocations. And it is not clear that it would maximize utility (either net or
average) within society, either. Many American consumers would simply purchase goods
and services (like clothes make in China) in a manner that benefits entities outside the
U.S.—transnational corporations, other countries, etc.
Putting efficiency and utilitarian considerations aside, one can see that the cap and
dividend distribution would not pass muster with the present Rawlsian model, as well. In
a constitutional liberal democracy well ordered by the present extension to Rawls‘s
theory, dividends would be distributed in a way that will guarantee the social minimum,
secure the fair worth of the equal basic liberties, and meet the demands of the difference
principle (instead of simply dispensing the same amount of money to all citizens). The
same holds for potential ―tax and dividend‖ policies, under which the revenues from
carbon taxes are distributed equally to all citizens. 36 The present model behooves us to
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consider other uses of these revenues—education, public housing, health care, public
infrastructure, job training, etc.
Furthermore, cap and dividend (and other sky trust) policies, along with tax and
dividend schemes, completely neglect the duties presently existing citizens have to future
generations. That is, the previously discussed intergenerational principle of just savings
implies that revenues from the sale of carbon allocations (or carbon taxes) must also be
directed towards maintaining the previously discussed just institutions for future
generations. Thus, such funds might be used to pay citizens to not participate in
deforestation, to offset tax credits for energy efficient homes, to increase funding for
environmental protection agencies, and so forth. The revenues could also be used to pay
participants within society to grow trees (which store carbon dioxide). Moreover, it
would be a complete violation of Rawls‘s second principle of justice for society to raid
the coffers of a sky trust in a manner that (for example) simply benefits powerful interests
within the petroleum industry or the military-industrial complex. It would be even more
odious if the revenues from carbon taxes or the selling of carbon allocations were used to
sponsor unjust wars or to bring about human rights abuses. But that is another matter.
As another illustration, let us consider the issue of mountaintop removal coal mining
somewhere in U.S. Appalachia—e.g., West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, etc. Such
practices—which involve deforesting and removing the top of a mountain (the
―overburden‖), taking away the coal, and then placing the overburden back on top of the
denuded mountain—are clearly an unsustainable. Yet, the fact that mountaintop removal
mining is unsustainable is not enough to demonstrate that it is unjust. From the
perspective of background environmental justice, the first question is: do such methods of
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extraction violate any citizen‘s (present or future) fundamental rights and liberties—
including basic environmental rights? Recent evidence suggests that such methods of
removing coal, which irreversibly disrupt of hydrological cycles and cause the leaching
of selenium, have a severe negative impact both on environmental and human health. 37
Thus, the present model does not permit mountaintop removal coal mining.
However, from the perspective of background environmental justice, that is only one
of a number of concerns. Did the permission given to employ such techniques violate the
constraint of precautionary reasoning? If the only serious scientific investigation
regarding the long-term effects of mountaintop coal mining occurred over thirty years
after permission was first given to conduct such mining operation, it would appear that
precautionary reasoning was not observed. 38 Thus, citizens negatively affected (e.g., as a
result of environmental diseases) by mountaintop removal coal mining would be right to
complain that it was wrong for the government to disregard caution (and in fact act in an
incredibly reckless manner) when dispensing the legal right to engage in such practices.
Moreover, what about the previously discussed demands of fair equality of
opportunity? Consider ordinary citizens (e.g., not employees) who have been made
unhealthy by the processes involved in the mining of the coal. We must ask: did they
have a fair chance of participating and benefiting from the process of coal extraction?
That is, the fact that regular citizens were negatively affected in terms of environmental
health is made even more reprehensible due to the fact that they did not have a fair
opportunity to participate in the activities that caused the environmental hardships. For
example, suppose the toxic chemicals that his or her company caused to be released into
37
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the natural environment poisoned the CEO of a company (that engaged in the
mountaintop removal coal mining that caused the poisoning). According to the present
extension to Rawls‘s model, this would undoubtedly be unjust—i.e., it is violation of
basic justice (or human rights) if anyone is poisoned in such a manner. However, from
the perspective of background environmental justice, the poisoning is less egregious since
at least the CEO had the opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the activities that
poisoned him or her.
From the perspective of pure procedural environmental justice, it is unjust for those
entities who benefit the most from what causes environmental diseases to use their more
advantaged social positions to make it harder (e.g., through political lobbying, corporate
advertising) for those who are made worse off to get important social goods, such as
health care, education, money, etc. Suppose that benefits from the activities that resulted
in ordinary citizens being poisoned (e.g., corporate profits) were used to deny present and
future citizens fair equality of opportunity. From the perspective of background
environmental justice, the injustice of mountaintop removal coal mining would be
compounded if some of the corporate profits were used, for example, to pay for political
lobbying that made it extremely difficult for ordinary workers to unionize. It would be
even more offensive if corporate profits from mountaintop removal coal mining were
used as political gifts, or to support the election of judges that made unmerited rulings—
e.g., legal decisions that permitted the very same pollution that poisoned ordinary
citizens.
But what about the respect a constitutional democracy owes future citizens? The coal
extraction that a liberal democracy permits cannot compromise the fair equality of

154
opportunity of future citizens to compete for environmental and other social goods.
Consider future people who will suffer from environmental diseases caused by present
mountaintop removal coal mining practices. Clearly the worth of their basic liberties will
be unfairly diminished. And, besides the loss of potential tourism (and the associated
local tax revenues), citizens who find themselves at an already disadvantaged social
position will find it harder to compete for a number of environmental goods. Besides
losing the coal, some of the other vanished goods will include clean water, access to
natural mountain vistas, recreational opportunities (e.g., trout fishing), and countless
aesthetic experiences.
Of course, the complexity of such injustices cannot be fully adumbrated due to the fact
that the long term consequences of mountaintop removal coal mining are not really
known. Nonetheless, the present Rawlsian model of background environmental justice
maintains that mountaintop removal coal mining is also unjust if less advantaged citizens
must pay for the cleanup and restoration of an environment that was fouled by activities
that only benefited the most well off participants of society—coal companies, financial
investors, etc. And future citizens who enter society at a disadvantaged position should
not have to pay (e.g., in terms of taxes) for the cleanup of the toxic chemicals—especially
if the mountaintop removal coal mining is what caused them to be at a less advantaged
position in society (e.g., due to an environmental disease). It would be especially odious
if, instead of the polluters (and investors who benefited from the mountaintop removal
coal mining), the grandchildren of citizens who were killed (or made unhealthy) were
forced to pay for cleaning up the environmental mess that killed (or sickened) their
grandparents.
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With these two examples noted, before moving on to the next chapter, ―Rawlsian
Environmental Pragmatism,‖ I would like to make the following observation regarding
intergenerational just savings and anthropogenic climate change. Just savings (of the
Rawlsian stripe) circumvents much of the present debate over global climate change and
our generation‘s use of carbon based energy. By this I mean the following. Much of the
public debate over whether citizens of liberal democracies (along with everyone else in
the world) should decrease their use of fossil fuels and switch to ―clean‖ energy is now
focused on the scientific issue of whether global warming is anthropogenic. However,
from what we have seen in this chapter, even if global warming is not anthropogenic—in
fact, even if global warming is a complete hoax—citizens of liberal democracies should
still comply with the demands of just savings for future generations.
We have seen that this intergenerational demand is significant, and can be the object
of an overlapping consensus of reasonable worldviews. And it implies that our generation
has a duty of justice to set aside significant amounts of coal, petroleum, and other natural
resources—i.e., at least enough to meet the demands of the equal liberty principle, as well
as the principle of fair equality—for an unbounded number of generations. And from this
it logically follows that, irrespective of the science regarding the extent to which global
climate change is caused by human activity, our generation should still significantly
reduce our use of petroleum and coal, and turn to alternative forms of energy. With this
noted, let us now focus on the extent to which the present model of background
environmental justice can be viewed as a form of environmental pragmatism.
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Chapter 8

Rawlsian Environmental Pragmatism
After the U.S. Civil War, the American philosophers John Dewey (1859–1952),
William James (1842–1910), and Charles Pierce (1839–1914), developed a number of
forms of pragmatism. Elements of these theories started to resurge in the 1960s, and have
consequently helped to shape the contemporary pragmatisms of such notable thinkers as
W.V. Quine, Richard Rorty, Jürgen Habermas, and Hilary Putnam. While pragmatism
comes in many varieties, it is generally said that pragmatism focuses on ―what works.‖
And in relation to moral philosophy, pragmatists do not concern themselves with the
traditional quest for objectively true universal moral principles. Recently, under what has
become to be known as ―environmental pragmatism,‖ some have argued that
environmental philosophers should give up on controversial axiological claims, and
instead focus on ―what works‖ as pragmatic solutions to our environmental woes. 1
Moreover, some environmental pragmatists, such as Andrew Light and Eric Katz, have
questioned whether professional philosophers can say anything intelligent about how
we—as a society—can actually deal with the increasing number of environmental
problems that we are facing. 2
I think the present extension of Rawls‘s theory of political liberalism—a framework
for what I have dubbed ―background environmental justice‖—is prepared to meet this
1
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challenge. However, it will not have the overall shape that some environmental
philosophers have thought an environmental pragmatism would have. For example, the
environmental pragmatists Anthony Weston and Eric Katz argue that philosophers should
discontinue using the idea of natural entities possessing positive intrinsic value as a
foundation for a viable environmental ethic. 3 This is mistaken. An ecocentric axiology,
for example, seems entirely fitting for an environmental ethic.
However, one must make a fundamental distinction, like Rawls, between moral and
political theory. No doubt, many environmental philosophers already do this.
Nonetheless, the point I now wish to make is this. Non-anthropocentric environmental
philosophers (biocentrists, ecocentrists, etc.) should continue to embrace nonanthropocentric axiologies when explicating and defending their comprehensive moral
theories. No philosopher should ever be asked to not pursue what she earnestly believes
is true. This holds, no matter whether the issue is the sanctity of human life, or the
intrinsic value of our natural environment. At the same time, however, I contend that
non-anthropocentrist thinkers ought to embrace the present form of Rawlsian political
liberalism as a political philosophy. Ecocentrists, for example, should be environmental
pragmatists within the domain of public society. Accordingly, Andrew Light, and other
environmental pragmatists, should not argue that moral philosophers should give up
defending the intrinsic value of nature. It is merely political philosophers who should
abandon the notion of the positive intrinsic value of nature.
Of course, the notion of using the Rawlsian framework of background environmental
justice as a basis for a type of environmental pragmatism might not be obvious to many
3
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thinkers. However, as I alluded to earlier, Rawls‘s mature theory has not been discussed
much in the literature on environmental pragmatism. I find this regrettable. Recall that
pragmatism can be fitted to many domains. For example, legal pragmatism focuses on
legal theory, and religious pragmatism concentrates on ―what works‖ in terms of
religious belief. Similarly, Rawls‘s mature model of political liberalism is surely
pragmatist to the extent that it is ultimately a theory of ―what works.‖ But what exactly is
the problem that the Rawlsian framework is addressing? After shifting from the domain
of the moral to the political, the salient question for Rawls was the following: ―…how
can religious and secular doctrines of all kinds get on together and cooperate in running a
reasonably just and effective government?‖ 4 His theory of political liberalism, he
thought, was the most reasonable answer. In JF, he also says:
Recall that justice as fairness is framed for a democratic society. Its
principles are meant to answer the question: once we view a democratic
society as a fair system of social cooperation between citizens regarded as
free and equal, what principles are appropriate to it? Alternatively: which
principles are most appropriate for a democratic society that not only
professes but wants to take seriously the idea that citizens are free and
equal, and tries to realize that idea in its main institutions?5
But while the Rawlsian model we have been considering might have a pragmatist nature,
due to what we observed earlier, it obviously could not serve as a comprehensive
pragmatism. Accordingly, as Rawls‘s justice as fairness is only a partially specified
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conception of political justice, the framework I have been defending in this project will
merely constitute a partially specified political conception of environmental pragmatism.
Just as for Rawls the question (when we view ourselves as free and equal citizens of a
liberal democracy) is not who has the right religion, the question within environmental
pragmatism (when delimited to political society) is not who has the correct theory of the
value of nature, holism, and so on. Yet, standard environmental pragmatism, as defined
by Andrew Light, ―…directs us to choose that political strategy which most expediently
results in solutions to environmental problems, and one of the tests of such effectiveness
is whether it fits the political context where it is being applied.‖6 The Rawlsian theory
presently under consideration, however, is more refined that this. No doubt, there is a
certain urgency required for adequately grappling with our present environmental
maladies. Nonetheless, background environmental justice of the sort I have been
defending vehemently eschews expeditiousness as the criteria for policy adoption. As we
have observed, the extended model of Rawlsian political liberalism recognizes that some
sort of environmental authoritarianism, say, could prove to be quite effective at solving
our environmental woes. But such structures must never be adopted—even within
political contexts where they could be successfully applied. In a society of free and equal
citizens, competence and effectiveness must never trump fairness.
But perhaps the fundamental reason the Rawlsian theory we have been examining can
be properly dubbed ―pragmatist‖ is due to its freestanding nature—i.e., its taking no
particular comprehensive theory of the good as the foundation for political justice.
Consider what Rawls says in his Commonweal magazine interview with Bernard Prusak:
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―I make a point in Political Liberalism of really not discussing anything, so far as I can
help it, that will put me at odds with any theologian, or any philosopher.‖7 My hope is
that the same applies to the present model of background environmental justice.
Moreover, as it relates to contemporary environmentalism, the extended Rawlsian model
recognizes that we need not publicly debate the wrongness of the human-centered moral
perspective, or the intrinsic value of nature. This is because, in the public sphere, much
convergence is possible without having to engage in such controversial axiological
issues. 8 Consider what Light says in his ―Compatibilism in Political Ecology‖:
Metaphilosophically inclined environmental pragmatists would argue that
we need to give up on some of the debates in political ecology for no other
reason than the fact that there is much that we do agree on… that has not
yet been effectively put into policy or communicated to the public. From
this metatheoretical perspective, environmental pragmatists are not
wedded to any particular theoretical framework from which to evaluate
specific problems, but can choose the avenue which best protects the longterm health and stability of the environment, regardless of its theoretical
origin. 9
Light is correct. Introducing divisive ecofeminist or deep ecological reasons into the main
institutions of our public society seems not only to violate our duty of civility (as we
observed in chapter three): it might be imprudent.
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Again, the present extension of Rawls‘s political liberalism stipulates that we—as
citizens of a liberal democracy—must limit ourselves to reasons (and forms of reasoning)
that all other reasonable and rational citizens will accept (irrespective of their
comprehensive theory of the good) when we publicly deliberate about how our political
society will deal with the mounting environmental issues we now face. Thus, I argue that
it must be included as a viable option in the new direction in environmental philosophy
now known as ―environmental pragmatism.‖ But, again, this does not necessarily mean
that one should give up on the notion of the intrinsic value of the natural world. In fact,
arguments regarding the intrinsic value of the natural environment can positively help to
establish a greener background culture in our society. Nor does the present model claim
that individual citizens should not participate in the radical environmental movement.
Those involved with Earth First!, for example, can play an important role in protecting
the natural environment and raising ecological consciousness. (Rawls does permit some
forms of nonviolent civil disobedience.) The present Rawlsian model maintains only that
controversial non-anthropocentric reasoning be excluded from the public justification of
our political society.
However, while we are to understand the present model as freestanding, not all
citizens will embrace it. Some will contend that political liberalism will invariably do no
better than the consistently mediocre masses, with their ―shallow‖ ecological outlook.
Maybe the greatest hope for humanity, as well as the rest of the natural environment as
we know it, is to be found in political structures more radical than constitutional liberal
democracies. With its rush to embrace pluralism, liberalism might be too tolerant of
environmentally destructive views. One might sensibly argue, for instance, that the status
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quo, under political liberalism, imbued as it is with its chronic ratiocinative myopia, is
simply incapable of sufficiently taking care of the natural environment in a way that
comports with the flourishing of human and other natural forms of life. Perhaps modern
liberalism is essentially ecologically non-sustainable. Along these lines, some notable
authors, such as Robert Heilbroner, have befittingly lamented that capitalist forms of
democratic liberalism are fundamentally detached from ecological sustainability. 10
To this type of objection, one must admit that numerous countries that have been
labeled in one way or another as ―liberal democracies‖ have rapaciously squandered and
plundered the natural environment within their domain. But does the model under
consideration merely constitute an apologia of the status quo? Again, I think not.
According to Rawls, the content of public reason is not fixed. 11 It can be turned green. It
is possible for a social climate (and people‘s considered convictions) to change.
And so in this vein, we must note that the Rawlsian framework we have been
considering does not maintain, for example, that grassroots activists should stop working
to raise ecological consciousness and change the status quo. Moreover, members of free
constitutional democracies can support environmental groups, such as the World Wildlife
Fund. Citizens can vote and run for office. People can work for electoral reform, write
letters, blog, and organize. Free and equal citizens can peacefully protest. Community
members can educate others and themselves. People can donate money to nonprofit
environmental law firms, such as Earthjustice. Citizens can lobby their elected
representatives. That is how a liberal constitutional democracy should work. So, not only
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is the raising of ecological consciousness possible, it is possible even when the task is
delimited by the constraint of Rawlsian public reason and the principle of legitimacy.
Lastly, Rawls was right to address the issue of our burdens or judgment, as well as the
fact of pluralism. There are many theories of morality and justice, and people
passionately disagree about which comprehensive religious or philosophical view is
correct. And it is from the perspective of moral theory that the question is: which
comprehensive doctrine is correct?12 But while many thinkers believe that it is their own
conception of the good that is correct (and that we accordingly ought to apply it to the
basic setup of our society), Rawls disagrees. Again, a mature Rawls was not seeking the
true principles of justice. Remember that in ―Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical,‖ Rawls says:
…the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and
not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a
conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of
informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free
and equal persons. 13
Accordingly, the partially specified political conception of environmental pragmatism
that we have been considering is not a theory of what is true. Background environmental
justice is a theory of what is most reasonable for a pluralistic democratic society of free
and equal citizens. While it is an anthropocentric theory (and a contingently
anthropocentric theory at that), it is one that all citizens in the real world—including non12
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anthropocentrists—should embrace if they wish to be reasonable citizens of a free
democratic society. To reject such a view is, in essence, to admit that human beings are
incapable of coming together with their common reason and manage themselves in both a
democratic and sustainable manner. To do so would be a sad regress from the
enlightenment, and our cherished values of freedom and equality.
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Conclusion

John Rawls is considered by many to be the most influential political philosopher of
our time. Yet, like other major historical and contemporary political philosophers, he said
very little about environmental issues—at least in his published writings. Thus, the
project developed in the preceding eight chapters is timely. Not only are technical
scientific answers necessary for solving environmental problems. Political solutions are
also now required as citizens of pluralistic liberal democracies work through a wide
variety of environmental issues. But these political resolutions can range the entire gamut
from being completely just, to utterly unfair.
Again, Rawls himself did not say much about environmental ethics or environmental
justice. But he did not apply justice as fairness to many other important issues with which
free and equal citizens must contend—e.g., he never addressed the issue of pornography.
He could not have done so, as there are always an endless number of significant issues in
normative social philosophy to which his theory can be applied. Thus, the venture that
John Rawls started with his own justice of fairness will never be completed. Nonetheless,
Norman Daniels has shown us how the Rawlsian project can be applied to health care. 1
Beitz and Pogge have extended it into the realm of global justice. Similarly, within this
work I have presented an extension of Rawls‘s own political liberalism that can gauge
background environmental justice as we (citizens of liberal democracies) work through
our most pressing environmental concerns.
That being said, neither Rawls‘s own theory nor my extension to it is a panacea for the
mounting environmental challenges that liberal democracies currently face. For one
1
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thing, the present extension to Rawls‘s political liberalism is not meant to be a complete
theory of environmental justice. We have seen that it is not a supranational model of
environmental justice, and is therefore inert with respect to many important issues
surrounding supranational environmental justice—e.g., global climate justice. However,
it is not designed to do so. In this work, background environmental justice has been
merely developed for a domestic constitutional democracy comprised of free and equal
citizens. Moreover, following Rawls, the present model is not put forth as the correct
theory of environmental justice. Rather, the present Rawlsian contractualist framework
provides the most reasonable solution to how free and equal citizens of pluralistic
democracies—deeply divided on religious and moral values (including environmental
values)—should grapple with the myriad environmental issues they now face. Thus, even
though it is not a complete framework for environmental justice, I believe it is a
significant device for thinking about how pluralistic free societies can be shaped.
Moreover, even when delimited to a single liberal democracy, Rawls‘s theory of
political liberalism is not meant to settle every political dispute. First, the Rawlsian model
is procedural. Thus, it cannot fully answer all questions regarding any issue, let alone
environmental justice. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is an allocative theory. The
utilitarian doctrine says (roughly) that we should enact those environmental policies that
will bring about the most utility. Like all social goods, all environmental goods must be
allocated to the greatest benefit of society. Thus, a utilitarian conception of environmental
justice will maintain that every rock, tree, river, hill, ecosystem, etc., should be
organized—in terms of conservation, preservation, or restoration—in whatever manner
will maximize the social good. But not being an allocative theory, the present framework
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of background environmental justice is not equipped to precisely specify those aesthetic
beauties or natural wonders that are to be restored and/or preserved for future
generations. Nevertheless, this is not a detractor per se. To a certain extent, once the
requirements of background environmental justice are met, this is to be done by free and
equal citizens working through the democratic institutions of a society (ideally) ordered
by the present model of background environmental justice.
In this vein, consider that Rawls, himself, thought that his theory could not (and
should not) settle all the legislative questions a liberal democracy might face. In JF, he
says, ―There are many questions legislatures must consider that can only be settled by
voting that is property influenced by nonpolitical values.‖2 Once background
environmental justice is secured, what the present model asks is that, in the public arena,
debaters argue via political values that comply with public reason, and are thus such that
all reasonable citizens can embrace. And clearly there are many environmental values
that can pass such constraints without difficulty. In fact, Rawls provided several
examples of what he had in mind. In his PL, he says:
There are numerous political values here to invoke: to further the good of
ourselves and future generations by preserving the natural order and its
life sustaining properties; to foster species of animals and plants for the
sake of biological and medical knowledge with its potential applications to
human health; to protect the beauties of nature for purposes of public
recreation and the pleasures of a deeper understanding of the world. The
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appeal to values of this kind gives what many have found a reasonable
answer to the status of animals and the rest of nature.3
And these, I think, are the sorts of values and ideas that have been used in my extension
to his political liberalism.
As I have argued, since it is built on ideas from our public political culture that do not
engender much controversy, I believe that it should be capable of being an object of an
overlapping consensus of reasonable conceptions of the good. Accordingly, like Rawls, I
believe that the implementation of the present framework in free democratic societies will
not result in a mere modus vivendi. Thus, the Rawlsian system developed in the preceding
chapters can both pass the test of stability and provide us with reasonable solutions to
some of our most important environmental policy challenges. Again, this is significant
because, while it is not to be circumvented, the fact of reasonable pluralism is now a
daunting complication that citizens of liberal democracies must inevitably contend with
as they attempt to grapple with global climate change, population control, environmental
health, industrialized food production, sustainability, and so forth. As was mentioned
earlier in this project, due to different experiences, conflicting evidence, the complexity
of data, variations in weighing considerations, and the vagueness of the concepts
involved, Rawls thought that it is unlikely that the political judgments of reasonable
citizens within a free constitutional democracy will ever converge. 4
But in terms of Rawls‘s burdens of judgment, this is precisely the situation we find
ourselves in today as we grapple with multifaceted environmental concerns. There are
bitter debates over the science and economics of global warming. The models of natural
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biodiversity are intricate, and the data incomplete. Scientists disagree about the efficacy
of nuclear, hydrogen, wind, and solar energy. Not all citizens appreciate wilderness. We
have no experience running a sustainable planet with so many people on it. It should not
be surprising, then, that citizens with many different religions, philosophies, and moral
values will not agree about the multitude of environmental matters (which are now
political issues) that constitutional democracies now face. Accordingly, it was a keen
insight for Rawls to shift to a freestanding political conception of justice.
Moreover, just as the major issues that humanity must deal with are always in flux, so
too are the real world social contingencies of the basic structures of society, as well as the
types of participants involved in social cooperation. Corporations, treaties, and nationstates exist only contingently. Levels of technology and populations rates are never fixed.
There are, and always will be, an infinite number of ways the Rawlsian model can be
modified to handle the environmental issues we have been discussing. As a result, the
delicate task of reformulating Rawls‘s basic project and relating it to background
environmental justice will always be ongoing. Following Rawls, ―There is not a priori
guarantee that we have matters right.‖5
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